💬 Discussion
Two Greek figures examine a sports arena, betting tokens and a digital event-contract terminal.

Close the Event-Contract Gap

Federally licensed exchanges sell contracts that pay one dollar if a named team wins. Filed as derivatives, they escape state gambling law, and in suits brought by thirteen states the federal courts have so far mostly sided with the exchanges [1]. State attorneys general, tribal gaming associations and licensed operators want the gap closed, and several bills in Congress would do it.

  • 4 in 5 dollars traded on the largest exchange are bets on sport [1]
  • 11 states have no legal sports betting, yet the contracts are sold there [11]
  • 18 is the age limit on the exchanges, where most licensing states set 21 [12]

The proposal

Federal law treats a contract on a sporting event as a wager under the law of the customer's state, and leaves contracts on elections and economic data where they are.

The debate

Supporters say the contracts are sports bets under another name that evade state licences, taxes and protections, and reach states that never legalized betting. The exchanges and the federal regulator answer that event contracts are swaps under federal law, with real uses in hedging risk and informing the public about future events. The regulator calls the exchanges supervised markets, not the Wild West, and has gone to court against the states. Bills to restore state control or ban the contracts have been introduced in both chambers and by both parties, and none has passed.

  • “Sports event contracts create a backdoor mechanism to offer sports betting in states that have not authorized it.”

    argues for: Dina Titus, Democrat, Nevada Press release, 10 February 2026

  • “Event contracts serve legitimate economic functions. They allow businesses and individuals to hedge event-driven risks, enable investors to manage portfolio exposure, and provide the public with information about the outcome of future events.”

    argues against: Michael Selig, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Statement of the chairman, 17 February 2026

The analysis

Close the Event-Contract Gap

44% of the weight is for, 56% against.

An argument's weight combines three questions: how big the effect is, how certain it is and how much the good at stake matters. The larger the slice, the more the argument weighs.

For

Against

Whether closing the event-contract gap is a good proposal, the analysis leaves open; on average it comes out slightly behind.

Unclear

Unclear: Under the assumptions used, the proposal brings more than it costs in 35 of 100 model runs.

 Overall effect: small

How strongly the proposal works overall, in five steps from very small to very large, comparable across all debates. The ring is always full, even when the overall effect is small; this step says how large it is.

The analysis does not settle the dispute, and the arguments the two sides press hardest are not the ones that weigh most. Health gains from licence protections and the age limit stand against the forecasts that could vanish with the sports volume and the higher price at a sportsbook. The forecasts are the largest item and echo the regulator's point about public information. Their size, though, is a price the analysis sets, and nobody has shown that the platforms need sport to survive. The money arguments turn on one unpublished figure, what retail customers lose on an exchange per dollar; if it exceeds what a sportsbook keeps, they change sides.

In detail

All arguments

Arguments for5 arguments

The protections that come with a licence

3points

A state gambling licence carries a package: an exclusion register a person can put themselves on, deposit caps, mandatory funding for treatment, and rules on how the product may be sold. A federal derivatives licence carries none of it. In the eleven states without legal sports betting, the measure closes sports contracts altogether.

Value 9 · HealthImpact 0.8Plausibility 4
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is mental health: gambling disorder and the depression, anxiety and suicide risk that travel with it. This site places that in the class it uses for life and health, one step below the top of it because the condition is one most people recover from. What is priced here is the person's own state, not the money they lose, which is counted separately, and not the harm to their household, which nothing available measures well enough to price. That the people concerned chose to open the account does not lower the weight — a disorder is a disorder however it began. The value sits one step below the maximum: the stream is health, and health that can be regained.

Impact

One exchange alone traded 1.7 billion dollars of notional volume in June 2026, roughly four fifths of it on sport [1]. Across the sector something like 28 billion dollars a year in sports contracts is a reasonable estimate. At an average annual turnover of about 9,300 dollars per active account that is roughly 3 million accounts. One person can hold several, directly on an exchange and through a broker that routes to it; 1.3 accounts per person is set, in a range from 1.0 to 2.0, which gives about 2.31 million people. Of those, about 339,000 aged 18 to 20 lose access altogether and are counted in their own argument, and about 67,000 adults who would not have started under gambling advertising rules are counted in theirs; about 1.9 million people remain. In the national gambling survey, 17 percent of sports bettors and 24 percent of fantasy sports players report problematic gambling behaviour many times a year; 19 percent is used here, and there is no reason the figure differs on an exchange [3]. That gives about 361,000 people. What the measure does for them depends on the state. In the jurisdictions that license sports betting, home to 68 percent of the population, the contracts come under a licence: an exclusion register, deposit caps and treatment funded from the tax are set to reach 12 percent of them, in a range from 4 to 25 percent. In the eleven states without legal sports betting, home to the other 32 percent, the contracts close for everyone [11]; 25 percent of the affected are set to stop rather than move offshore, in a range from 10 to 50 percent. Together that reaches about 58,000 people. The survey counts behaviour, not a diagnosis, and most of the group would not meet a clinical threshold [3]. The 0.2 quality-adjusted years a year this site uses for a gambling disorder is therefore applied only to the clinical share, about 28 percent, from the 2.5 million adults with a severe problem against 5 to 8 million with a milder one [10]; the rest is set at a tenth of that. That averages 0.07 quality-adjusted years per person, in a range from 0.04 to 0.12: about 4,100 quality-adjusted years a year. The Impact is close to the age-limit gain, because the group it reaches is narrow and most of it is not clinically ill.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Sports event contract volume across the sector Setting, about 28 billion dollars a year at 1.16 dollars to the euro, range 12 to 60 billion dollars [1] 24.1 billion euro-equivalent
÷ Active accounts Setting, range 4,000 to 20,000 euro-equivalent (about 4,600 to 23,000 dollars) 8,000 euro-equivalent of turnover each a year (about 9,300 dollars) 3 million accounts
÷ People Setting, range 1.0 to 2.0: one person can hold an account on an exchange and another through a broker that routes to it 1.3 accounts per person 2.31 million people
− People counted in their own arguments the age limit and the advertising rules reach these groups first; counting them here as well would count them twice 339,000 aged 18 to 20 + 67,000 adults who would not have started under advertising rules 0.41 million people
= People who remain 1.9 million people
× Showing problematic gambling behaviour repeatedly between the 17 percent of sports bettors and the 24 percent of fantasy sports players who report problematic behaviour many times a year; behaviour, not a diagnosis [3] 19 % 361,400 people
× Reached by the measure Settings: where sports betting is licensed, the licence package reaches 12 percent (range 4 to 25); in the eleven states without it, 25 percent stop rather than move offshore (range 10 to 50) [4][11] 68 % × 12 % + 32 % × 25 % = 16.2 % 58,400 people
× Quality-adjusted years lost per person a year Setting, range 0.04 to 0.12: 0.2 for the clinical share, from 2.5 million adults with a severe problem against 5 to 8 million with a milder one; a tenth of that for the rest [10] 28 % × 0.2 + 72 % × 0.02 = 0.07 4,090 quality-adjusted years
× Value of the years the value of a healthy life year used across this site 40,000 euro-equivalent each 163.5 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 0.82
Score 0.82 Impact × 9 Value × 4 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 3 of 100

Plausibility

Every link here is visible and none of the numbers has been measured. The counterfactual is the same customers on a federally regulated exchange with no state protections. That exclusion registers and deposit caps reach problem gamblers is supported by the limit-setting evidence from Europe, though from before-and-after comparisons rather than controlled ones, and none of it was done on an exchange [4]. That the rate of problem gambling among exchange customers matches that among sportsbook customers is an assumption, and the loss data now available cut against the benign reading of it: a venue where two thirds of contracts are priced below 10 cents or above 90 is a longshot market, and longshot betting is the pattern most associated with chasing [6]. In the states without legal sports betting the link is a closure rather than a protection, and how many of the affected stop rather than move offshore has not been measured either. How heavy the loss is for people with problematic behaviour but no disorder is a setting; the survey does not measure it [3]. The confounder that matters is selection — the people who seek out an exchange are not a random sample of bettors — and nothing addresses it. The counter-mechanism, that a determined customer moves to an offshore market with no protections at all, is booked as its own argument against this measure. The Plausibility is below the middle: the protections plainly do something, and how much of it reaches this particular population has never been looked at.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 5.5 Evidence of effect: Associational · at most 5.5 Placement: Chain closed, unevidenced · plausibility 4–5

Open: State exclusion registers record who has self-banned. Matching those lists against exchange account data — which the exchanges hold — would show directly how many excluded gamblers are trading sports contracts, and could carry P to 6.

Under-21s lose access

2.1points

Most states that license sports betting set the age at 21; New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Montana, Wyoming and the District of Columbia set it at 18. A federally regulated exchange sets it at 18 everywhere, including the eleven states with no legal sports betting at all. The age at which someone starts gambling is among the strongest predictors of whether they develop a problem with it.

Value 9 · HealthImpact 0.7Plausibility 3.5
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is the mental health of people in late adolescence, when the impulse control that keeps most adults out of trouble with gambling is not yet fully in place. It sits in the class this site uses for life and health, one step below the top of it because what is lost can be regained. What is priced is the condition itself rather than the money lost, which for this group is small in absolute terms and large relative to what they have. Nothing here treats an eighteen-year-old as incapable of choosing; what is counted is only that starting earlier makes a problem more likely, which is a finding rather than a judgment. The value sits one step below the maximum: the stream is health, and health that can be regained.

Impact

About 2.31 million people trade sports contracts, as derived in the argument on licensing protections. No source gives their ages, and people aged 18 to 20 are about 5 percent of American adults; because a sportsbook is closed to most of them, three times that share is set, 15 percent, in a range from 5 to 30 percent: about 346,000 people. Earlier versions started from the whole cohort of 13 million and assumed 8 percent of it, which would make them 44 percent of all users. Under the measure each state's own rule applies. In New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Montana, Wyoming and the District of Columbia the age is 18 [12], and in Kentucky it depends on the operator; together they hold about 2 percent of the population, counting Kentucky at half, and nothing changes for young people there. Everywhere else the 18-to-20-year-olds lose access: where the limit is 21 because of the age rule, in the eleven states without legal sports betting because the contracts close for everyone [11]. That leaves about 339,000 young people losing access three years early. Not all of them are harmed and most are not: an average loss of 0.01 quality-adjusted years a year across the whole group is used, in a range from 0.003 to 0.03, which amounts to assuming that something like one in twenty carries a real cost and the rest carry none. That gives about 3,400 quality-adjusted years a year. Combined in quadrature, the individual ranges span a factor of about 44; the range is held at a factor of 25, and the depth of the doubt is carried by the low plausibility. The Impact is close to the licensing protections and reaches a different group, which is why the two are counted separately.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
People trading sports contracts derived in the argument on licensing protections [1] 3 million accounts at 1.3 accounts per person 2.31 million people
× Aged 18 to 20 Setting, range 5 to 30 percent: three times their 5 percent share of adults, because a sportsbook is closed to most of them 15 % 346,000 people
× Living where the measure changes their access all states except New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Montana, Wyoming and the District of Columbia, where the age is 18, and half of Kentucky, where it depends on the operator; in the eleven states without legal sports betting the contracts close for everyone [11][12] 97.9 % 338,900 people
× Quality-adjusted years lost, averaged across all of them Setting, range 0.003 to 0.03: equivalent to assuming about one in twenty carries a real cost and the rest none [3] 0.01 a year 3,389 quality-adjusted years
× Value of the years the value of a healthy life year used across this site 40,000 euro-equivalent each 135.6 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 0.68
Score 0.68 Impact × 9 Value × 3.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 2.1 of 100

Plausibility

That the age of first gambling predicts later problems is well documented and the mechanism is not disputed. What is unmeasured is everything specific to this case. The counterfactual is the same cohort with the exchanges closed to them, and no source counts how many under-21s hold exchange accounts, because the exchanges do not publish it and no regulator collects it. The chain has three links — the age limit differs, young people use the lower one, using it earlier raises later risk — and the middle one has no number attached. The counter-mechanism is real and unanswered: an eighteen-year-old shut out of the exchange has an offshore site and a friend's account available, so the exclusion may be nominal. The confounder in the underlying literature is the familiar one, that people who start gambling young differ in ways that also predict problems later, and the studies establishing the link are observational. Reverse causation does not arise for the policy itself. The Plausibility is low because the number of young people this actually concerns has never been counted.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 5.5 Evidence of effect: Associational · at most 5.5 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: Exchanges hold the age distribution of their accounts and file reports with the federal regulator. Publishing it by state, against the state age limit, would settle the take-up link outright.

States collect on it

2points

A sportsbook hands its state between a tenth and half of what it keeps. An exchange selling the identical wager hands it nothing, because a derivative is not a gambling product. Moving the volume into the licensed channel moves the tax with it.

Value 5 · Public financesImpact 0.7Plausibility 5.5
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is state and local revenue, priced at the middle of the scale like any other public money. What is counted here is only the receiving end of a payment. Its paying end is the customers who move to a sportsbook, booked as its own argument against the measure at the same amount. The tax comes out of the margin those customers pay, so without that second argument the tax would read as money appearing from nowhere. Several states earmark this money for problem gambling treatment, which is not counted separately because an earmark is a budgeting choice rather than a second good. The value is the middle of the scale, the level this site uses for public money whatever it is spent on.

Impact

About 28 billion dollars a year of sports contracts would come under state gambling law, counted at the dollar each contract pays out, which is what its two sides put in between them [1]. Half of that is retail customers' money. In the eleven states without legal sports betting, home to 32 percent of the population, none of it can reach a licensed sportsbook [11]; in the rest 80 percent is assumed to, in a range from 60 to 95 percent. That is 54 percent of the retail money, about 7.6 billion dollars of handle. American sportsbooks keep 10.2 percent of what is staked, and states take about 22 percent of that in tax, which is what the 2025 figures of 16.96 and 3.71 billion dollars imply [2]. Applied here that is about 170 million dollars a year, in a range from 70 to 380 million. The dollar carries the standard weight of one for public money. The exchanges' own fee revenue, which is federally rather than state taxed, is not counted. The Impact is the smallest gain here and it is the one figure in the debate that follows almost entirely from published tax rates.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Sports event contract volume [1] notional, one dollar per contract; about 28 billion dollars a year at 1.16 dollars to the euro 24.1 billion euro-equivalent
× Put in by retail customers Setting, range 35 to 65 percent: every contract has two sides, and the professional side posting prices does not move to a sportsbook 50 % 12.05 billion euro-equivalent
× Share reaching a licensed sportsbook Setting, range 60 to 95 percent of retail money in the jurisdictions that license sports betting, home to 68 percent of the population; in the eleven states without legal sports betting none can [11] 68 % × 80 % = 54.4 % 6.56 billion euro-equivalent
× Kept by the sportsbook 16.96 billion dollars of 166.94 staked in 2025 [2] 10.2 % 669 million euro-equivalent
× Taken in state tax 3.71 billion dollars of 16.96 in 2025 [2] 22 % 147.1 million euro-equivalent
× Weight of a dollar in a state budget the standard weight for public money on this site 1.0 147.1 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 0.74
Score 0.74 Impact × 5 Value × 5.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 2 of 100

Plausibility

The tax arithmetic is not in question: rates are published, sportsbook revenue is reported monthly, and the ratio between them is measured rather than modelled [2]. The counterfactual is the current position, in which the same wagers generate no state revenue at all. What is estimated is how much volume actually arrives in the licensed channel, and that is the same number carrying the argument on what the same bet costs at a sportsbook, so the two move together. The confounder that matters is that customers used to a low stated fee may bet less once they face a sportsbook's margin; how much less has not been measured, and the switching share of 80 percent where sportsbooks exist is set with that in mind. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the upper end of what a projection can carry: the tax rate is published and only the volume it applies to is estimated.

Evidence: Projection · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Definitional

What the venues take, on balance

1.1points

Money the customers lose does not vanish. A sportsbook keeps a tenth of every stake where the exchange kept a fee and paid the rest out between customers, so the measure moves receipts from one set of companies to another. On balance slightly more is taken than before, and it is taken by operators rather than by the professionals posting prices.

Value 3 · Income without a returnImpact 1Plausibility 3.5
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is money companies take in, and money counts in full wherever it lands — an operator's dollar is not worth less because of who owns the company. What places it below ordinary money is what stands opposite it: a grocer's revenue pays for groceries, while a stake buys a wager that on average returns less than it cost. Income taken with so little given back is real income, and it is counted two steps below the middle of the scale. The tax share of the same money keeps the middle, because what it buys is chosen by a legislature. Nothing is counted here for the fairness of who gets to take it. The value is well below the middle, because the money is real and what is given for it is not.

Impact

Three receipts move. Sportsbook operators take 10.2 percent of about 7.6 billion dollars of handle and hand 22 percent of it to the states, keeping about 610 million dollars [2]. The exchange side — the platform's fee and what the professionals posting prices earned from retail customers — no longer receives the 6 percent it was taking on that same handle, about 460 million dollars [6]. Offshore operators pick up the wider margin on the volume that leaves American jurisdiction, roughly 84 million dollars, the half of the offshore loss that is a receipt rather than a refusal to pay. Each of these receipts is the other end of a loss booked against the measure, at the same amount. On balance the receiving side takes about 230 million dollars a year more than before, counted at full weight. It is the smallest of the money streams and the least certain in its sign, because it is a difference between two large figures, one of which has never been measured in dollars. The Impact is small, and it exists so that the customers' extra loss is not counted as though the money disappeared.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Take of sportsbook operators after tax the state's 22 percent is booked in the argument on tax [2] [2] 10.2 % × 78 % × 6.56 billion 521.5 million euro-equivalent
− Takings the exchange side no longer receives the platform fee and what the professionals posting prices earned from retail customers; rests on the same unmeasured figure as the customers' argument [6] 6 % × 6.56 billion 393.3 million euro-equivalent
= Net gain of the domestic venues 128.2 million euro-equivalent
+ Wider margin picked up offshore the half of the offshore loss that is a receipt rather than a refusal to pay 4 % × 1.81 billion 72.3 million euro-equivalent
= Net change in what betting venues take in 200.5 million euro-equivalent
× Weight of a dollar received money counts in full wherever it lands; what is given back for it is carried by the value, not by the weight 1.0 200.5 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 1
Score 1 Impact × 3 Value × 3.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.1 of 100

Plausibility

This carries the plausibility of the argument it mirrors, and for the same reason: it is built from the identical quantities. The sportsbook hold and the tax rate are regulatory returns [2]. What is not measured is the dollar loss of retail customers on the exchange, and it enters here with the opposite sign to the way it enters the customers' argument — if the exchange was taking more than the 6 percent assumed, the exchange side loses more and this figure shrinks or turns negative. The counterfactual is the current position, with the volume on the exchanges. The confounder that matters is the same one: how much less customers bet once they face a sportsbook's margin, which nobody has measured. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is low, identical to the argument whose quantities it shares, because the same unmeasured figure drives both.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: Dollar-weighted returns for the maker and taker sides from the exchanges' own transaction data would fix both this figure and the customers' argument at once.

The advertising comes under rules

0.57points

Because this is not legally gambling, none of the rules on gambling advertising apply to it. The football league has banned prediction market commercials outright, alongside tobacco and firearms, so the marketing moved to paid creators: 140 sponsored videos from one platform in ninety days, 101 from the other, plus social posts that are barely labelled as advertising and promo codes offering bonuses.

Value 9 · HealthImpact 0.2Plausibility 3.5
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is the same one the argument above counts — gambling disorder and what travels with it — reaching a different group of people. It carries the same weight, one step below the top of the scale. What separates the two is who they concern: that argument is about protecting people already trading, this one is about people who would never have started. Nothing here is priced for the deception of an undisclosed advertisement as such, which is a wrong of a different kind and is dealt with by advertising law rather than by gambling law. The value sits one step below the maximum: the stream is health, and health that can be regained.

Impact

Roughly 3 million accounts, about 2.31 million people, trade sports contracts, and the sector is growing fast enough that acquisition is where the money goes. A quarter of them, about 577,000 people, are assumed to have been acquired in a year through paid creator content or a bonus offer, in a range from a tenth to a half — one platform sponsored at least 140 YouTube videos in ninety days and the other at least 101, alongside social posts that are undisclosed or barely labelled and promotional codes offering credit to new customers [7][9]. Of those, a fifth would not have started under the advertising rules a state gambling licence carries, in a range from a twentieth to a half: about 115,000 people. About 15 percent of them are under 21 and are counted in the argument on the age limit. Advertising rules matter only where sports betting is licensed, home to 68 percent of the population; in the other states the contracts close for everyone, which is counted in the argument on licensing protections. That leaves about 67,000 adults. Applying 19 percent — between the 17 percent of sports bettors and the 24 percent of fantasy sports players the national survey finds with problematic behaviour — gives about 12,700 people [3], each carrying an average loss of 0.07 quality-adjusted years a year, the figure derived in the argument on licensing protections. That the football league placed these products in the same prohibited advertising category as tobacco and firearms is not evidence of harm, but it is evidence that the people closest to the market do not regard the current arrangement as normal [8]. Combined in quadrature, the individual ranges span a factor of about 48; the range is held at a factor of 25, and the depth of the doubt is carried by the low plausibility. The Impact is the smallest of the health gains and it reaches the one group the other protections cannot: people who are not customers yet.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
People trading sports contracts [1] 3 million accounts at 1.3 accounts per person 2.31 million people
× Acquired through paid creator content or a bonus offer Setting, range 10 to 50 percent [7][9] 25 % 577,000 people
× Who would not have started under gambling advertising rules Setting, range 5 to 50 percent 20 % 115,400 people
× Adults the 15 percent under 21 are counted in the argument on the age limit 85 % 98,100 people
× Living where sports betting is licensed elsewhere the contracts close for everyone, counted in the argument on licensing protections [11] 68 % 66,700 people
× Showing problematic gambling behaviour [3] 19 % 12,670 people
× Quality-adjusted years lost per person a year Setting, range 0.04 to 0.12: derived in the argument on licensing protections [10] 0.07 887 quality-adjusted years
× Value of the years the value of a healthy life year used across this site 40,000 euro-equivalent each 35.5 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 0.18
Score 0.18 Impact × 9 Value × 3.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.6 of 100

Plausibility

The marketing is documented and everything downstream of it is assumed. The counterfactual is the same platforms under state advertising rules, which no American jurisdiction has yet applied to them. That the advertising exists at this scale is a matter of record: sponsorship counts are published by tracking services, the undisclosed nature of much of it has been reported, and promotional codes are visible on the platforms themselves [7][9]. What has no measurement is the link that carries the whole quantity — how many customers advertising actually creates rather than merely reallocates between platforms. The wider evidence on gambling advertising restrictions is discouraging rather than encouraging: Italy banned gambling advertising outright in 2019, and what followed has never been measured against a country that kept advertising — its football authority and its Senate call the ban ineffective without data — so the one national test offers no reduction to point to, which is why this figure sits low. The confounder is that a fast-growing product attracts users through word of mouth and press coverage that no rule reaches. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is low because the number of customers advertising creates has never been measured and the nearest attempt to restrict it elsewhere produced no reading in either direction.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: Sponsorship spending and new-account numbers are both known to the platforms and to their creator partners. Account growth against sponsorship volume, across the states that have already blocked these exchanges, would test the link within a year.

Arguments against5 arguments

The forecasts go with the volume

4.3points

Prediction markets produce a continuously updated probability for anything they list, and those numbers are used by journalists, researchers and companies. Sport is four fifths of the volume that pays for the platform. Take it away and the markets on elections, interest rates and public health may not survive on their own.

Value 7 · Public debateImpact 1.8Plausibility 3.5
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is the quality of public information: a number that says how likely something is, produced by people with money at stake rather than by anyone with an argument to make. This site places that in the class it uses for participation and the conditions of public debate, above money and below health. The value is not in any single forecast but in having an independent series at all, which is why removing the volume that funds the platform matters more than removing any one market. Nothing here is counted for the entertainment of following the odds, which belongs with the enjoyment of betting and is not priced in this evaluation. The value sits in the upper middle of the scale, at the level this site uses for the conditions of public debate.

Impact

Sport is about four fifths of the volume on the largest exchange, and it is the volume that pays for the technology, the compliance and the market-making that keep the other contracts liquid [1]. Removing it does not automatically end the election and economic markets, but it removes the business that supports them. What those forecasts are worth has no market price, so this evaluation sets one: a Normalised Impact of 1.75 on the scale of this evaluation, in a range from 0.25 to 5. The lower end treats them as a curiosity that better-funded polling and forecasting already supply; the upper end treats them as a genuinely superior instrument whose accuracy in the 2024 and 2026 election cycles is now documented. This is the least grounded number in the debate and it is stated as a price rather than derived. The Impact is small, and it is the one stream here that would be entirely avoidable by writing the measure to exempt the platforms rather than the contracts.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Share of exchange volume that is sport [1] four fifths on the largest platform 80 percent
= Value set on the forecasting series the volume supports Setting, range 50 million to 1 billion: the low end treats them as a curiosity that polling already supplies, the high end as a superior instrument whose accuracy is documented 350 million euro-equivalent a year 350 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 1.75
Score 1.75 Impact × 7 Value × 3.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 4.3 of 100

Plausibility

Two things would have to hold and neither has been shown. The counterfactual is the exchanges continuing with their non-sports contracts alone, and nobody has established that they could not: the platforms existed before sports contracts were listed, on much smaller volumes, and several operate profitably outside the United States without them. That is a serious counter-argument to the whole chain and it is unresolved. Beyond it sits the question of what the forecasts are worth, which has a literature — prediction markets have repeatedly matched or beaten polling averages — but no method for pricing. The confounder in that literature is that the markets read the polls, so their accuracy is partly borrowed rather than independent, and the transaction data now available show the same prices carrying a systematic favourite–longshot bias, which is a caution about treating them as clean probabilities [6]. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is low: the claim rests on a price nobody has estimated and on a business-model assumption that the platforms' own history argues against.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: Several states already block these exchanges. Comparing the liquidity of election and economic contracts before and after those blocks took effect would test the business-model link directly.

Bettors pay the tax

2.6points

A sportsbook hands its state about a fifth of what it keeps, and that money comes from the customers' stakes. An exchange pays no state gambling tax, so customers who move to a sportsbook start paying it. What the state gains on one side, the customers pay on the other.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 1.0Plausibility 5.5
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is money, priced at the middle of the scale. What is counted here is the share of the customers' extra loss that reaches state treasuries as gambling tax. It counts at 1.3, a little above face value, because the losses concentrate among people under financial pressure. The receiving end is the argument on what states collect, at the same amount, where each dollar counts at the standard weight of one. Booking both ends shows that the tax is a payment from bettors to the state and only the difference in weight remains. The value is the middle of the scale, and the position of the people paying is carried by the Impact.

Impact

About 28 billion dollars a year of sports contracts trades on the exchanges, counted at the dollar each contract pays out [1]. Half of that is assumed to come from retail customers, in a range from 35 to 65 percent. In the eleven states without legal sports betting none of it can reach a licensed sportsbook [11]; in the rest 80 percent is assumed to, in a range from 60 to 95 percent. That is about 7.6 billion dollars of handle. A sportsbook keeps 10.2 percent of it, and states take about 22 percent of that in tax, which is what the 2025 figures of 16.96 and 3.71 billion dollars imply [2]. The customers therefore pay about 170 million dollars a year of tax they do not pay on an exchange. It is counted at 1.3 because of who carries it, about 100 dollars a year for each account that moves. The Impact is the same sum as the tax gain, seen from the end that pays it, and only the difference in weight separates the two.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Sports event contract volume Setting, about 28 billion dollars a year at 1.16 dollars to the euro, range 12 to 60 billion dollars [1] notional, one dollar per contract 24.1 billion euro-equivalent
× Put in by retail customers Setting, range 35 to 65 percent: every contract has two sides, and the professional side posting prices does not move to a sportsbook 50 % 12.05 billion euro-equivalent
× Share reaching a licensed sportsbook Setting, range 60 to 95 percent of retail money in the jurisdictions that license sports betting, home to 68 percent of the population; in the eleven states without legal sports betting none can [11] 68 % × 80 % = 54.4 % 6.56 billion euro-equivalent
× Kept by the sportsbook 16.96 billion dollars of 166.94 staked in 2025 [2] 10.2 % 669 million euro-equivalent
× Paid on to the state as tax 3.71 billion dollars of 16.96 in 2025 [2] 22 % 147.1 million euro-equivalent
× What the money is worth to the customers paying it retail customers, among whom the losses concentrate 1.3 191.2 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 0.96
Score 0.96 Impact × 5 Value × 5.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 2.6 of 100

Plausibility

The tax arithmetic is not in question: rates are published, sportsbook revenue is reported monthly, and the ratio between them is measured [2]. The comparison is with the current position, in which the same customers pay no state gambling tax on the exchange. What is estimated is how much volume actually arrives in the licensed channel, and that is the same number carrying the argument on what states collect. What could distort the result is that customers used to a low stated fee may bet less once they face a sportsbook's margin; how much less has not been measured. Whether it could run the other way does not arise. Unlike the rest of the customers' extra loss, this share does not depend on what customers lose on an exchange, because the tax is a fixed slice of the sportsbook's margin. The Plausibility is the same as for the tax gain, because it is the same amount.

Evidence: Projection · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Definitional

Some of it goes where nobody is looking

1.6points

Prediction markets on sport existed offshore for years before a licensed American exchange listed them, and American customers reached them without difficulty. Closing the regulated version does not close the market. What it closes is the version that files reports.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 0.9Plausibility 3.5
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is money lost where there is no recourse, priced at the middle of the scale like other money. An offshore or crypto-settled market has no age check worth the name, no segregated customer funds, no reporting obligation and no authority a customer can complain to. What is priced here is both the transfer that does not stop and the extra harm of it happening beyond reach. The problem gambling that follows a customer offshore is counted in the argument on licensing protections rather than a second time here, since it is the same person and the same disorder. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is money and the absence of protection around it is priced in the Impact.

Impact

Of the 14 billion dollars retail customers put into sports contracts a year, 15 percent is assumed to move to markets outside any American regulator, in a range from 5 to 35 percent — about 2.1 billion dollars. For that share the licensing protections counted above do not arrive and the state tax does not either; the customers simply carry on somewhere with fewer safeguards than they had before the measure. The loss is set at 8 percent of the migrating money, in a range from 3 to 20 percent: an offshore book keeps about as much as a licensed one, some 4 points more than the 6 percent assumed lost on the exchange, and the absence of any recourse — withheld winnings, frozen balances — adds about as much again. That is about 170 million dollars a year, counted at 1.3 like the customers' other money: a Normalised Impact of 0.94 on the scale of this evaluation. Of the two halves, the wider margin is an operator's receipt and is counted as such on the other side; what is taken by refusing to honour a bet is not, because money kept that way is not a receipt anyone is entitled to. Crypto-settled markets make this easier than it was for offshore sportsbooks, because there is no payment processor to block. The Impact is small beside the health gains, and it eats directly into the protections that are part of the case for the measure.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Sports event contract volume [1] notional, one dollar per contract; about 28 billion dollars a year at 1.16 dollars to the euro 24.1 billion euro-equivalent
× Put in by retail customers Setting, range 35 to 65 percent: the professional side does not follow its customers offshore 50 % 12.05 billion euro-equivalent
× Share moving beyond any American regulator Setting, range 5 to 35 percent: crypto-settled markets have no payment processor to block, but some platforms geofence effectively 15 % 1.81 billion euro-equivalent
× Additional loss per dollar that goes there Setting, range 3 to 20 percent: an offshore book keeps about as much as a licensed one, some 4 points above the 6 percent assumed lost on the exchange, plus about as much again for the absence of any recourse 8 % 145 million euro-equivalent
× What the money is worth to the customers losing it retail customers, among whom the losses concentrate 1.3 188 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 0.94
Score 0.94 Impact × 5 Value × 3.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.6 of 100

Plausibility

The pattern is established and the size is not. Offshore prediction markets on sport operated for years with American customers before a licensed exchange listed the same contracts, which is the precedent this argument rests on, though it is a description rather than a measurement — nobody counted the American volume on those platforms. The counterfactual is the current position with a licensed alternative available. The chain is short and visible: the regulated version closes, the customer wants to continue, an unregulated one is reachable. The counter-mechanism is genuine and only partly answered: several of those offshore platforms geofenced American users under regulatory pressure and some now do so effectively, which would hold the migrating share below the figure used. That is why the range runs down to 5 percent. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is low because the migrating share has never been measured and the effectiveness of geofencing against it is unresolved.

Evidence: Precedent · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: Thirteen states are already enforcing against these exchanges. Comparing crypto-settled market activity from those states against the rest, before and after enforcement, would measure the migration directly.

The same bet costs more

1.5points

An exchange matches one customer against another and takes a fee of one or two percent; a sportsbook takes the other side itself and keeps about a tenth of everything staked. Part of that tenth goes to the state as tax, which is its own argument. What remains ends up with the sportsbook operators, and on the figures used here it is more than customers lost on the exchange.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 0.8Plausibility 3.5
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is money, priced at the middle of the scale. What is counted here is what the customers who move lose beyond what the exchange was taking from them, less the state's tax inside it. It counts above face value, at 1.3, because the losses concentrate among people under financial pressure. Where the money goes is counted separately: it is an operator's receipt, booked in the argument on what the venues take. The tax share the same customers pay is its own argument, because it does not depend on the unmeasured exchange figure. What the bettor loses along with the money, the ability to sell out of a position before an event ends, is not priced here. The value is the middle of the scale, and the position of the people paying is carried by the Impact.

Impact

About 28 billion dollars a year of sports contracts trades on the exchanges, counted at the dollar each contract pays out, which is what the two sides of a contract put in between them [1]. Half of that is assumed to come from retail customers, in a range from 35 to 65 percent; in the eleven states without legal sports betting none can reach a licensed sportsbook, and in the rest 80 percent is assumed to [11]. That is about 7.6 billion dollars of handle. A sportsbook keeps 10.2 percent of what is staked [2]. On the exchange, before fees, money only changes hands between customers, so retail customers lose the fee plus what the professionals earn from them; the published average return of minus 20 percent is an average across contracts, dominated by cheap longshots, and not a share of the money [6]. Six percent is used, in a range from 2 to 15 percent, so the same customers lose 4.2 points more on every dollar staked, about 320 million dollars a year. About 170 million dollars of it is state tax and is counted in its own argument; the remaining 150 million dollars a year ends up with the sportsbook operators. It is counted at 1.3 because of who carries it. The range runs down to a gap close to zero; the case in which the exchange is the dearer venue cannot be drawn on this scale and is named in the note on the scale. The Impact is the part of the higher price that depends on the unmeasured exchange figure, and its sign rests on it: above about 10 percent, the exchange would be the dearer venue.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Sports event contract volume Setting, about 28 billion dollars a year at 1.16 dollars to the euro, range 12 to 60 billion dollars [1] notional, one dollar per contract 24.1 billion euro-equivalent
× Put in by retail customers Setting, range 35 to 65 percent: every contract has two sides, and the professional side posting prices does not move to a sportsbook 50 % 12.05 billion euro-equivalent
× Share reaching a licensed sportsbook Setting, range 60 to 95 percent of retail money in the jurisdictions that license sports betting, home to 68 percent of the population; in the eleven states without legal sports betting none can [11] 68 % × 80 % = 54.4 % 6.56 billion euro-equivalent
× Additional loss per dollar staked Setting on the exchange figure, range 2 to 15 percent: before fees the exchange is zero-sum across all money invested, so retail customers lose the taker fee plus what the professionals earn from them; the published minus 20 percent is an average across contracts, not across dollars [6]. The sportsbook figure is 16.96 billion dollars kept from 166.94 billion staked [2] [2][6] 10.2 % kept by a sportsbook against 6 % lost on the exchange 275.3 million euro-equivalent
− Of which paid on to the state as tax booked as its own argument, because it does not depend on the exchange figure [2] [2] 22 % of the 10.2 % a sportsbook keeps 147.1 million euro-equivalent
= Extra loss that ends up with the venues 128.2 million euro-equivalent
× What the money is worth to the customers losing it retail customers, among whom the losses concentrate; about 170 euro-equivalent each a year (about 200 dollars) in all, well below the share of a household budget at which a larger figure would apply 1.3 166.7 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 0.83
Score 0.83 Impact × 5 Value × 3.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.5 of 100

Plausibility

The sportsbook figure is a regulatory return: 16.96 billion dollars kept from 166.94 billion staked in 2025 [2]. The exchange figure is not measured. The only transaction-level study reports returns per contract, and states itself that before fees the average return across all money invested is zero; its minus 20 percent says how often cheap contracts lose, not how much money retail customers lose [6]. What customers lose in dollars is the taker fee — 1.75 cents on a 50-cent contract — plus whatever the professionals posting prices earn from them, and that split has not been published. The counterfactual is the same customers at a sportsbook; no design links the two populations. The confounder that matters is betting appetite: longshot buyers who move may choose parlays, where a sportsbook keeps 25 to 30 percent, which would enlarge this argument; against it, an exchange lets a customer sell out of a position, so part of what they pay there buys something a sportsbook does not supply. Whether it could run the other way does not arise. The tax share inside the higher price does not depend on the exchange figure and is booked separately at a higher plausibility. The Plausibility is low: one of the two prices is measured, the other is not, and the sign of the argument hangs on it.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: Dollar-weighted returns for the maker and taker sides from the exchanges' own transaction data — the study already holds them per contract — would give the exchange figure directly and settle the sign.

An exchange will not throw you out for winning

1.1points

A sportsbook that keeps losing to a customer restricts or closes their account, which is legal everywhere and routine. An exchange has no position to protect, so it does not care who wins. It also holds customer money in segregated accounts under federal rules and does not lend against a bet.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 0.6Plausibility 4
▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

Value

The stream is money and the security of money: what a skilled bettor is prevented from earning when a sportsbook closes their account, and what any customer stands to lose if an operator fails holding their balance. It is priced at the middle of the scale like other money. Nothing here is counted for the fairness of being restricted for winning, which is a grievance rather than a stream, nor for the convenience of trading out of a position, which is a feature rather than a harm. The great majority of customers are never restricted and never affected by either, which is why the figure is small. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is money and its security.

Impact

Two small things sit under this argument. The first is the skilled minority: perhaps 50,000 people trade sports contracts with a genuine edge and would be limited or closed by a sportsbook within months, losing something like 2,300 dollars a year each — about 120 million dollars, in a range from 23 to 350 million. The second is the safety of customer balances: the exchanges hold them in segregated accounts under federal rules, while sportsbook balances are in several states an ordinary claim against the company. Against perhaps 2.3 billion dollars of balances, an operator failure at one percent a year with half the money recovered gives about 12 million dollars of expected loss. Together roughly 130 million dollars a year. The transaction data cut against the first half rather than for it: on the exchange, the side posting prices earned minus 9.64 percent, so even the skilled were losing, just less [6]. The Impact is the smallest in this debate and it is the one argument for exchanges that survives their own loss data.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Customers trading with a genuine edge who a sportsbook would restrict Setting, range 20,000 to 150,000: the measured maker return of minus 9.64 percent suggests the winning group is small [6] 50,000 people
× Lost to each a year Setting, range 400 to 6,000 euro-equivalent (about 460 to 7,000 dollars at 1.16 dollars to the euro) 2,000 euro-equivalent (about 2,300 dollars) 100 million euro-equivalent
+ Expected loss from an operator failure holding unsegregated balances exchange balances are segregated under federal rules; sportsbook balances are an ordinary claim in several states 2 billion euro-equivalent (about 2.3 billion dollars) × 1 % × half recovered 110 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 200 million euro-equivalent a point 0.55
Score 0.55 Impact × 5 Value × 4 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.1 of 100

Plausibility

The premises are documented and the sizes are constructed. That sportsbooks restrict winning customers is universal practice, openly acknowledged and legal in every American jurisdiction; that federally regulated exchanges segregate customer funds follows from the rules they operate under. The counterfactual is the current position with both venues available. What has no source is the number of customers with a genuine edge, and the transaction data suggest it is smaller than the argument assumes: the makers' average return per contract was minus 9.64 percent, so even the side posting prices lost on the typical contract [6]. That cuts against the load-bearing quantity, though less than it seems: it is an average across contracts rather than dollars, taken across a population that certainly contains both winners and losers, and the argument concerns the winners. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is below the middle: both premises are certain and the number of people who actually benefit is contradicted by the same data that carry the rest of this evaluation.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain closed, unevidenced · plausibility 4–5

Open: The exchanges hold the distribution of customer returns, not just the average. Publishing the share of accounts with positive lifetime returns would settle the size of this argument outright.

How robust the result is

Under the assumptions used, the proposal brings more than it costs in 35 of 100 model runs.

gains more than it costscosts more than it gains

Each dot stands for 200 of the 20,000 model runs.

What decides the money arguments is a figure nobody has published: how much retail customers lose on an exchange for every dollar they put in. The one transaction study reports an average return of about minus 20 percent per contract but notes that across all money invested the exchange is zero-sum before fees; the number describes longshots, not dollars [6]. This evaluation uses 6 percent, in a range from 2 to 15, against the 10.2 percent a sportsbook keeps [2]. Above about 10 percent the exchange would be the dearer venue; that case lies outside the range drawn here. The second setting is what the money is worth where it lands. An operator's receipt counts in full but one step below ordinary money, because a wager buys so little in return; the tax customers pay and the tax states collect are two ends of one payment, as are the customers' extra loss and the operators' extra take. The forecasts that could go with the sports volume carry the sign on their own: without them the proposal would come out slightly ahead, and their size is a price this analysis sets at low plausibility, so it should be checked before a decision. On these figures the proposal comes out ahead in about 35 of 100 runs, and on average it lies slightly behind.

Show the distribution of the model runs

20,000 simulated futures

Unclear · 35 %

In 35 of 100 simulated futures the proposal brings more than it costs.

No effect is known exactly; every argument has a range. The calculation draws a possible size for each argument from its range 20,000 times and counts how often the benefits exceed the costs.

Net effect in points per future. Left of zero the drawbacks outweigh the benefits, right of zero the benefits win. Eight in ten futures fall between −11 and +5.7 points.
Scale and assessment

Scale of this evaluation: Normalised Impact, unitless and calibrated to this topic. For comparison, one point here corresponds to about 200 million euro-equivalent a year.

Size class:small

Effect small (−0.48) · 41 % of the effect is positive

Areas show individual argument weights. The positive share of the effect nets out money transfers between the two sides; the probability of a positive net effect is determined separately.

How we score →

Review and sources

AI evaluation · not yet reviewed by a human

This evaluation was produced and sourced by an AI model; a human review is still pending. Figures and conclusions may still change. The review log is at the foot of the page.How review works →

Last reviewed by Claude Opus 5.5 · October 29, 2026 · 11× AI, not yet reviewed by a human
  1. October 29, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5re-scored

    Tax share split off con-1 as con-6 and paired with pro-2 at equal P; con-1, pro-6 and con-3 paired, withheld winnings booked net; spans of pro-3 and pro-5 held at factor 25; category unchanged.

  2. October 29, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5record updated

    Page texts for the new page layout (draft G) with quotes from primary sources; numbers unchanged.

  3. October 21, 2026AI reviewClaude Fable 5.1record updated

    Money amounts in argument texts stated in dollars per style-en.md; scores, chains and balance unchanged

  4. October 20, 2026AI reviewClaude Fable 5.1record updated

    Summary and scale note rewritten to the style of 20 Oct 2026; numbers unchanged

  5. October 16, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5record updated

    Impact ranges added to all nine arguments from the settings in the derivations, combined in quadrature; P(D > 0) 0.387 → 0.452, still unclear.

  6. October 14, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5re-scored

    Prüfbericht 11.10.: Konten → Personen (1,3 je Person), Alter 18 in NH/RI/MT/WY/DC, 11 Staaten ohne legale Sportwetten (Schließung statt Lizenz, 54 statt 65 % in Sportsbooks), NGAGE-Verhalten ≠ Störung (0,07 statt 0,2 QALY), pro-3 aus der Nutzerzahl (15 % unter 21); r 0,63 → 0,46, besser → ausgeglichen.

  7. September 16, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5re-scored

    Anbieterempfang nach Julians Entscheidung vom 16.09. von V 4 auf V 3 gesenkt (pro-6): Pro 3,73 zu Con 2,16, r 0,64 auf 0,63 — Kategorie nach altem Maßstab unverändert besser.

  8. September 16, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5re-scored

    Glücksspiel-Regel 16.09.: Buchungsregel gluecksspiel-gegenleistung/1.0 angewandt: Empfaengerseite Gewicht 1 und V 4 statt 0,5 — con-1 in Zahlerbein (0,4277) und Empfaengerseite pro-6 (V 4, 225 Mio) geteilt, con-3 mit Spielergewicht 1,3, normalisierung erstmals an allen Geldstroemen; r 0,64

  9. September 14, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5re-scored

    Gesamtprüfung 08.09. nachgearbeitet: Kalshi −20 % sind Kontrakt-, nicht Dollarrenditen (Papier: vor Gebühren Nullsumme): pro-4/con-4 entfallen, v1-con-1 kehrt mit 6 % Börsenverlust zurück (P 3,5); Nominalvolumen auf Kleinkundengeld, Gruppen in pro-1/pro-5 getrennt, con-5 110 statt 150 Mio; r 0,69 → 0,64.

  10. September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5re-scored

    Re-scored after checking the channel-cost claim: transaction data on 313,972 Kalshi contracts show retail losing about 20 percent, not the stated fee, so v1's largest contra argument was wrong and is withdrawn; advertising added as a separate stream.

  11. September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5First evaluation

    Created for the English side: the channel-shift cost from an exchange fee to a sportsbook hold is what keeps the balance close.

Evaluations are produced with AI support and reviewed on a schedule for new developments; human passes are marked separately.How we review →

Show all 12 sourcesHide sources
  1. DLA Piper: Legal status at odds: tracking developments in prediction markets and sports betting. dlapiper.com
  2. Sports Handle: US Sports Betting in 2025 Reaches Record Highs. sportshandle.com
  3. National Council on Problem Gambling: National Survey on Gambling Attitudes and Gambling Experiences 3.0. ncpgambling.org
  4. Journal of Gambling Studies, comparative policy review: Limit-setting in online gambling: a comparative policy review of European approaches. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
  5. Congressional Research Service: CFTC Issues Proposed Rule Regarding Prediction Markets. congress.gov
  6. Bürgi, Deng and Whelan, University College Dublin: Makers and Takers: The Economics of the Kalshi Prediction Market. karlwhelan.com
  7. Tubefilter: Prediction markets like Kalshi and Polymarket are everywhere, but not at the Super Bowl. tubefilter.com
  8. Front Office Sports: NFL Won't Allow Prediction-Market Super Bowl Commercials. frontofficesports.com
  9. Slate: Polymarket and Kalshi's secret ads are flooding social media. slate.com
  10. National Council on Problem Gambling: National Survey on Gambling Attitudes and Gambling Experiences and Helpline Annual Report. ncpgambling.org
  11. Track360: US Sports Betting Legal States Tracker 2026: All 50 States + DC. track360.io
  12. New Hampshire Lottery: Sports betting: where to bet. nhlottery.com

More debates in this area

Very likely better · 98 %
Size: medium
Federal Sports Betting Standards

Set a federal floor under state sports betting: a limit on deposits, affordability checks, no bonus bets, and no advertising during play.
Very likely better · 100 %
Size: medium
Ban Dual-Currency Casinos

Prohibit online casino games that use a second, nominally free currency to avoid being classified as gambling.
All debates in Gambling and Betting →