Greek discussion partners examine a sports betting phone, a blank ticket, a gated coin tray and a timer.

Federal Sports Betting Standards

Since the Supreme Court opened the way in 2018, each state has written its own sports betting rules, from strict to almost none. Representative Paul Tonko and Senator Richard Blumenthal, both Democrats, want a federal floor under them and reintroduced their SAFE Bet Act on 11 March 2025 ^[5]. The gaming industry rejects federal rules as an intrusion on the states, and the bill is still before Congress.

16.96 billion dollars is what American sportsbooks kept of the money staked in 2025 ^[1]
27 percent of American adults hold an active online sportsbook account ^[9]
2.5 million American adults meet the clinical definition of gambling disorder ^[4]

The proposal

Sportsbooks get a federal floor: five deposits a day at most, no credit cards, affordability checks for large bettors, no bonus bets and no advertising during games.

The debate

Supporters say the industry markets every play as a moment to bet and exploits people prone to addiction, and they compare the bill to federal rules on tobacco and alcohol. The American Gaming Association answers that licensed operators pay state taxes, keep bettors away from illegal bookies and offshore sites, and already work with state regulators. It calls federal standards an affront to the states that built their own frameworks. Tonko and Blumenthal first introduced the bill on 12 September 2024, and neither chamber has passed it.

“In just a few years, the sports gambling industry has become entrenched in every aspect of sports, with every play, pass, pitch, and punt marketed as a moment to bet.”

argues for: Paul Tonko, Democrat, New York Press release, 12 March 2025
“Today’s regulated sports wagering operators are contributing billions in state taxes across the U.S., protecting consumers from dangerous neighborhood bookies and illegal offshore websites, and working diligently with over 5,000 state and tribal regulators and other stakeholders to ensure a commitment to responsibility and positive play.”

argues against: Chris Cylke, American Gaming Association Statement, 12 September 2024

The analysis

Federal Sports Betting Standards

60% of the weight is for, 40% against.

An argument's weight combines three questions: how big the effect is, how certain it is and how much the good at stake matters. The larger the slice, the more the argument weighs.

For

Against

On the current analysis, federal sports betting standards are a good proposal, although the bill is really two bills with different evidence behind them.

Very likely better

Very likely better: Under the assumptions used, the proposal brings more than it costs in 98 of 100 model runs.

Overall effect: medium

How strongly the proposal works overall, in five steps from very small to very large, comparable across all debates. The ring is always full, even when the overall effect is small; this step says how large it is.

Like Tonko and Blumenthal, the analysis favors the bill, but the part of the bill they talk about most carries the least. Over half of the weight is money changing hands: what heavy bettors keep stands against what operators and state treasuries no longer receive. That money does more good in strained households than as takings for which a sportsbook delivers almost nothing in return. The deposit limits and affordability checks carry the case, together with fewer people with a gambling disorder, while the advertising and bonus-bet rules have nothing measured behind them. The industry's strongest point is the offshore books, which the very bettors the limits target are most likely to seek out, and it is the largest item against the bill.

In detail

All arguments

Arguments for4 arguments

Limits catch the people losing most

10points

Sports betting losses are extraordinarily concentrated: a small share of bettors accounts for about half of what sportsbooks keep. The bill does not cap losses. It allows five deposits a day, bans credit cards, and requires an affordability check before anyone stakes more than 1,000 dollars in a day or 10,000 in a month. How much that slows the heaviest players has not been measured anywhere.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 5.1Plausibility 4

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The stream is money that stays in a household instead of moving to a sportsbook. It is priced at the middle of the scale like any other money. The payment is booked in full on both sides: this argument carries what the bettors keep, at the weight money has for them, and two arguments against carry what the state treasuries and the operating companies no longer receive, each at the full weight of a dollar. What makes the package a gain is not that one side is discounted but that the same dollar is worth more to a financially strained household than to the people it was flowing to, and that what the operators receive buys the bettor nothing. What the bettor loses along with the money — the enjoyment of the bet — is a real thing and is counted as its own argument against this measure; for losses made under a gambling disorder nothing stands opposite, because that money was not a purchase in any meaningful sense. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is money.

American sportsbooks kept 16.96 billion dollars of what was staked in 2025 ^[1]. Losses in this market are concentrated the way they are in every gambling market: about half of what the books keep comes from a small minority of heavy players, about 8.5 billion dollars. The bill reaches that group through three rules: no more than five deposits in 24 hours, no deposits by credit card, and an affordability check before an operator accepts more than 1,000 dollars of wagers in 24 hours or 10,000 dollars in 30 days ^[5]. The check is passed if the deposit is no more than 30 percent of monthly income, or if it would pass a consumer lender's standard for an unsecured loan. There is no fixed cap on deposits or losses: the income test applies to each deposit, so a player who passes can keep depositing up to five times a day. The heavy minority crosses the thresholds by construction; what is unknown is how many of them fail the check and how much less they then lose. A reduction of a quarter in that group's losses is used as a scenario, in a range from a tenth to nearly a half, giving about 2.1 billion dollars a year. That money stays with heavy bettors, who carry a weight of 1.4 here because the losses concentrate among financially constrained households: a Normalised Impact of 5.12 on the scale of this evaluation. What the sportsbooks and the state treasuries no longer receive is not netted away inside this figure; it stands in two arguments against this measure, each at the full value of a dollar. The Impact is the largest in this debate, and it rests on a scenario figure for the one link nobody has measured.

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	Kept by American sportsbooks in a year [1]	16.96 billion dollars at 1.16 to the euro	14.6 billion euro-equivalent
×	Share lost by the small minority of heavy players Setting, range 35 to 65 percent: losses concentrate this way in every gambling market, and it is that group the limits are aimed at	50 %	7.3 billion euro-equivalent
×	Reduction in their losses under the deposit limit and affordability checks Scenario parameter, range 10 to 45 percent: the bill sets a limit of five deposits a day and an income test above 1,000 dollars a day or 10,000 a month, not a fixed loss limit; the European studies concern fixed deposit and loss limits and do not measure this instrument [5][6]	25 %	1.83 billion euro-equivalent
×	What a dollar is worth to the bettors the income weight of the people who lose the money — between the strained band at 1.5 and the middle at 1.0, weighted towards the strained band because both credit studies find the damage concentrated there. The receiving side is not deducted here: the state treasuries and the operating companies carry their loss in full in two arguments against, at a weight of 1.0 each [1]	1.4	2.56 billion euro-equivalent
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro-equivalent a point	5.12

Score 5.12 Impact × 5 Value × 4 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 10 of 100

Limits on gambling have been tried and the results point one way, but not for this instrument. Austria required 5,000 registered players to set deposit caps of at most 800 euro a week, and the reduction fell on the most intensive players rather than being spread across everyone ^[6]. Norway made loss limits mandatory for its horse-betting monopoly in 2021, and consumption fell across every group of gamblers studied. Both are fixed money limits, and both are before-and-after comparisons without a control group. The bill sets a limit on the number of deposits and an income test on each deposit, which a high earner passes and a determined player can meet by spreading deposits ^[5]. How much of the heavy players' spending rules of this kind stop has not been observed anywhere, so the quarter used here is a scenario parameter and not a transfer of the European figures. The counterfactual is the current position in American states, some of which require responsible-gaming tools but none of which imposes these thresholds. The confounder that matters is that players who hit a limit can open an account elsewhere, which is counted as its own argument against this measure. Reverse causation does not arise for a statutory rule. The Plausibility is below the middle: every link from the check to lower losses is named, and the size of the middle one has not been measured for this kind of rule.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain closed, unevidenced · plausibility 4–5

Open: The United Kingdom has piloted financial risk checks for high-spending online gamblers since 2024. Operator data on how many checks fail and what the affected customers spent afterwards would measure the middle link directly and could carry P to 6.

Less gambling disorder

5.4points

About 2.5 million American adults meet the clinical definition of gambling disorder, and the share of helpline callers naming an app as their main problem has risen from 23 to 31 percent in a year. Half of those callers are under 35. Gambling disorder is not a financial condition; it is a psychiatric one, with the depression and suicide risk that implies.

Value 9 · HealthImpact 1.5Plausibility 4

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The stream is mental health: the compulsion itself, the depression and anxiety that travel with it, the sleep that goes, the relationships that end, and at the far edge the suicide risk that is several times the ordinary rate among people in treatment for gambling. This site places that in the class it uses for life and health, one step below the top of it because what is lost can be regained — most people who develop a gambling disorder recover from it. Nor does the weight rise because the condition is self-inflicted or fall because it is: this site prices what happens to a person, not how they came to be there. What is counted is the person's own condition, not the money, which is counted in the arguments above, and not the harm to their family, which nothing here measures well enough to price. The value sits one step below the maximum: the stream is health, and health that can be regained.

About 2.5 million American adults meet the clinical definition of gambling disorder, with a further five to eight million showing some problematic behaviour ^[4]. Among online sports bettors specifically, 19 percent report problematic behaviour repeatedly — more than twice the rate among gamblers generally. A quarter of the clinical group is attributed here to the online betting expansion, in a range from a tenth to a half, which the helpline data support: online and app-based gambling has gone from 23 to 31 percent of what callers name as their main problem in a single year ^[4]. That is 625,000 people. The standards are assumed to prevent or resolve the condition for 15 percent of them, in a range from 5 to 30 percent — deposit limits reach the mechanism of a disorder more directly than an advertising rule does. Across 94,000 people a loss of 0.2 quality-adjusted years each gives 18,800 quality-adjusted years a year. The Impact is small in size and the largest here in weight, which is why it carries a third of the case for this measure on a fraction of the money.

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	American adults meeting the clinical definition of gambling disorder [4]		2.5 million people
×	Share attributable to the online betting expansion Setting, range 10 to 50 percent: online and app-based gambling rose from 23 to 31 percent of helpline callers' main problem in a single year [4]	25 %	625,000 people
×	Share the standards prevent or resolve Setting, range 5 to 30 percent: a deposit cap reaches the mechanism of a disorder more directly than an advertising rule does	15 %	94,000 people
×	Quality-adjusted years lost per person a year Setting, range 0.1 to 0.35: the compulsion itself, with the depression, anxiety and elevated suicide risk that travel with it	0.2	18,800 quality-adjusted years
×	Value of the years the value of a healthy life year used across this site	40,000 euro-equivalent each	752 million euro-equivalent
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro-equivalent a point	1.5

Score 1.5 Impact × 9 Value × 4 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 5.4 of 100

Every step of this chain is visible and none of the sizes has been measured. The counterfactual is the same population under current state rules. That online sports betting raises problem gambling rates is supported by survey data showing the rate among online bettors at more than twice the general figure, but survey data of that kind cannot separate the betting from the people who choose it — someone predisposed to a gambling problem is also more likely to open a betting app, which is the reverse-causation problem this evidence cannot solve ^[4]. The helpline series is better on timing, because online complaints rose sharply in the years the apps arrived, but it counts help-seeking rather than illness. What no source addresses at all is the step from these particular rules to fewer people with the disorder; the reasoning that a limit on deposits interrupts loss-chasing is sound and untested. The counter-mechanism is that someone with a disorder is precisely the person who will open a second account, which is answered only in part by the argument against this measure that follows. The Plausibility is below the middle: the harm is real and the path from these rules to less of it is reasoned rather than observed.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 5.5 Evidence of effect: Associational · at most 5.5 Placement: Chain closed, unevidenced · plausibility 4–5

Open: Helpline contacts are recorded by state and by gambling type. A comparison of states adopting deposit limits against those that do not, over two years, would give the first direct measurement of this link.

Fewer advertisements, fewer free bets

4points

The bill would clear sportsbook advertising out of live broadcasts and daytime television and end the bonus bets that get people started. It is the part of the bill most people notice and the part with the weakest evidence behind it. Italy banned gambling advertising outright in 2019, and what happened afterwards cannot be read either way.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 2.7Plausibility 3

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The stream is the same one the argument above counts — money staying with households instead of moving to sportsbooks — reached by a different instrument. It carries the same weight at the middle of the scale. What differs is who is affected: advertising and promotional offers reach everyone rather than the heaviest losers, so the population here is broader and less financially strained, which lowers the weight slightly. That adjustment sits in the Impact. As above, the payment is booked in full on both sides: what the operators and the treasuries no longer receive stands in two arguments against, at the full value of a dollar. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is money.

Of the 16.96 billion dollars American sportsbooks keep in a year, about 2.1 billion is already counted as stopped by the deposit rules in the argument above; the advertising and promotion rules act on the remaining 14.8 billion ^[1]. An eight percent reduction in that volume is used, in a range from three to twenty percent if the reduction occurs; whether it occurs at all is a question of plausibility. The low centre of that range reflects that the one national test of such a ban, described in the next paragraph, offers no reduction to point to. That gives about 1.2 billion dollars a year. Advertising reaches a wider and less strained group of bettors than deposit limits do, so the weight on their side is 1.3 rather than 1.4: a Normalised Impact of 2.66 on the scale of this evaluation. What the operating companies and the state treasuries no longer receive on this money is not deducted here; it stands in two arguments against of their own, apart from the deposit-limit money, with the same weak evidence as this argument. The Impact is roughly half the deposit-limit gain, and it is the half this evaluation is least confident of.

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	Kept by American sportsbooks in a year, 16.96 billion dollars at 1.16 dollars to the euro [1]		14.6 billion euro-equivalent
−	Already stopped by the deposit rules the advertising rules act on what remains, so the two reductions are not applied to the same money twice	the argument above	1.83 billion euro-equivalent
=	Losses the advertising rules can still reach		12.77 billion euro-equivalent
×	Reduction in volume from ending advertising and bonus bets Setting, range 3 to 20 percent if the reduction occurs; whether it occurs is a question of plausibility. The low centre reflects that the one national test, Italy, gives no measurable reduction to point to — but also no measurement of its absence [8]	8 %	1.02 billion euro-equivalent
×	What a dollar is worth to the bettors advertising reaches a wider and less financially strained group than deposit limits do, so the bettors' side is weighted 1.3 rather than 1.4; the receiving side is not deducted here but carried in full by the two arguments against that mirror this one [1]	1.3	1.33 billion euro-equivalent
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro-equivalent a point	2.66

Score 2.66 Impact × 5 Value × 3 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 4 of 100

This has been tried at national scale, and the result cannot be read. Italy has banned all gambling advertising and sponsorship since 2019. Its football authority and the lawyers advising the industry now argue that the ban failed and pushed players towards unlicensed sites, but they bring no measurement ^[7]; the Italian Senate asked the government in March 2025 to reconsider the ban, citing its limited effect on gambling addiction, again without data ^[8]. No study compares Italy with a country that kept advertising, and the pandemic fell in the middle of the period and moved gambling online everywhere; an increase in an uncontrolled before-and-after is therefore no evidence that the ban failed, any more than a decrease would have been evidence that it worked. What is left is a chain that is plausible link by link and measured at no link: that promotion draws people in is what the industry's own spending says, and that stopping it lowers volume by a measurable amount has never been observed against a comparison. The American bill also bans bonus bets and odds boosts, which Italy did not and which are how most online sportsbooks acquire customers; nothing has tested that separately. Reverse causation does not arise, since the ban was a legislative act. The Plausibility is low because the closest thing to this measure was enacted in a comparable market and produced no reading in either direction.

Evidence: Precedent · plausibility at most 5.5 Evidence of effect: Associational · at most 5.5 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: The bill's advertising and promotion rules would apply nationally at one date, so a comparison of states with existing promotional restrictions against those without, before and after, would settle it within two seasons.

Fewer bankruptcies and overdrafts

1.4points

Personal bankruptcy filings rose by a quarter to a third in states after online sports betting arrived, measured on the credit records of seven million people. Debt sent to collections, consolidation loans and car loan arrears all moved with it. Slowing how fast someone can lose reaches that directly.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 0.6Plausibility 5

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The stream is the cost of financial collapse, which is not the same as the money lost betting. A bankruptcy costs filing fees and legal fees, then a decade of credit that is dearer or unavailable, then the practical consequences of that: a car loan refused, a deposit that cannot be raised, a job application that runs a credit check. It is priced at the middle of the scale like other money. The debt discharged in a bankruptcy is not counted as a loss, because it moves to the creditor rather than disappearing. The gambling losses themselves are counted in the two arguments above and are not repeated here. The value is the middle of the scale, because what is counted is a money cost and not the collapse itself.

Personal bankruptcy filings run at about 490,000 a year in the United States. Credit-record data for seven million consumers, compared across states as online betting arrived at different dates, put the increase at 25 to 30 percent where it is legal ^[2]. About seven in ten Americans live in such a state, which makes roughly 79,000 filings a year attributable to it. The standards in this bill reach that directly — an affordability check before a large deposit is aimed at exactly the person about to file — and a fifth of the increase is assumed removed, in a range from a twelfth to a third: 15,800 filings a year. A bankruptcy costs the person filing about 14,000 dollars once the fees, the years of impaired credit and the practical consequences are counted, in a range from 4,600 to 41,000: about 220 million dollars. Behind every household that files stand many more in difficulty who do not: the transaction study finds overdrafts and card debt rising across the financially constrained betting households, of whom only a small minority ever reach a court ^[3]. Twenty such households for every avoided filing, in a range from ten to forty, at about 350 dollars a year each in overdraft fees, collection charges and the premium on a consolidation loan, in a range from 170 to 580, add about 110 million dollars. The total is about 330 million dollars a year, counted at face value: this is a real cost, and the strain of the households it falls on is carried by the value and not by a second weight on the money. The Impact is small beside the betting losses themselves, because bankruptcy is the visible end of a much larger stream that is counted elsewhere.

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	Personal bankruptcy filings a year		490,000 filings
×	Share attributable to online sports betting [2]	25 to 30 percent higher where legal, in states holding seven tenths of the population	79,000 filings a year
×	Share the standards remove Setting, range 8 to 33 percent: an affordability check before a large deposit is aimed at exactly the person about to file	20 %	15,800 filings a year
×	Cost of a bankruptcy to the person filing Setting, range 4,000 to 35,000 euro-equivalent (about 4,600 to 41,000 dollars): fees, then years of credit that is dearer or unavailable, and the practical consequences of that	12,000 euro-equivalent (about 14,000 dollars)	190 million euro-equivalent
+	Overdrafts, collections and consolidation loans among heavy bettors who do not file Setting: 20 distressed households per avoided filing (range 10 to 40 — the transaction study finds overdrafts and card debt rising across the financially constrained betting households, of whom only a small minority ever file) at 300 euro-equivalent a year each (about 350 dollars; range 150 to 500: overdraft and late fees, collection charges, the premium on a consolidation loan) [3]	15,800 × 20 households in distress for every filing × 300 euro-equivalent a year (about 350 dollars)	285 million euro-equivalent
×	Weight of a dollar a real stream — fees, refused credit and the consequences of it consume resources rather than move money — and real streams carry no income weight on this site; the position of the households concerned sits in the value class, not here	1.0	285 million euro-equivalent
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro-equivalent a point	0.57

Score 0.57 Impact × 5 Value × 5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.4 of 100

The link between online betting and financial collapse is the best-established finding in this debate. Sports betting became legal in different states at different times, which allows early states to be compared against late ones on the same credit records, and across that comparison bankruptcy filings, debt sent to collections, consolidation loans and car loan arrears all rose together ^[2]. A second study using the bank transaction records of 230,000 households found the same pattern from the other direction: net investment fell 14 percent in betting households, concentrated among those already financially constrained ^[3]. The confounder that would matter — that states legalising early differ economically from those legalising late — is what the staggered timing absorbs, and reverse causation does not arise, because a household's credit record does not determine when its legislature acts. What is not established is the step this argument needs: those studies measure legalisation against prohibition, not one set of operating rules against another. That transfer is the whole uncertainty here. The Plausibility is at the middle: the harm is measured under a design that supports it, and whether these particular rules remove a fifth of it has never been tested.

Evidence: Converging studies · plausibility at most 8 Evidence of effect: Quasi-experimental · at most 8

Arguments against7 arguments

Some of it moves to books with no rules at all

5.1points

A bettor stopped by a deposit limit has thirty licensed operators to try and, after that, an offshore site with none. Unregulated books have no limits, no self-exclusion register, no way to get money back and no obligation to pay out. The people most likely to go looking are the ones the limits were written for.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 2.9Plausibility 3.5

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The stream is money again, at the middle of the scale, but it is money lost under worse conditions. An offshore book takes the same stake and offers none of what a licensed one must: no cap on deposits, no exclusion register a person can put themselves on, no regulator to complain to, and no certainty of being paid when a bet wins. What is priced here is both the transfer that the measure fails to prevent and the additional harm of losing it somewhere with no recourse. The gambling disorder that follows a person offshore is counted in the argument on health rather than twice here. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is money and the absence of protection around it is priced in the Impact.

Of the 3.3 billion dollars of betting losses the standards remove, a quarter is assumed to reappear at unregulated books, in a range from a tenth to a half: about 830 million dollars. For that share the gain counted in the two arguments above does not happen — the bettors do not keep the money, they lose it somewhere else. At the weight money carries for them, on average 1.36 across the two instruments, that is a Normalised Impact of 1.94. On top of it, losing money where there is no exclusion register, no deposit limit, no regulator to complain to and no obligation to pay out is worse than losing it at a licensed book: a premium of half that amount is added for the absent protections, in a range from a fifth to the full amount: a Normalised Impact of 0.97. The result is a Normalised Impact of 2.91 on the scale of this evaluation. Not counted separately is that the offshore book pays no state tax, so the money reaches a receiver one step lower in value than the domestic mix — a second-order difference on a fifth of the sum. The people who go looking are not a random quarter: they are disproportionately the heavy losers the limits target, which is what makes this argument bite. The Impact is more than half the deposit-limit gain, which means the substitution question decides how much of this bill actually works.

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	Betting losses the standards remove	1.83 plus 1.02 billion euro-equivalent from the two arguments in favour (about 2.1 plus 1.2 billion dollars at 1.16 dollars to the euro)	2.85 billion euro-equivalent
×	Share reappearing at unregulated books Setting, range 10 to 50 percent: the people who go looking are disproportionately the heavy losers the limits target [7]	25 %	713 million euro-equivalent
×	What a dollar is worth to the bettors the gain the two arguments in favour counted on this money does not happen: the bettors lose it anyway, only elsewhere. 1.4 on the deposit-limit share and 1.3 on the advertising share, 1.36 on average	1.36	970 million euro-equivalent
+	Premium for the absent protections Setting, range 20 to 100 percent: no deposit limit, no exclusion register, no regulator to complain to, no obligation to pay out	50 % of 970 million	485 million euro-equivalent
=	Together		1,454 million euro-equivalent
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro-equivalent a point	2.91

Score 2.91 Impact × 5 Value × 3.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 5.1 of 100

Everything here rests on a number nobody has. The counterfactual is the same bettors under current rules, and no American study measures how many restricted bettors move offshore, because no American state has imposed a binding deposit limit long enough to look. The pattern is reported only qualitatively: Italy's football authority and the lawyers advising the industry argue that Italy's advertising ban left offshore operators visible and pushed players towards them, though neither is a disinterested source and no measurement accompanies the claim ^[7]. The chain is short and each link is visible: a limit binds, the bettor wants to continue, an offshore site is one search away. The counter-mechanism is real and unanswered: offshore sites are harder to fund now than they were, since payment processors and banks block much of the traffic, and how much friction that adds has not been quantified. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is low because the share that moves offshore has never been measured anywhere and the payment friction working against it is unquantified.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: Payment processors can see attempted transfers to known offshore operators. A comparison of those flows in states adopting deposit limits against states that do not would measure the substitution directly and could carry P to 6.

Takings lost to the limits

3.4points

Roughly four fifths of what sportsbooks keep stays with the operating companies. When the deposit rules and affordability checks stop heavy bettors' losses, the operators no longer take about 1.7 billion dollars a year. The amount counts in full; as a good it weighs less than ordinary revenue, because nothing is delivered in return for it.

Value 3 · Takings without returnImpact 2.9Plausibility 4

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The stream is money, but money of a particular kind: takings with nothing delivered in return. A grocer who takes ten dollars hands over groceries; a sportsbook keeps the difference between stakes and payouts, and for the share lost under risky or disordered play the bettor received nothing that offsets it. This receipt therefore sits two steps below the middle of the scale, where ordinary business revenue sits. The quantity is untouched by that: the money is gone from the companies in full and counts at face value, whoever owns the shares. The tax share of the same payment keeps the middle of the scale in the argument beside this one. The value is well below the middle, because nothing is delivered in return for this receipt.

Of the 16.96 billion dollars American sportsbooks kept in 2025, about 78 percent stayed with the operating companies after tax, the rest passing to state treasuries ^[1]. The deposit rules and affordability checks leave about 2.1 billion dollars a year with heavy bettors, the argument in favour that this one mirrors. About 1.7 billion dollars of that no longer reaches the operators, in a range from about 660 million to 3 billion that follows the deposit-limit chain. The amount is booked at full face value with no income weight: a dollar a company does not take is a dollar it does not take. Earlier versions of this evaluation discounted it to half on the ground that shareholders are wealthy; that discount is gone, and what lowers the argument now is the value of the receipt rather than its size. The takings lost on the money the advertising rules stop, about 920 million dollars, stand in their own argument. Jobs and capital that would go with a smaller American betting industry are a real cost of a different kind and are not counted here or anywhere in this evaluation. The Impact is the largest of the money items against the bill, because most of what the books keep stays with them.

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1.83 billion euro-equivalent

Betting losses the deposit rules stop

× 78 % the remainder after the 22 percent that passes to state treasuries as tax

1,430 million euro-equivalent

Share staying with the operating companies

[1]

× 1.0 no discount on the amount: a dollar a company does not take is a dollar it does not take; the lower worth of this receipt sits in the value, not in the quantity

1,430 million euro-equivalent

Weight of a dollar at the receiving end

÷ 500 million euro-equivalent a point scale of this evaluation

2.86

Normalised Impact

Score 2.86 Impact × 3 Value × 4 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 3.4 of 100

That a fall in betting takes these takings with it is certain; their size follows from the deposit-limit chain and carries its uncertainty. The comparison is the current market ^[1]. The takings are a fixed share of what heavy bettors no longer lose, so this argument holds exactly as far as the deposit rules do and carries the same plausibility as that argument in favour. Deposit limits in Austria and Norway reduced the heaviest players' spending, but they were fixed money limits, measured before and after without a control group ^[6]. How much this bill's income test slows anyone has not been measured. What could distort the result is the share that reappears at unregulated books, which is booked as its own argument rather than deducted here. Whether it could run the other way does not arise for a statutory rule. The Plausibility is below the middle, because the size of the deposit-limit effect is a setting.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain closed, unevidenced · plausibility 4–5

Open: The same measurement that would settle the deposit-limit argument settles this one: operator data on how many affordability checks fail and what the affected customers spent afterwards.

Tax lost to the limits

1.6points

A fifth of what sportsbooks keep passes to state treasuries as tax. When the deposit rules and affordability checks stop heavy bettors' losses, about 470 million dollars a year of that tax no longer arrives. Public money counts at its full value.

Value 5 · Public revenueImpact 0.8Plausibility 4

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The stream is money, priced at the middle of the scale like any other money. It is the tax share of the payment the deposit rules stop: what heavy bettors keep, the treasuries do not get. A tax dollar stands for a public service and therefore runs at full face value. The operators' share of the same payment is valued lower in the argument beside this one, because nothing is delivered in return for it. No particular use is claimed for the money on either side. The tax lost on the money the advertising rules stop stands in its own argument, with the weaker evidence of that half of the bill. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is public money.

Of the 16.96 billion dollars American sportsbooks kept in 2025, 3.71 billion passed to state treasuries as tax, about 22 percent ^[1]. The deposit rules and affordability checks leave about 2.1 billion dollars a year with heavy bettors, the argument in favour that this one mirrors. At the same rate, about 470 million dollars a year of tax stops arriving, in a range from about 190 to 850 million that follows the deposit-limit chain. The amount is booked at full face value: a dollar the treasuries do not get is a dollar they do not get, and no particular use is claimed for it on either side. It is not netted away inside the argument in favour. The payment is booked in full on both sides, and the gain of the package comes from the difference in what a dollar is worth at its two ends. The tax lost on the money the advertising rules stop, about 260 million dollars, stands in its own argument, because that half of the bill rests on weaker evidence. The Impact is modest, because only about a fifth of what the books keep reaches a treasury.

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1.83 billion euro-equivalent

Betting losses the deposit rules stop

× 22 % 3.71 of the 16.96 billion dollars the books kept in 2025

403 million euro-equivalent

Share passing to state treasuries as tax

[1]

× 1.0 public money runs at full face value; no particular use is claimed for it on either side

403 million euro-equivalent

Weight of a dollar at the receiving end

÷ 500 million euro-equivalent a point scale of this evaluation

0.81

Normalised Impact

Score 0.81 Impact × 5 Value × 4 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.6 of 100

That a fall in betting takes this tax with it is certain; its size follows from the deposit-limit chain and carries its uncertainty. The comparison is the current market and its tax take ^[1]. The tax is a fixed share of what heavy bettors no longer lose, so this argument holds exactly as far as the deposit rules do and carries the same plausibility as that argument in favour. Deposit limits in Austria and Norway reduced the heaviest players' spending, but they were fixed money limits, measured before and after without a control group ^[6]. How much this bill's income test slows anyone has not been measured. What could distort the result is the share that reappears at unregulated books, which is booked as its own argument rather than deducted here. Whether it could run the other way does not arise for a statutory rule. The Plausibility is below the middle, because the size of the deposit-limit effect is a setting.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6 Placement: Chain closed, unevidenced · plausibility 4–5

Open: The same measurement that would settle the deposit-limit argument settles this one: operator data on how many affordability checks fail and what the affected customers spent afterwards.

Takings lost with the ads

1.4points

When advertising and bonus bets end and betting falls, the operators no longer take their four fifths of that money, about 920 million dollars a year. The amount counts in full; as a good it weighs less than ordinary revenue, because nothing is delivered in return for it.

Value 3 · Takings without returnImpact 1.6Plausibility 3

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Of the 16.96 billion dollars American sportsbooks kept in 2025, about 78 percent stayed with the operating companies after tax ^[1]. The advertising and promotion rules leave about 1.2 billion dollars a year with bettors, the argument in favour that this one mirrors. About 920 million dollars of that no longer reaches the operators, in a range from about 350 million to 2.3 billion that follows the advertising chain. The amount is booked at full face value with no income weight; what lowers the argument is the value of the receipt rather than its size. It stands apart from the takings lost under the deposit rules, because the two halves of the bill rest on evidence of different strength. The Impact is about half the operators' loss under the deposit rules, and it is the half with the weaker evidence.

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1.02 billion euro-equivalent

Betting losses the advertising rules stop

× 78 % the remainder after the 22 percent that passes to state treasuries as tax

797 million euro-equivalent

Share staying with the operating companies

[1]

× 1.0 no discount on the amount: a dollar a company does not take is a dollar it does not take; the lower worth of this receipt sits in the value, not in the quantity

797 million euro-equivalent

Weight of a dollar at the receiving end

÷ 500 million euro-equivalent a point scale of this evaluation

1.59

Normalised Impact

Score 1.59 Impact × 3 Value × 3 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.4 of 100

That a fall in betting takes these takings with it is certain; whether the advertising and promotion rules reduce betting at all is not. The comparison is the current market and ^[1]. The takings are a fixed share of what bettors no longer lose, so this argument holds exactly as far as the advertising effect does and carries the same plausibility as that argument in favour. The one national test, Italy's ban on gambling advertising since 2019, has no comparison country, and the pandemic moved gambling online in the middle of the period ^[7]^[8]. Neither the critics of the ban nor its defenders bring a measurement. What could distort the result is the share that reappears at unregulated books, which is booked as its own argument. Whether it could run the other way does not arise for a legislative act. The Plausibility is low, because the effect this loss depends on has never been measured.

Evidence: Precedent · plausibility at most 5.5 Evidence of effect: Associational · at most 5.5 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: The same comparison that would settle the advertising argument settles this one: states with existing promotional restrictions against those without, before and after the federal rules apply.

People lose something they chose

1points

Most people who bet on sport are not addicted and are not in trouble. They put twenty dollars on a game because it makes the game better. A rule that stops some of that takes something real away from them — priced here at what comparable entertainment costs for the same hours, not at what they staked.

Value 4 · EnjoymentImpact 0.5Plausibility 5

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The stream is enjoyment: the interest a wager adds to a match that would otherwise not matter, and the sociability around it. This site places that in the class it uses for comfort and everyday pleasure, well below health, money in a strained household, or the environment. It is not nothing — this site does not treat a freely chosen pleasure as worthless simply because someone disapproves of it — but it does not weigh much either. It counts only where the choice is genuinely free: for the share of losses that comes from risky or disordered play, the stake buys no enjoyment at all, and the payment itself is the harm. The value is in the lower part of the scale, because what is lost is a chosen pleasure rather than anything anyone depends on.

About 27 percent of American adults hold an active online sportsbook account, roughly 71 million people ^[9]. Taking 45 percent of them as genuinely active in a given month (range 30 to 60) and one hour a week each of placing and following bets (range half an hour to three), that is about 1.66 billion hours of betting a year. The standards remove about a fifth of market volume — 3.3 billion dollars of the 16.96 billion the books keep ^[1] — and betting time is assumed to fall in proportion: roughly 324 million hours. Of those, only the freely chosen share carries any enjoyment. About 69 percent of what is lost in this market comes from people whose play is risky or disordered ^[3]^[4]; for them the stake buys nothing that offsets the loss. The remaining 31 percent leaves about 100 million hours. Those hours are priced at what comparable entertainment costs for the same time, not at what was staked: a streaming subscription at about 14 dollars a month against roughly 30 hours of use is about 45 cents an hour, a cinema ticket at about 17 dollars for two hours about 8.70. At about 2.90 dollars an hour (range 45 cents to 8.70) that is a Normalised Impact of 0.5 on the scale of this evaluation. The Impact is far smaller than the money involved, because an hour of entertainment costs little even when the stake behind it is large.

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	American adults with an active online sportsbook account [9]	27 percent of adults	71 million people
×	Hours of betting a year Setting, range 30 to 60 percent active and half an hour to three hours a week: placing and following bets, not time spent watching sport	45 percent genuinely active × 52 hours	1.66 billion hours
×	Share of betting the standards remove betting time is assumed to fall in proportion to volume [1]	2.85 of 14.6 billion euro-equivalent, about a fifth	324 million hours
×	Share freely chosen Setting, range 20 to 45 percent: about 69 percent of what is lost in this market comes from people whose play is risky or disordered, and for them the stake buys no enjoyment [3][4]	31 %	100.5 million hours
×	Price of comparable entertainment Setting, range 0.40 to 7.50 euro-equivalent (about 45 cents to 8.70 dollars): a streaming subscription at about 14 dollars a month against roughly 30 hours of use, a cinema ticket at about 17 dollars for two hours	2.50 euro-equivalent an hour (about 2.90 dollars)	251 million euro-equivalent
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro-equivalent a point	0.5

Score 0.5 Impact × 4 Value × 5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1 of 100

That people get something out of betting is not in doubt, since they pay for it repeatedly and freely. What has no measurement is how much of it is lost when betting is restricted, and how much time is involved at all. The counterfactual is the same bettors under current rules. Three of the four links are settings: how many account holders are genuinely active, how many hours they spend, and what an hour of comparable entertainment is worth. Only the share attributable to risky and disordered play rests on survey and credit evidence ^[3]^[4]. Against the figure pulls the fact that deposit limits and advertising rules fall on everyone, including the great majority who never approach a problem, and the inconvenience to them is real and uncounted here; for it pulls the possibility that betting time is more concentrated than volume, so that a fifth of volume removes less than a fifth of the hours. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the middle: the stream certainly exists, and its size rests on settings rather than measurement.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6

Tax lost with the ads

0.68points

When advertising and bonus bets end and betting falls, the tax share of the money bettors keep no longer reaches state treasuries. That is about 260 million dollars a year. Public money counts at its full value, and the amount stands or falls with the advertising effect.

Value 5 · Public revenueImpact 0.5Plausibility 3

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The stream is money, priced at the middle of the scale like any other money. It is the tax share of the payment the advertising and promotion rules stop: what bettors keep, the treasuries do not get. A tax dollar stands for a public service and therefore runs at full face value. The operators' share of the same payment is valued lower in the argument beside this one, because nothing is delivered in return for it. No particular use is claimed for the money on either side. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is public money.

Of the 16.96 billion dollars American sportsbooks kept in 2025, 3.71 billion passed to state treasuries as tax, about 22 percent ^[1]. The advertising and promotion rules leave about 1.2 billion dollars a year with bettors, the argument in favour that this one mirrors. At the same rate, about 260 million dollars a year of tax stops arriving, in a range from about 100 to 650 million that follows the advertising chain. The amount is booked at full face value, and no particular use is claimed for it on either side. It is not netted away inside the argument in favour; the payment is booked in full on both sides. It stands apart from the tax lost under the deposit rules, because the two halves of the bill rest on evidence of different strength. The Impact is small, because only about a fifth of a small effect reaches a treasury.

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1.02 billion euro-equivalent

Betting losses the advertising rules stop

× 22 % 3.71 of the 16.96 billion dollars the books kept in 2025

225 million euro-equivalent

Share passing to state treasuries as tax

[1]

× 1.0 public money runs at full face value; no particular use is claimed for it on either side

225 million euro-equivalent

Weight of a dollar at the receiving end

÷ 500 million euro-equivalent a point scale of this evaluation

0.45

Normalised Impact

Score 0.45 Impact × 5 Value × 3 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.7 of 100

That a fall in betting takes this tax with it is certain; whether the advertising and promotion rules reduce betting at all is not. The comparison is the current market and its tax take ^[1]. The tax is a fixed share of what bettors no longer lose, so this argument holds exactly as far as the advertising effect does and carries the same plausibility as that argument in favour. The one national test, Italy's ban on gambling advertising since 2019, has no comparison country, and the pandemic moved gambling online in the middle of the period ^[7]^[8]. Neither the critics of the ban nor its defenders bring a measurement. What could distort the result is the share that reappears at unregulated books, which is booked as its own argument. Whether it could run the other way does not arise for a legislative act. The Plausibility is low, because the effect this tax loss depends on has never been measured.

Evidence: Precedent · plausibility at most 5.5 Evidence of effect: Associational · at most 5.5 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: The same comparison that would settle the advertising argument settles this one: states with existing promotional restrictions against those without, before and after the federal rules apply.

Running the checks costs money

0.57points

Every operator has to count deposits, run an income or credit check on everyone who crosses the thresholds, rebuild its advertising schedules and prove all of it to a state regulator, which in turn needs federal approval every three years. The checks also put income data on file at betting companies for about a million people.

Value 5 · Enforcement costImpact 0.1Plausibility 9.5

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The stream is money spent on checking rather than on anything the checking produces: compliance staff, verification services, system changes and regulatory review. It is priced at the middle of the scale like any other money and is a genuine cost rather than a transfer, since the hours and the systems are consumed. Whether operators absorb it or pass it on to bettors makes no difference to the weight. What the checks do to privacy is not priced here, because nothing measures it; it is named in the Impact. The value is the middle of the scale, the level this site uses for money spent on running a rule.

About 71 million American adults hold an active online sportsbook account, and about 45 percent of them are active in a given month ^[9]. A set 5 percent of those, in a range from 2 to 10 percent, would cross 1,000 dollars of wagers in a day or 10,000 in thirty days at least once a year: about 1.6 million people. A third of them are assumed to be checked already under operators' own source-of-funds reviews for high-value customers, leaving about 1.07 million additional checks a year. An income or credit check with document review costs a set 17 dollars, in a range from 6 to 46: about 19 million dollars a year. Counting deposits, blocking credit cards and rebuilding advertising schedules is a one-off system change, set at about 70 million dollars across the market and spread over the five years: 14 million a year. State regulators must enforce the new standards and the Attorney General must review every state programme every three years ^[5]; that is set at about 35 million dollars a year, in a range from 12 to 93 million. Together about 67 million dollars a year. The time bettors spend supplying documents is not counted, and neither is the risk of holding income data for about a million people at betting companies, for which no measure exists. The Impact is the smallest in this debate: the checks reach only the heaviest players, and most of the machinery already exists.

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	Bettors active in a given month [9]	45 % of 71 million account holders	32 million people
×	Crossing the thresholds at least once a year Setting, range 2 to 10 percent: more than 1,000 dollars of wagers in a day or 10,000 in thirty days [5]	5 %	1.6 million people
×	Not already checked by the operator Setting: operators already review the source of funds of their largest customers	2/3	1.07 million checks a year
×	Cost of an income or credit check Setting, range 5 to 40 euro-equivalent (about 6 to 46 dollars): document review or a credit enquiry	15 euro-equivalent (about 17 dollars)	16 million euro-equivalent
+	System changes for deposit counts, card blocks and advertising schedules Setting	60 million euro-equivalent once (about 70 million dollars), over five years	12 million euro-equivalent
+	State enforcement and federal programme approval Setting, range 10 to 80 million euro-equivalent (about 12 to 93 million dollars) [5]	30 million euro-equivalent a year (about 35 million dollars)	30 million euro-equivalent
=	Together		58 million euro-equivalent
×	Weight of a dollar spent on compliance the standard weight this site uses for money spent on running a rule	1.0	58 million euro-equivalent
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro-equivalent a point	0.12

Score 0.12 Impact × 5 Value × 9.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.6 of 100

A duty to check means checks: the cost arises whenever the duty applies, and nothing in it depends on how anyone responds. The comparison is current practice, in which operators run identity checks for every account and source-of-funds reviews only for their largest customers. The bill sets the thresholds and the content of the check, so the number of checks follows from how many bettors cross the thresholds ^[5]. That number, the share already checked and the unit cost are settings, and their doubt sits in the range of 0.025 to 0.12 rather than in the plausibility. The remaining doubt is enforcement: some operators may check less thoroughly than the text requires before a regulator acts. The Plausibility is very high: the cost follows from the duty itself, and only how fully it is enforced is open.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 9.5 Evidence of effect: Definitional

How robust the result is

Under the assumptions used, the proposal brings more than it costs in 98 of 100 model runs.

gains more than it costscosts more than it gains

Each dot stands for 200 of the 20,000 model runs.

The two halves of the bill have different evidence behind them and are scored separately, down to the money each half moves. Deposit limits have been tried in Europe and worked on the heaviest players; an advertising ban has been tried once at national scale, in Italy, and its outcome cannot be read either way ^[6]^[7]^[8]. This is above all a debate about distribution: about three fifths of the weight is money that stays with bettors instead of reaching state treasuries and operators ^[1]. What bettors keep counts at 1.4 and 1.3 times a dollar, because heavy losses concentrate in strained households; what treasuries lose counts at full value. The operators' takings are valued below the middle of the scale, because nothing is delivered for them. The verdict turns only if a bettor's dollar counted for less than about two thirds of a dollar at the receiving end, or if the operators' takings were valued well above a tax dollar. The enjoyment bettors lose is priced at what comparable entertainment costs for the same hours, a streaming subscription or a cinema ticket, not at what they staked; another hourly price moves that argument far. The case rests on the deposit limits: without that argument, whose plausibility is 4, the balance turns negative, so how much the income test slows heavy players should be checked against operator data before a decision. So scored, the proposal comes out ahead in 98 of 100 runs.

Show the distribution of the model runs

20,000 simulated futures

Very likely better · 98 %

In 98 of 100 simulated futures the proposal brings more than it costs.

No effect is known exactly; every argument has a range. The calculation draws a possible size for each argument from its range 20,000 times and counts how often the benefits exceed the costs.

Net effect in points per future. Left of zero the drawbacks outweigh the benefits, right of zero the benefits win. Eight in ten futures fall between +3.4 and +12 points.

Scale and assessment

Scale of this evaluation: Normalised Impact, unitless and calibrated to this topic. For comparison, one point here corresponds to about 500 million euro-equivalent a year.

Size class:medium

Effect medium (+3.6) · 68 % of the effect is positive

Areas show individual argument weights. The positive share of the effect nets out money transfers between the two sides; the probability of a positive net effect is determined separately.

How we score →

Review and sources

AI evaluation · not yet reviewed by a human

This evaluation was produced and sourced by an AI model; a human review is still pending. Figures and conclusions may still change. The review log is at the foot of the page.How review works →

Last reviewed by Claude Opus 5.5 · October 29, 2026 · 11× AI, not yet reviewed by a human

October 29, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5re-scored
Tax and operator legs split by instrument and paired with pro-1/pro-2 via gegenbein (new con-7, con-8), con-3 booked net with netto_grund; category likely better to very likely better (0.899 to 0.984).
October 29, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5record updated
Page texts for the new page layout (draft G) with quotes from primary sources; numbers unchanged.
October 21, 2026AI reviewClaude Fable 5.1record updated
Money amounts in argument texts stated in dollars per style-en.md; scores, chains and balance unchanged
October 20, 2026AI reviewClaude Fable 5.1record updated
Summary and scale note rewritten to the style of 20 Oct 2026; numbers unchanged
October 16, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5record updated
Advertising argument range now starts above zero (3 to 20 percent if the reduction occurs; whether it occurs stays in P 3); P(D > 0) 0.900 → 0.899, category unchanged.
October 14, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5re-scored
Prüfbericht 11.10.: pro-1 an H.R.2087 § 103(b)(6)(F) angepasst (5 Einzahlungen/24 h + Einkommensprüfung, keine Verlustgrenze), 25 % als Szenarioparameter, P 5 → 4 (mechanistisch); pro-2 auf die Restbasis nach pro-1, Gegenbuchungen nachgezogen; neues con-6 Vollzugs- und Prüfkosten; r 0,62 → 0,61.
September 16, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5re-scored
Anbieterempfang nach Julians Entscheidung vom 16.09. von V 4 auf V 3 gesenkt (con-5): Pro 12,09 zu Con 7,36, r 0,59 auf 0,62 — nach altem Maßstab Wechsel von ausgeglichen zu besser.
September 16, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5re-scored
Glücksspiel-Regel 16.09.: Regel gluecksspiel-gegenleistung/1.0 angewandt: Transfer nicht mehr in den Pro-Karten genettet, sondern brutto — pro-1 i 1,45→2,56, pro-2 0,81→1,52, dazu con-4 (Steuer, V 5) und con-5 (Anbieter, V 4) mit Gewicht 1; con-1 Unterhaltung nach Zeit statt 75 % des Einsa
September 14, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5re-scored
Gesamtprüfung 08.09. nachgearbeitet: Steueranteil (22 %) im Empfängergewicht 0,61 statt eigener Karte (con-2 entfällt); pro-1 i 1,65→1,45, pro-2 P 2→3 (Italien unlesbar statt Nullbefund), pro-3/con-1 ohne w auf Realströmen, con-3 Gap 0,86; r 0,60 → 0,65.
September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5record updated
i_spanne und normalisierung an allen 7 Argumenten (nur globale Anker), Eintrittsgruppe limits-actually-bind. Substanziell: con-1 und con-2 standen auf definitorisch, traten also auch dann ein, wenn die Einzahlungsgrenzen wirkungslos bleiben — jetzt mechanistisch und in der Gruppe, P und p_ceiling unveraendert. Das hebt P(D>0) von 0,39 auf 0,76; Kategorie bleibt Besser.
September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5First evaluation
Created for the English side: deposit limits and advertising rules scored separately, because the European evidence splits between them.

Evaluations are produced with AI support and reviewed on a schedule for new developments; human passes are marked separately.How we review →

Show all 9 sourcesHide sources

Sports Handle: US Sports Betting in 2025 Reaches Record Highs. sportshandle.com
Hollenbeck, Larsen and Proserpio, Management Science: The Financial Consequences of Legalized Sports Gambling. pubsonline.informs.org
Baker and others, National Bureau of Economic Research: Gambling Away Stability: Sports Betting's Impact on Vulnerable Households. nber.org
National Council on Problem Gambling: National Survey on Gambling Attitudes and Gambling Experiences and Helpline Annual Report. ncpgambling.org
Congress.gov: H.R. 2087, SAFE Bet Act of 2025. congress.gov
Journal of Gambling Studies, comparative policy review: Limit-setting in online gambling: a comparative policy review of European approaches. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
DLA Piper: Removal of the Italian gambling advertising ban: why Italy's football authority is now pushing for change. dlapiper.com
Orsingher Ortu: Italy's gambling advertising ban under scrutiny. orsingher.com
Siena College Research Institute: More Than a Quarter of Americans, 27%, Have An Active Online Sports Betting Account; A Third Have Opened an Account At Least Once. sri.siena.edu

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