Universal Background Checks

Require a background check for every firearm transfer, not only for sales by licensed dealers, by routing private sales through a dealer.

AI evaluation · not yet reviewed by a human

This evaluation was produced and sourced by an AI model; a human review is still pending. Figures and conclusions may still change. The review log is at the foot of the page.How review works →

Federal law requires a check on the buyer only when a licensed dealer makes the sale, so a private seller may hand a gun to a stranger at a table or through a website without one. A survey of American gun owners found that 22 percent of recent acquisitions involved no check, and 57 percent of private purchases in states that do not regulate them. The bill before Congress closes that by requiring almost all transfers to go through a licensed dealer, who runs the check as they would for their own sale; gifts between close family, loans at a range and temporary transfers for hunting are exempt. It creates no registry and does not change who is prohibited from owning a gun. This evaluation looks ten years ahead.

Balance

Much better for the future · 0.90 previous scale

Balance on the previous scale. The Bilanz 2.0 simulation is not yet available for this evaluation. The category comes from the share of the debate on the pro side (r).

For 76 · 90 % Against 8.4 · 10 %

Size class: small Scale of this evaluation: Normalised Impact — unitless, calibrated to this topic. For comparison: one point here is worth roughly 100 million euro per year. Everything on the positive side of this ledger rests on one assumed number: that closing the private-sale gap lowers firearm homicide by four percent and firearm suicide by two percent in the states it newly reaches. Those figures are set low on purpose, because the research synthesis rates the evidence for private-sale checks specifically as limited, and the strongest results in the field come from a different policy — requiring a permit before purchase, which this bill does not do. At zero effect the measure is a pure cost and comes out clearly negative. At the effect sizes found for permit laws, three to five times these, it would be the strongest measure on this site. How we score →

Arguments for

Arguments against

6 arguments evaluated · Scoring v1.3 Δ absolute +67.6

Arguments — For

3 arguments

People who are not shot

51of 100

There were 17,927 firearm homicides in 2023 and about 85,000 non-fatal firearm assaults. Roughly two thirds of both happen in the 31 states where a private sale needs no check at all.

Value 9.5 · Life and healthImpact 9.8Plausibility 5.5

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The stream is people who are alive, and people who are not in a hospital with a gunshot wound, at the end of the period. It sits just below the top of the scale because it mixes deaths with a larger number of serious injuries, weighted towards the deaths, which is how this site prices a stream containing both. A tenth is added on the same anchor for the families of those killed, following the same rule used wherever this site counts violent death. Nothing is added for fear, for the neighbourhoods where shootings concentrate, or for the medical spending avoided, each of which is real and each of which would enlarge this argument. Nothing is counted for the offenders. The value sits just below the maximum: the stream mixes deaths with a larger number of injuries, weighted towards the deaths.

American firearm homicides numbered 17,927 in 2023 and non-fatal firearm assaults about 85,000 ^[1]^[2]. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia already require checks on private sales, so the bill is new in 31 states holding roughly 65 percent of both figures: about 11,650 deaths and 55,000 injuries. The reduction used is four percent, in a range from one to twelve percent wherever the requirement bites at all; whether it bites at all is the separate question carried by the plausibility. That figure is set low deliberately: the research synthesis rates the evidence for private-sale checks as limited, and the larger effects in the literature come from permit-to-purchase laws, which add a licence and an in-person application that this bill does not ^[3]. Four percent gives 466 deaths and 2,210 serious injuries a year. Valued at the figures this site uses for a life and a serious injury, with a tenth added for the families of those killed, that is 983 million euro. The Impact is the largest here and it is a single assumed percentage away from being nothing at all.

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	Firearm homicides in the 31 states without a private-sale requirement [2]	17,927 nationally, about 65 percent of them	11,650 deaths a year
×	Reduction once private sales need a check Setting, range 1 to 12 percent wherever the requirement bites at all: a quarter of what permit-to-purchase studies report, because the synthesis rates the evidence for private-sale checks alone as limited [3]	4 %	466 deaths a year
×	Value of a life, with a tenth added for the families the value of a statistical life used across this site and the surcharge this site applies to violent death	1.4 million euro each, plus 10 percent	718 million euro a year
+	Serious injuries avoided, valued alongside them the value of a serious injury used across this site [1]	55,000 firearm assaults, 4 percent fewer, at 120,000 euro each	983 million euro a year
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	100 million euro a point	9.83

Score 9.83 Impact × 9.5 Value × 5.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 51 of 100

The counterfactual is the same states without the requirement, which is what the state-panel studies behind the research synthesis construct from the timing of state laws. Those designs are quasi-experimental — differences in differences across states and years — and the synthesis grades the resulting evidence for comprehensive checks on total homicide as moderate, its second-highest category ^[3]. The confounder that matters is that states legislating background checks also legislate everything else at the same time, from permit requirements to waiting periods to storage laws, so the effect attributed to checks may belong to a package; the strongest individual results in the field, from Connecticut's permit law and Missouri's repeal of one, are results about permits and not about checks alone. That is named and unresolved, and it is the reason the effect size used here is a quarter of what those studies report. Reverse causation is present in the raw correlation, since states with more violence legislate more, and the panel designs address it with state fixed effects. The Plausibility is a little above the middle: the direction is supported by a graded synthesis and the specific policy in this bill is the weakest-evidenced version of it.

evidence basis: Converging studies · P ceiling 6 identification: Quasi-experimental · rung ceiling 8

Counterfactual: the same states before their own law, and states that never passed one. Design: quasi-experimental — differences in differences across states and years, graded as moderate evidence for comprehensive checks on total homicide by the research synthesis [3]. Confounder: states legislating checks legislate other firearm measures at the same time, so the effect may belong to a package; named, unresolved, and the reason the effect size used is a quarter of what permit-law studies report. Direction: reverse causation is present in the raw correlation and handled by state fixed effects. Ceiling: set at 6.0, below the quasi-experimental ceiling, because the graded evidence covers comprehensive check regimes and not the private-sale requirement on its own.

Guns bought to die with

21of 100

Firearm suicides reached 27,300 in 2023, a record for the third year running and 58 percent of all gun deaths. A share of the guns used are bought shortly beforehand, and a check is a delay as well as a filter.

Value 9.5 · LifeImpact 5.5Plausibility 4

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The stream is people alive at the end of the period who would otherwise have died by their own hand. It is placed just below the top of the scale, with a tenth added on the same anchor for the families, exactly as for the homicides above. It is a separate argument from those because the mechanism is different: a homicide is prevented by keeping a gun from someone prohibited, a suicide by putting a step and a delay between an intention and a method. Nothing is counted for attempts survived, which are numerous and would enlarge this. Nothing is counted for substitution to another method, which belongs in the quantity and is discussed there. The value sits just below the maximum, and this argument is separate from the homicides because a delay and a filter are not the same mechanism.

Firearm suicides reached 27,300 in 2023, 58 percent of all gun deaths, and about 65 percent of them occur in the 31 states this bill would newly reach — roughly 17,750 ^[2]. The reduction used is two percent, in a range from half a percent to six percent wherever the requirement bites at all, which is half the figure used for homicides. It is lower for a reason that runs against the argument: most people who die by firearm suicide use a gun that has been in the household for years, so a rule about acquisition reaches only the minority who buy shortly beforehand. That gives about 355 deaths a year, valued at the figure this site uses for a life with a tenth added for the families: 547 million euro. Substitution is not subtracted separately, because the studies this rests on measure total suicide rather than firearm suicide alone, and a method that is substituted is already inside their estimate. The Impact is a bit over half the homicide argument, and it is smaller because most of the guns involved were bought long before the decision to use them.

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	Firearm suicides in the 31 states without a private-sale requirement [2]	27,300 nationally, about 65 percent of them	17,750 deaths a year
×	Reduction once private sales need a check Setting, range 0.5 to 6 percent wherever the requirement bites at all: half the homicide figure, because most firearm suicides use a gun that has been in the household for years [3]	2 %	355 deaths a year
×	Value of a life, with a tenth added for the families the value of a statistical life used across this site and the surcharge this site applies to violent death	1.4 million euro each, plus 10 percent	547 million euro a year
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	100 million euro a point	5.47

Score 5.47 Impact × 9.5 Value × 4 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 21 of 100

The direction has support and the specific claim has a finding against it. The counterfactual is the same states without the requirement. Studies of comprehensive check regimes report reductions in firearm suicide, but the research synthesis rates that evidence as inconclusive and at least one careful state study — California's, examined over ten years after its comprehensive law — found no change in firearm suicide or homicide at all ^[3]^[6]. That is a counter-finding on the link that carries the quantity, not merely an absence of evidence, which is what places this argument where it sits rather than at the middle. The confounder is the same package problem as for homicides, and the direction check is the same: states with higher suicide rates legislate differently, and panel designs address it with fixed effects. Reverse causation is not otherwise plausible. The counter-finding is genuine, and the fact that the substitution mechanism is well documented in the suicide literature makes it easier to believe. The Plausibility is below the middle: the direction is supported in some states, a careful study of the largest state found nothing, and the mechanism reaches only the guns bought shortly before.

evidence basis: Converging studies · P ceiling 5 identification: Quasi-experimental · rung ceiling 8 band: Load-bearing link disputed · P 3.5–4

Counterfactual: the same states before their own law. Design: quasi-experimental — state panel differences in differences, the same family of designs as for homicides [3]. Confounder: simultaneous firearm legislation, unresolved; and most firearm suicides use a gun acquired long before, which limits the mechanism by construction. Direction: reverse causation handled by state fixed effects. Ceiling: 5.0, because the synthesis rates this evidence as inconclusive. Band: load-bearing link disputed — the direction has support, and a ten-year study of California's comprehensive law found no change in firearm suicide.

The finding against this is specific: a ten-year evaluation of California's comprehensive background check law found no change in firearm suicide or homicide. The direction is supported elsewhere, so what is disputed is the link that carries the quantity rather than the claim itself. Read back: rather less often than not, a private-sale requirement lowers firearm suicide by anything like the assumed two percent.

Open: Point-of-sale records and death certificates are both dated. Measuring what share of firearm suicides used a gun acquired within a year would settle how much of this mechanism can exist at all, and could move this argument in either direction.

Guns that cross state lines

4.1of 100

A state that requires checks on private sales still receives guns from the states next to it that do not. About three in ten guns recovered in crime in the strict states were first sold in another one.

Value 9.5 · Life and healthImpact 0.9Plausibility 5

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The stream is the same one as the first argument — people not killed — but in a different place: the nineteen states and the District that already require checks and still receive guns from the states that do not. It carries the same value class and the same family surcharge. It is separate rather than folded in because the first argument counts only the states where the rule is new, and this is the effect the rule has where it already exists. Nothing is counted for the traffickers. Nothing is counted for the strict states' enforcement costs, which fall. The value sits just below the maximum for the same reason as the first argument, and this stands apart because it lands in the states the first argument leaves out.

About 6,275 firearm homicides a year occur in the nineteen states and the District that already require checks on private sales. Federal tracing data show that roughly three in ten guns recovered in crime in such states were first sold in another state, and the source states are overwhelmingly the ones with the loosest transfer rules. A national requirement closes the supply at its origin rather than at the border. The reduction used is three percent of the out-of-state share, in a range from one to ten percent wherever a national requirement changes the flow at all — about 56 deaths a year, or 87 million euro with the family surcharge. The figure is small because trafficking survives a paper requirement: a straw purchaser who passes a check buys the gun legally and hands it on, which no check catches. The Impact is a tenth of the first argument, which is the honest size of an effect that works on the supply of trafficked guns rather than on the buyer in front of the counter.

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	Firearm homicides in the states that already require checks [2]	17,927 nationally, about 35 percent of them	6,275 deaths a year
×	Share involving a gun first sold in another state federal tracing data for states with strict transfer rules [5]	30 %	1,883 deaths a year
×	Reduction once the source states also require checks Setting, range 1 to 10 percent wherever a national requirement changes the flow at all: straw purchasing defeats a check entirely for anyone using an accomplice with a clean record	3 %	56.5 deaths a year
×	Value of a life, with a tenth added for the families the value of a statistical life used across this site and the surcharge this site applies to violent death	1.4 million euro each, plus 10 percent	87 million euro a year
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	100 million euro a point	0.87

Score 0.87 Impact × 9.5 Value × 5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 4.1 of 100

The counterfactual is the strict states as they are, receiving guns from loose ones. The chain is named and each link is documented separately: tracing data establish the interstate flow, and the concentration of source states with weak transfer laws is a repeated finding in the tracing literature. What is not measured is the last link — how much of that flow a national requirement would stop — because no national requirement has existed to measure. The confounder that matters is straw purchasing, which defeats the mechanism entirely for anyone willing to use an accomplice with a clean record; it is named and unresolved and is the reason the effect is set at three percent rather than at the whole out-of-state share. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the middle: the flow is measured, the share of it a check requirement would stop is assumed, and straw purchasing limits it by construction.

evidence basis: Mechanism · P ceiling 6 identification: Mechanistic · rung ceiling 6

Counterfactual: strict states as they are, receiving guns from loose ones. Design: mechanistic — tracing data establish the interstate flow and the concentration of source states, but no national requirement has existed to measure the last link. Confounder: straw purchasing, which defeats a check entirely for anyone using an accomplice with a clean record; named, unresolved, and the reason the effect is set at three percent. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: mechanistic 6.0 binds.

Arguments — Against

3 arguments

A trip to the dealer

3.6of 100

Every private sale would have to go through a licensed dealer, who charges a fee for the service. For the seller and the buyer that is a drive, a wait and about thirty euro, on every transfer.

Value 5 · Enforcement costImpact 1.0Plausibility 7

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The stream is money and time consumed in complying with the rule: the dealer's transfer fee, the drive to reach one, and the wait while the check runs. It is priced at the middle of the scale, like other money spent on running a rule, and the time is converted at the rate this site uses for an hour of a person's waking day. Both halves are real costs rather than money changing hands: the time is time, and the fee buys the staff minutes and the record-keeping that a transfer takes at the counter, which is why it is not set against the dealer's receipt. Nothing is counted for the transfers that do not happen because of the friction, which would be a further loss and is not estimated. The value is the middle of the scale, the level this site uses for the cost of running a rule.

Private firearm transfers in the United States run somewhere near four million a year, of which about 2.6 million occur in the states this bill would newly reach. Each would cost a dealer's transfer fee, which runs from about 25 to 50 dollars, and roughly an hour and a half of the parties' time between them, worth another ten euro at the rate this site uses for a waking hour. Dollar figures are converted at 0.90 euro to the dollar, a setting with a range from 0.85 to 0.95. Forty euro a transfer is the figure used, in a range from 30 to 60, and across 2.6 million transfers that is 104 million euro a year at the ordinary weight for money. The figure would be larger in rural counties where the nearest dealer is an hour away, which is the substance of the objection made by the bill's opponents and is inside the range rather than outside it. Nothing is added for the federal system's own capacity, which is counted separately. The Impact is a tenth of the lives saved on the other side, which is the ordinary proportion when a rule is cheap per transaction and the harm it addresses is fatal.

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	Private firearm transfers in the states the bill newly reaches [4]	about four million a year nationally, 65 percent of them	2.6 million transfers a year
×	Fee and time per transfer Setting, range 30 to 60 euro a transfer: a dealer fee of 25 to 50 dollars, converted at 0.90 euro to the dollar, plus about an hour and a half of the parties' time between them at the rate this site uses for a waking hour; the upper end is the rural county where the nearest dealer is an hour away	40 euro	104 million euro a year
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	100 million euro a point	1.04

Score 1.04 Impact × 5 Value × 7 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 3.6 of 100

The costs here are prices rather than predictions. The counterfactual is the same transfers taking place privately at no cost. Dealer transfer fees are published and competitive, and the number of private transfers is estimated from owner surveys rather than counted, because private sales are by definition unrecorded — that survey estimate is the softer half of the calculation and it is wide. The chain has no behavioural link that carries the quantity: if the rule is followed, the fee is paid. The confounder is compliance in the other direction, which would lower this cost and lower the benefit at the same time, so it does not move the balance. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is high: the fee is a published price and only the number of private transfers is estimated.

evidence basis: Precedent · P ceiling 8 identification: Definitional · no rung ceiling

Counterfactual: the same transfers taking place privately at no cost. Design: definitional — if the rule is followed, a published dealer fee is paid; no behavioural link carries the quantity. Confounder: non-compliance, which lowers this cost and the benefit together and therefore does not move the balance; named. Direction: not applicable. Ceiling: precedent 8.5, held at 8.0 because compliance with a rule about transfers that leave no record cannot be observed directly.

Handing a gun to a friend

3.6of 100

The bill turns an unrecorded private transfer into a federal offence unless it goes through a dealer or fits an exemption. Forty million gun owners in the affected states would be living under a rule about something they have always done informally.

Value 9 · Rights and libertyImpact 0.8Plausibility 5

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The stream is a liberty narrowed: the freedom to hand a rifle to a neighbour, sell a shotgun to somebody at a club, or pass a pistol to a nephew without involving a licensed intermediary. This site places that at the constitutional core, because what is restricted is the exercise of a right the Supreme Court has held to be individual, and the restriction is a criminal one. What is priced is the restriction itself, spread evenly across the owners it applies to, and not the disapproval of people who dislike the law. The prosecutions that follow are few and are inside the same figure rather than a separate one. Nothing is counted for the exemptions in the bill, which cover gifts to close family, loans at a range and temporary hunting transfers, and which are why the figure per owner is small. The value is at the constitutional core because what is narrowed is the exercise of an individual right under criminal penalty, and the amount per owner is small because the ordinary cases are exempt.

About 40 million adults own a firearm in the 31 states this bill would newly reach. The restriction on them is real and it is not large, because the transfers people actually make most often — to a spouse, a parent, a child, a friend at a range, a hunting companion for the day — are exempt on the face of the bill. What is left is the sale or lasting loan to someone outside that circle, which most owners do rarely or never. Two euro per owner per year is used, in a range from 0.5 to 8, which is the band this site uses for a restriction that applies broadly and bites lightly; the same band prices the loss of anonymity in the platform evaluations elsewhere on this site. That gives 80 million euro a year. Prosecutions are inside this figure: they run in the low hundreds a year in states with such laws, and a case is worth far more than two euro to the person facing it, but there are too few of them to move a figure built on 40 million people. The Impact is a twelfth of the lives on the other side, and it is built on a per-person figure rather than on any measured harm.

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	Firearm owners in the states the bill newly reaches [4]		40 million adults
×	Value of the restriction per owner per year Setting, range 0.5 to 8 euro: the band this site uses for a restriction that applies broadly and bites lightly, since transfers within the family, at a range and for hunting are exempt	2 euro	80 million euro a year
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	100 million euro a point	0.8

Score 0.8 Impact × 9 Value × 5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 3.6 of 100

The restriction is definitional — the statute says what may not be done — but what it is worth to the people it applies to is a valuation and not a finding. The counterfactual is the same owners under present law in those states. The chain is short and complete: a transfer that is lawful becomes an offence, and the people who would have made it lose the option. The confounder is the exemptions: how broadly a court reads the family, range and hunting carve-outs decides whether this costs an owner almost nothing or a good deal more, and it is unresolved. Reverse causation does not arise. The two-euro figure is the site's own convention for a broad, light restriction rather than anything measured about firearm owners, and if the restriction is felt more sharply than that convention assumes, this argument is several times larger. The Plausibility is at the middle: the restriction is certain and its value to those it binds is a convention.

evidence basis: Plausibility · P ceiling 5 identification: Definitional · no rung ceiling

Counterfactual: the same owners under present law in the 31 states. Design: definitional — the statute states what becomes an offence; no behavioural link carries the quantity. Confounder: how broadly courts read the family, range and hunting exemptions, which decides whether the restriction bites at all; named and unresolved. Direction: not applicable. Ceiling: plausibility 5.0 binds, because the per-owner figure is this site's convention for a broad light restriction and not a measurement.

Checks that stop the wrong people

1.2of 100

The federal system returns a wrong denial in a small share of cases, and the appeal takes months. Four million additional checks a year means a few thousand more lawful buyers turned away.

Value 9 · Rights and libertyImpact 0.2Plausibility 6

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The stream is the wrongly refused: people entitled to buy who are matched to somebody else's record, or to a disposition that was never updated, and who wait months for it to be corrected. This site places that at the constitutional core, because what is denied is the exercise of a right on the basis of an error by the state. Nothing is counted for the delay experienced by everyone else, which is inside the first cost argument as time. Nothing is counted for the correctly denied, who are the point of the measure. Nothing is counted for the system's running costs, which are small and are borne federally. The value is at the constitutional core because what is at stake is a right denied by mistake, and the number of people it happens to is what keeps the argument small.

About four million additional checks a year would run under this bill, of which roughly one percent are denied and about five percent of those denials are overturned on appeal — around 2,000 wrongly refused buyers a year. What a wrong refusal costs is put at 5,000 euro, in a range from 1,000 to 20,000: the site's band for an unfounded suspicion recorded against a named person, which is what a denial is. That gives 10 million euro. Added to it is the federal system's own cost of running the additional volume, about 12 million euro a year at the ordinary weight for public money. Together that is 22 million euro. Nothing is added for the days between a denial and its correction, which are inside the same band. The Impact is the smallest here and it is the argument most likely to be understated, because the error rate is measured only at the point of appeal and most people do not appeal.

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	Additional checks a year [4]		4 million checks
×	Denials that are later overturned administrative counts published by the federal system and its appeals office [5]	1 percent denied, 5 percent of those overturned	2,000 people a year
×	Cost of a wrong refusal Setting, range 1,000 to 20,000 euro: this site's band for an unfounded suspicion recorded against a named person	5,000 euro	10 million euro a year
+	Plus the federal cost of running the additional volume	about 12 million euro a year	22 million euro a year
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	100 million euro a point	0.22

Score 0.22 Impact × 9 Value × 6 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.2 of 100

The counterfactual is the same buyers under the present system, in which private sales are not checked at all. Both inputs are administrative counts rather than estimates: the federal system publishes denial volumes and the appeals office publishes overturn rates. The chain is short — more checks, proportionally more denials, proportionally more errors — and it has no behavioural link carrying the quantity. The confounder is that the appeal rate is not the error rate: somebody wrongly denied who does not appeal never appears in the statistics, which means the true number is higher than the one used and this argument is understated rather than overstated. That is named and points against the direction of the setting. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is a little above the middle: the counts are administrative and the error rate is measured only among those who appeal.

evidence basis: Precedent · P ceiling 7 identification: Definitional · no rung ceiling

Counterfactual: the same buyers under the present system, in which private sales are unchecked. Design: definitional — more checks produce proportionally more denials and errors; no behavioural link carries the quantity. Confounder: the appeal rate understates the error rate, since people who do not appeal never appear in the statistics, which makes this argument understated rather than overstated; named. Direction: not applicable. Ceiling: precedent 8.5, held at 7.0 because the error rate is observed only among appellants.

Summary

On this ledger the measure comes out strongly positive, and the reason is arithmetic rather than sympathy: the costs are a thirty-euro fee, an afternoon, and a narrowed liberty priced at two euro per owner a year, while the benefit is measured in lives. Even at the deliberately low effect assumed here — four percent off firearm homicide in the 31 states the rule is new in — that is 466 deaths and 2,210 serious injuries a year. The honest weakness is that the four percent is assumed rather than found. The research synthesis rates the evidence for private-sale checks specifically as limited, a ten-year evaluation of California's comprehensive law found no change at all, and the strong results in the field belong to a different policy: requiring a permit before purchase, which this bill does not do. At zero effect the measure is pure cost; at the effect sizes found for permit laws it would be the strongest thing on this site.

Outlook — effect over time

Much better for the future · 0.90 previous scale

Sources

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Firearm injury and death: fast facts. cdc.gov
Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions: Gun violence in the United States 2023. publichealth.jhu.edu
RAND Corporation: The effects of background checks, in The Science of Gun Policy. rand.org
Miller, Hepburn and Azrael, Annals of Internal Medicine: Firearm acquisition without background checks: results of a national survey. acpjournals.org
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Firearms trace data and National Instant Criminal Background Check System operations reports. atf.gov
Castillo-Carniglia and colleagues, Annals of Epidemiology: California's comprehensive background check and misdemeanour violence prohibition policies and firearm mortality. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Last reviewed by Claude Opus 5 · September 6, 2026 · 2× AI, not yet reviewed by a human

September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5record updated
i_spanne an allen 6, normalisierung an 5 von 6 (leben, verletzung-schwer, personenstunde, eur-nennwert; zwei Grundrechts-Stroeme ohne Anker), Ob-Gruppe checks-change-who-gets-a-gun ueber die drei Pro-Argumente, kein Transfer im Record. Zwei gesetzte Konventionen: Dollar-Umrechnung 0,90 EUR/$ (Spanne 0,85-0,95, die Kette rechnete mit 1,20) und Haendlergebuehr als realer Ressourcenaufwand. Kategorie kippt von Deutlich besser (r 0,90) auf Ausgeglichen (P(D>0) 0,56).
September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5First evaluation
First evaluation: effect sizes set at a quarter of what permit-law studies report, because the synthesis rates private-sale checks alone as limited.

Evaluations are produced with AI support and reviewed on a schedule for new developments; human passes are marked separately.How we review →