Ban Dual-Currency Casinos

Prohibit online casino games that use a second, nominally free currency to avoid being classified as gambling.

AI evaluation · not yet reviewed by a human

This evaluation was produced and sourced by an AI model; a human review is still pending. Figures and conclusions may still change. The review log is at the foot of the page.How review works →

A sweepstakes casino sells one currency that cannot be cashed out and gives away a second that can. Because the redeemable stake is technically free, the game is legally a promotion rather than a wager, and none of the machinery around gambling applies: no state licence, no tax, no exclusion register, an age limit of 18 where states set 21, and no obligation to intervene when someone plays for eleven hours. Eleven states have banned the model since 2025 and the operators have moved to the rest. A federal ban would close it everywhere and leave ordinary retail prize promotions untouched. This evaluation looks five years ahead.

Balance

Better for the future · 0.77 previous scale

Balance on the previous scale. The Bilanz 2.0 simulation is not yet available for this evaluation. The category comes from the share of the debate on the pro side (r).

For 22 · 77 % Against 6.9 · 23 %

Size class: medium Scale of this evaluation: Normalised Impact — unitless, calibrated to this topic. For comparison: one point here is worth roughly 500 million euro per year. How we score →

Arguments for

Arguments against

6 arguments evaluated · Scoring v1.3 Δ absolute +15.1

Arguments — For

3 arguments

Money that stops leaving households

12of 100

Unlike the prediction market question, there is no cheaper channel waiting on the other side of this one. Most of the country has no legal online casino at all, so a ban does not move the spending — it mostly ends it. The money stays where it was.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 4.4Plausibility 5.5

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The stream is money staying in a household rather than moving to an operating company, priced at the middle of the scale like any other money. What makes it a gain is the gap between the two ends: the spending concentrates among people who can least afford it, and the companies are privately held foreign operators whose owners sit at the top of any income distribution. Only that gap is counted, not the whole sum. The enjoyment players lose along with the spending is real and is counted as its own argument against this measure rather than netted away here. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is a transfer of money and the distance between its two ends is priced in the Impact.

About 4.6 billion euro a year of player spending sits in states that have not banned the model ^[1]. Where it goes when the model is closed is what decides the size. Only seven states license online casino games, so for most players there is no licensed alternative within reach; a fifth of the spending is assumed to move offshore and is counted against this measure, another fifth moves to sports betting or a licensed casino where one exists, and the remaining three fifths simply stops — 2.76 billion euro a year staying with households, in a range from 1.4 to 3.7 billion. The two ends of that transfer differ sharply: the players carry a weight of 1.3, because the spending concentrates among people under financial pressure, and the operators are privately held companies whose owners carry 0.5. The difference of 0.8 gives 2.21 billion euro a year. The Impact is the largest in this debate and it is large for a structural reason: this is one of the few gambling measures with no cheaper channel on the other side of it.

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	Player spending in states that have not banned the model 7.2 billion dollars of consumer spending [1], converted at 1.15 dollars to the euro (setting, range 1.05 to 1.25) and reduced by the eleven states that have already banned the model — the remaining states hold roughly three quarters of the market [1]	7.2 billion dollars, less the eleven states that have banned them	4.6 billion euro
×	Share that simply stops Setting, range 30 to 80 percent: a fifth moves offshore and a fifth to sports betting or a licensed casino; online casino games are legal in only seven states [2]	60 %	2.76 billion euro
×	Difference in what a euro is worth the spending concentrates among people under financial pressure; the operators are privately held companies whose owners sit at the top of the distribution	1.3 minus 0.5	2.21 billion euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro a point	4.42

Score 4.42 Impact × 5 Value × 5.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 12 of 100

The market size is an industry estimate rather than a regulatory return, which is the main weakness: nobody files anything, so the 7.2 billion dollar figure and its growth from 4.8 billion in 2023 come from analysts reading app-store and payment data ^[1]. The counterfactual is the current position in the states that have not banned the model. What is genuinely estimated is where the spending goes, and the assumption that three fifths of it stops rests on a structural fact rather than a measurement: online casino games are legal in seven states and nowhere else, so the substitute that exists for sports betting does not exist here. The confounder that would matter is offshore substitution, which is booked as its own argument against this measure rather than discounted here. Eleven states have already banned the model, so this could be measured and has not been. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the upper end of what a projection can carry: the structure is clear and the market figure behind it is an estimate rather than a return.

evidence basis: Projection · P ceiling 6 identification: Definitional · no rung ceiling

Counterfactual: the current position in states that have not banned the model. Design: definitional — closing a product ends the spending on it; the estimated elements are the market size, which is an analyst estimate rather than a regulatory return, and where the spending goes. Confounder: offshore substitution, booked as con-2 rather than discounted here. Direction: not applicable. Ceiling: a projection carries 6.0 at most, and that binds. The absence of a licensed online casino in 43 states is the structural fact carrying the three-fifths assumption.

The most addictive format, with no brakes

9.7of 100

Slot-style games produce more gambling disorder per player than any other product, which is why every licensed jurisdiction wraps them in exclusion registers, session limits and loss caps. A sweepstakes casino runs the same games with none of that, at any hour, from 18. Removing the product removes the exposure.

Value 9 · HealthImpact 2.4Plausibility 4.5

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The stream is mental health: the compulsion itself and the depression, sleeplessness and suicide risk that travel with a gambling disorder. This site places it in the class it uses for life and health, one step below the top because it is a condition most people recover from. What is priced is the person's own state, not the money they lose, which is counted separately, and not the harm to the household around them, which nothing here measures well enough to price. That the games are marketed as free entertainment rather than as gambling does not change what happens to the person playing them. The value sits one step below the maximum: the stream is health, and health that can be regained.

Consumer spending on sweepstakes casinos reached about 7.2 billion dollars, up from 4.8 billion in 2023 ^[1]. Eleven states have banned them, which leaves roughly 4.6 billion euro a year addressable by a federal ban. Spread across an estimated 12 million accounts that is a few hundred euro each, but the spending is concentrated: about 3 million are regular players, in a range from 1.5 to 6 million, and it is among those that harm arises. Rates of problematic behaviour among online casino players run at or above the 19 percent measured for online sports bettors, and 20 percent is used here ^[3]: 600,000 people. Removing the product outright resolves or prevents the condition for a quarter of them, in a range from a tenth to nearly a half, since the rest move to another form of gambling — 150,000 people, each carrying a loss of 0.2 quality-adjusted years a year. The Impact is second only to the money in this debate and it carries the heaviest weight, which is why it drives the result.

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	Consumer spending on sweepstakes casinos 7.2 billion dollars of consumer spending [1], converted at 1.15 dollars to the euro (setting, range 1.05 to 1.25) and reduced by the eleven states that have already banned the model — the remaining states hold roughly three quarters of the market [1]	7.2 billion dollars, less the eleven states that have banned them	4.6 billion euro
=	Regular players Setting, range 1.5 to 6 million: spending is heavily concentrated and most accounts are trivial	of an estimated 12 million accounts	3 million people
×	Showing problematic gambling behaviour at or above the 19 percent measured among online sports bettors; slot-style play produces more disorder per hour than other formats [3]	20 %	600,000 people
×	Helped by removing the product Setting, range 10 to 45 percent: the rest move to licensed casinos, offshore sites or sports betting	25 %	150,000 people
×	Quality-adjusted years lost per person a year	0.2	30,000 quality-adjusted years
×	Value of the years the value of a healthy life year used across this site	40,000 euro each	1,200 million euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro a point	2.4

Score 2.4 Impact × 9 Value × 4.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 9.7 of 100

The direction is as well supported as anything in gambling research and the sizes are not. That continuous slot-style play produces more disorder per hour than other formats is a consistent finding across decades of clinical and machine-level data; the counterfactual in that work is other gambling products rather than no gambling, which is exactly the comparison this argument needs. What has no source is the American sweepstakes population itself: the operators publish nothing, no regulator collects it, and the account and spending figures used here are constructed from a market-size estimate. The counter-mechanism is real and only partly answered — a player whose sweepstakes site closes has licensed online casinos in seven states, offshore sites everywhere, and sports betting in most of the country, which is why only a quarter of the affected group is assumed to be helped rather than most of them. Reverse causation runs the usual way for prevalence figures and is unresolved: people prone to a gambling problem seek out these games. The Plausibility is below the middle: the harm of the format is well established and everything specific to this market is estimated.

evidence basis: Mechanism · P ceiling 5.5 identification: Associational · rung ceiling 5.5 band: Chain closed, unevidenced · P 4–5

Counterfactual: other gambling formats, which is the comparison the format literature actually makes. Design: associational — prevalence rates by product from clinical and survey data without exogenous variation [3]; the population figures are constructed from a market-size estimate with no source of their own. Confounder: selection into slot-style play by people already prone to a disorder; unresolved. Direction: reverse causation is live for the prevalence figure. Ceiling: associational 5.5 binds. Finding band: chain closed but unevidenced — the chain is named and the substitution counter-mechanism is answered by assuming only a quarter of the affected group is helped; only the measurement is missing.

Nothing measured argues against the claim; what is absent is any count of who plays these games and how much. The counter-mechanism — that players move to licensed casinos, offshore sites or sports betting — is answered by helping only a quarter of the affected group. Read back: about half the time, a ban reaches roughly the number of people assumed here.

Open: Eleven states have already banned the model at different dates. Comparing helpline contacts naming online casino games in those states against the rest, before and after, would measure this directly and could carry P to 6.

Licensed operators stop competing with an untaxed rival

0.8of 100

A licensed online casino pays state tax, funds treatment, runs an exclusion register and files reports. A sweepstakes site does none of it and sells the same games. In the seven states where both exist, one of them is playing by rules the other has opted out of.

Value 5 · Public financesImpact 0.3Plausibility 5

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The stream is state revenue, priced at the middle of the scale like any other public money. What is counted is only the receiving end of a transfer whose paying end — players handing a licensed operator's margin instead of a sweepstakes operator's — is inside the argument above. Nothing is priced here for fairness between operators as such: a company disadvantaged by a rival's regulatory arbitrage has a complaint, but it is a complaint about its own profits rather than a public good. What makes this a gain is only that the tax funds something and the arbitrage funds nothing. The value is the middle of the scale, the level this site uses for public money whatever it is spent on.

A fifth of the 4.6 billion euro is assumed to move to a licensed operator where one exists, which is 920 million euro. Only seven states license online casino games, so the volume that can land somewhere taxed is small and concentrated. Those states tax online casino revenue at rates ranging from 15 to more than 50 percent of what operators keep; applied to the share of the spending that becomes operator revenue this yields about 150 million euro a year, in a range from 60 to 300 million. The euro carries the standard weight of one for public money. What is not counted is the compliance and treatment funding that comes with a licence, which is a cost to the operator rather than a public gain. The Impact is the smallest in this debate, because the licensed channel that could absorb the volume exists in seven states and not in the other forty-three.

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	Player spending in states that have not banned the model 7.2 billion dollars of consumer spending [1], converted at 1.15 dollars to the euro (setting, range 1.05 to 1.25) and reduced by the eleven states that have already banned the model — the remaining states hold roughly three quarters of the market [1]	7.2 billion dollars, less the eleven states that have banned them	4.6 billion euro
×	Share moving to a licensed operator Setting, range 8 to 35 percent: only seven states license online casino games	20 %	920 million euro
×	Reaching a state treasury as tax Setting, range 7 to 33 percent: online casino tax rates run from 15 to over 50 percent of what operators keep, applied to the share of spending that becomes operator revenue [2]	16 %	150 million euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro a point	0.3

Score 0.3 Impact × 5 Value × 5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.8 of 100

The tax rates are published and the mechanism is arithmetic: revenue moving into a licensed channel is taxed at the licensed rate. The counterfactual is the current position, where the same spending generates nothing. What is estimated is how much moves, and the answer is bounded by a structural fact rather than a behavioural one — most players have no licensed online casino available to them, so the ceiling on this argument is low regardless of how players behave. The confounder that matters is that some of the spending would move to sports betting instead, which is taxed differently and in more states; that would raise this figure and is not counted, which makes it conservative. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the middle: the tax arithmetic is certain and the volume reaching it is small and estimated.

evidence basis: Projection · P ceiling 6 identification: Definitional · no rung ceiling

Counterfactual: the current position, in which sweepstakes spending generates no state gambling tax. Design: definitional — published rates applied to a share of revenue; the estimated element is how much volume moves. Confounder: spending moving to sports betting instead, taxed differently and more widely, which would raise the figure and is not counted. Direction: not applicable. Ceiling: a projection carries 6.0 at most, and that binds; P sits below it because the volume estimate is bounded by how few states license the alternative.

Arguments — Against

3 arguments

Millions of people liked playing them

4.3of 100

Most sweepstakes players spend a few euro a month on a game they enjoy and stop when they are bored. They are not in difficulty and they did not ask to be protected. A ban takes the game away from all of them to reach the minority who are.

Value 4 · EnjoymentImpact 2.2Plausibility 5

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The stream is enjoyment — a game people choose to play and pay for. This site places it in the class it uses for comfort and everyday pleasure, well below health or money in a strained household. It is not dismissed: an evaluation that treated a freely chosen pleasure as worthless because someone disapproved of it would be doing something other than measuring. But it does not weigh much either, and it weighs less when a substantial share of the spending comes from people who are not in a position to choose freely. The money itself is counted as a gain in the argument above; this is what it bought. The value is in the lower part of the scale, because what is lost is a chosen pleasure rather than anything anyone depends on.

The measure removes about 2.76 billion euro a year of spending. Roughly three fifths of that comes from recreational players getting what they paid for, in a range from two fifths to four fifths — the remainder is spent by people whose play is not a free choice in any useful sense, and their enjoyment is not counted. What the recreational players get is worth less than what they pay, since the games are a losing proposition by construction; half the amount spent is used, in a range from a quarter to the full amount. That gives 830 million euro, weighted at 1.3 for the incomes concerned: 1.08 billion euro a year. What is also not counted, and would raise this figure, is that a good part of the appeal of these games is social rather than financial — leaderboards, streaks, friends — and none of that transfers to a licensed casino. The Impact is half the money gain it offsets, which is the honest shape of a prohibition: most of the people it stops were not in trouble.

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	Spending the ban removes the share that simply stops, taken from the money argument — the same figure carries both cards	60 % of the 4.6 billion euro addressable	2.76 billion euro
×	Share from recreational players getting what they paid for Setting, range 40 to 80 percent: revenue concentrates among heavy players, so the average euro is spent by someone less free than the average player	60 %	1.66 billion euro
×	Enjoyment bought per euro spent Setting, range 25 to 100 percent: the games are a losing proposition by construction, so the pleasure is worth less than the price	50 %	0.83 billion euro
×	Weight of a euro at these incomes	1.3	1.08 billion euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro a point	2.16

Score 2.16 Impact × 4 Value × 5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 4.3 of 100

That people get something from these games is not in doubt; they return to them daily and pay for the privilege. What has no established method is pricing it, and the reason is specific rather than general: the standard approach assumes the buyer is choosing well, which is precisely what is contested for the share of this market that drives the revenue. The counterfactual is the same players under current rules. Two things pull in opposite directions and neither is resolved. Counting all recreational spending at face value overstates the loss, because the concentration of revenue among heavy players means the average euro is spent by someone less free than the average player — that is why only three fifths is treated as recreational. Against that, the ban falls on everyone including the great majority who never approach a problem, and the social features they lose are entirely uncounted. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the middle: the stream certainly exists and pricing a pleasure whose consumers may not be choosing well has no settled method.

evidence basis: Plausibility · P ceiling 5 identification: Definitional · no rung ceiling

Counterfactual: the same players under current rules. Design: definitional — that a freely repeated purchase yields something to the buyer is a framework assumption rather than a causal claim. Confounder: gambling disorder, under which the assumption fails and spending overstates enjoyment; addressed by treating only three fifths of the reduction as recreational. Direction: not applicable. Ceiling: a framework assumption carries 5.0 at most, and that binds because the size rests on stated shares rather than measurement.

A fifth of it goes offshore

1.8of 100

Offshore online casinos have taken American customers for twenty years and are one search away. The players who look hardest for a replacement are the ones who were playing most. What they find has fewer protections than the model being banned, not more.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 1Plausibility 3.5

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The stream is money lost where nothing at all applies, priced at the middle of the scale. An offshore casino has no age check that means anything, no obligation to pay out, no segregated customer funds and no authority to complain to. What is priced here is both the transfer the ban fails to prevent and the additional harm of it happening somewhere with no recourse whatever. The gambling disorder that follows a player offshore is counted in the argument on health rather than a second time here. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is money and the absence of protection around it is priced in the Impact.

A fifth of the 4.6 billion euro is assumed to move to operators outside any American jurisdiction, in a range from a tenth to two fifths — 920 million euro a year. For that share the money still leaves the household and the protections gained elsewhere in this measure never arrive. The loss is set at 54 percent of the migrating amount: the same weight gap of 0.8 that makes the money argument a gain, applied in reverse for the part that keeps flowing. That gives about 500 million euro a year. The players who look hardest for a replacement are the heavy ones, so the migrating share is not a random fifth, which makes this argument bite harder on the health gain than on the money gain. The Impact is a quarter of the money that stays with households, which is what keeps the overall balance from being one-sided.

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	Player spending in states that have not banned the model 7.2 billion dollars of consumer spending [1], converted at 1.15 dollars to the euro (setting, range 1.05 to 1.25) and reduced by the eleven states that have already banned the model — the remaining states hold roughly three quarters of the market [1]	7.2 billion dollars, less the eleven states that have banned them	4.6 billion euro
×	Share moving offshore Setting, range 10 to 40 percent: offshore sites lack the app-store distribution and social features that made this model popular	20 %	920 million euro
×	Loss per euro that goes there the same weight gap of 0.8 that makes the money argument a gain, applied in reverse for the part that keeps flowing, less the share that would have been lost anyway	54 %	500 million euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro a point	1

Score 1 Impact × 5 Value × 3.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.8 of 100

The pattern is old and the size is unmeasured. Offshore online casinos have accepted American customers for two decades and payment blocking has never stopped them entirely; crypto settlement has made it easier again. The counterfactual is the current position with a domestic alternative available. The chain is short and every link visible: the product closes, the player wants to continue, an offshore site is reachable. What no source supplies is the share. Eleven states have banned the model at different dates since 2025, which is exactly the variation that would answer this, and nobody has used it ^[1]. The counter-mechanism is partly answered: offshore sites lack the app-store distribution and social features that made the sweepstakes model popular, so the substitution is imperfect, which is why the share used is a fifth rather than a half. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is low because the migrating share has never been measured despite eleven natural experiments being available.

evidence basis: Mechanism · P ceiling 6 identification: Mechanistic · rung ceiling 6 band: Chain open · P 3–3.5

Counterfactual: the current position with a domestic alternative available. Design: mechanistic — chain named (product closes → player continues → offshore site), with no measurement despite eleven state bans at different dates providing usable variation [1]. Confounder: offshore sites lacking the app-store distribution and social features that made this model popular; partly answered by the low share used. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: mechanistic 6.0 binds. Finding band: chain open, because the migrating share carries the quantity and the substitution-quality counter-mechanism is only partly resolved.

The chain is named but the migrating share has never been measured, although eleven states banned the model at different dates and could be compared. Read back: about a third of the time, roughly a fifth of the spending reappears offshore.

Open: App download and payment data by state, before and after each of the eleven bans, would give the migrating share directly and could carry P to 6.

Ordinary prize promotions get caught

0.8of 100

The free-entry sweepstakes is a normal marketing instrument: a soft drink under a bottle cap, a code on a receipt, a competition on a cereal box. A ban written around a currency structure rather than around casino games risks reaching all of it. Several state bills have needed redrafting for exactly this reason.

Value 6 · OutputImpact 0.3Plausibility 4.5

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The stream is the value of a marketing instrument that works: prize promotions raise sales, and the difference between a promotion that runs and one that does not is output that does happen or does not. It belongs to the class this site uses for economic systems and prosperity. What is counted is not the promotion budget, which moves from a company to a printer or a broadcaster, but the transactions that would not otherwise occur and the cost of redesigning campaigns that no longer comply. Consumers who enjoy entering competitions are not counted, because nothing measures that. The value sits in the middle-upper part of the scale, at the level this site uses for economic output.

American retail prize promotions are a substantial industry and none of it is the target of this measure. What is at stake is drafting: a ban aimed at the dual-currency structure rather than at casino-style play catches any promotion that gives away a redeemable entry, and several state bills have been redrafted after exactly that objection was raised ^[1]. The cost is assumed to be compliance and redesign rather than abandonment — 150 million euro a year, in a range from 30 to 500 million, covering legal review, campaign changes and the promotions that are dropped rather than reworked. The upper end applies only if the federal text is written as loosely as the first state attempts were. This is the one argument in the debate that a competent drafter could remove entirely. The Impact is the smallest here, and unlike the others it is a function of how the measure is written rather than of what it does.

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	Compliance, redesign and abandoned campaigns in ordinary prize promotions Setting, range 30 to 500 million euro: the upper end applies only if the federal text is drafted as loosely as the first state attempts were [1]		150 million euro
×	Weight of a euro in company budgets the standard weight this site uses for business money	1.0	150 million euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	500 million euro a point	0.3

Score 0.3 Impact × 6 Value × 4.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.8 of 100

The mechanism is documented rather than theoretical: state bills have been amended after industry objections that their language reached ordinary promotions, which establishes both that the risk is real and that it is fixable ^[1]. The counterfactual is a ban drafted to target casino-style play directly. What has no source is the cost, because it depends entirely on final language that does not exist yet — a federal bill drafted after eleven state attempts would presumably learn from them, which is the counter-mechanism and it is a strong one. The chain is short and visible: loose language, compliance uncertainty, campaigns redesigned or dropped. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is below the middle: the risk is documented, the cost is unquantified, and a competent drafter removes it.

evidence basis: Precedent · P ceiling 6 identification: Mechanistic · rung ceiling 6 band: Chain closed, unevidenced · P 4–5

Counterfactual: a ban drafted to target casino-style play directly rather than a currency structure. Design: mechanistic — state bills amended after industry objections establish the risk without measuring the cost [1]. Confounder: a federal bill learning from eleven state attempts, which would remove the problem; strong and unresolved. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: mechanistic 6.0 binds. Finding band: chain closed but unevidenced — the chain is named, the drafting counter-mechanism is stated, and only the cost is unmeasured.

Nothing measured argues against the claim, and state bills have in fact been redrafted after this objection. The counter-mechanism — that a federal bill written after eleven state attempts would avoid the problem — is strong and is why the figure is small. Read back: about half the time, a federal ban imposes roughly the compliance cost assumed here on ordinary promotions.

Open: The eleven state bans differ in how narrowly they are drafted. Comparing promotional activity in the narrowly drafted states against the broadly drafted ones would separate the drafting cost from the ban itself.

Summary

This is the clearest result in the area and the reason is structural rather than moral. Every other gambling measure on this site pushes people from one channel into another, and the comparison between channels is what makes those debates close. Here there is nowhere better to push them: online casino games are legal in seven states and nowhere else, so a ban does not move the spending, it mostly ends it — about 2.8 billion euro a year staying with households that are, by the concentration of the revenue, not the ones who could afford to lose it. Against that sit the enjoyment of the majority who were never in difficulty, and the fifth of the volume that plausibly reappears offshore where nothing at all applies. Both are real and neither is large enough to close the gap. The one thing that could go wrong is drafting: a ban written around a currency structure rather than around casino games reaches every prize promotion in the country, and eleven state legislatures have already had to fix that.

Outlook — effect over time

Better for the future · 0.77 previous scale

Sources

InfoLawGroup: Sweepstakes Casino Laws in 2026: New Bans, Proposed Legislation, and Regulatory Trends. infolawgroup.com
Sports Handle: Legal US sports betting and online casino revenue, handle and state tax database. sportshandle.com
National Council on Problem Gambling: National Survey on Gambling Attitudes and Gambling Experiences 3.0. ncpgambling.org

Last reviewed by Claude Opus 5 · September 6, 2026 · 2× AI, not yet reviewed by a human

September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5record updated
i_spanne an allen 6 Argumenten, normalisierung erstmals an allen 6 (nur globale Anker), kein gegenbein (beide Transfers genettet), massstab_hinweis ohne r, drei deutsche Scoring-Token aus der englischen Prosa entfernt, Wechselkurs als Setzung mit Spanne benannt. Kategorie steigt von Besser (r 0,77) auf Deutlich besser (P(D>0) 0,99).
September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5First evaluation
Created for the English side: no licensed alternative exists in 43 states, which is why this ban ends spending rather than moving it.

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