💬 Discussion
Two Greek figures review identity documents beside a ballot box and polling booths.

SAVE America Act

Non-citizens may not vote in federal elections, and a new voter confirms citizenship with a sworn statement that audits check afterwards. Republicans want a document at registration and photo identification at the polls and on mail ballots; Democrats say that keeps eligible citizens from voting. The House passed the SAVE America Act on 11 February 2026, and this analysis assumes it becomes law around 30 September 2026, five weeks before the midterm election.

  • 211 million people are registered to vote [2]
  • 12 states already require documentary proof of citizenship in at least some cases [10]
  • 37 million ballots arrived by mail at the last midterm election, nearly a third of all [3]

The proposal

Anyone registering for a federal election must show proof of citizenship in person, and every voter must show photo identification, at the polls or with the mail ballot.

The debate

Republicans argue that only citizens should vote, that a document is the only reliable check, and that people already show identification for far smaller things. Democrats answer that non-citizen voting is already illegal and very rare, and that millions of citizens lack a passport or a birth certificate in their current name. The House passed the bill on 11 February 2026 by five votes, with a single Democrat in favor. The Senate has not passed it.

  • “I am of the view that U.S. elections should be for U.S. citizens only and that we should be proving that citizenship at the point in time that an individual registers to vote.”

    argues for: Bryan Steil, Republican, Wisconsin House floor, 11 February 2026

  • “When Kansas tried a similar law, 32,000 eligible citizens were blocked from registering.”

    argues against: Norma Torres, Democrat, California House floor, 11 February 2026

  • “Most of all, I urge this Chamber to reaffirm its commitment to the fundamental democratic principles that all eligible citizens should have the opportunity to participate in free, fair, and secure elections without unnecessary burdens and without partisan interference.”

    argues against: Joseph Morelle, Democrat, New York House floor, 11 February 2026

The analysis

SAVE America Act

4% of the weight is for, 96% against.

An argument's weight combines three questions: how big the effect is, how certain it is and how much the good at stake matters. The larger the slice, the more the argument weighs.

For

Against

The SAVE America Act is a poor proposal on the current analysis, although the gap it closes is real.

Very likely worse

Very likely worse: Under the assumptions used, the proposal brings more than it costs in fewer than 1 of 100 model runs.

 Overall effect: medium

How strongly the proposal works overall, in five steps from very small to very large, comparable across all debates. The ring is always full, even when the overall effect is small; this step says how large it is.

The opponents have the analysis on their side, though its largest item barely came up on the floor: mail ballots that would not count without a copy of photo identification. One side wins clearly, because a vote prevented and a vote lost weigh the same, and the eligible votes lost outnumber the ineligible ones stopped by far. The supporters' strongest point holds: a document closes the gap a sworn statement leaves, and one federal rule is simpler than a patchwork of state ones. The registration gate, the loss opponents name most often, is the second large item. Photo identification at the polling place, the most visible part of the bill, does little of the damage.

In detail

All arguments

Arguments for3 arguments

One federal rule replaces twelve state regimes

2.7points

Twelve states now impose documentary requirements of differing scope, and two of them are in court over it. A single federal standard removes part of that divergence, though the statute hands the cure processes back to the states.

Value 6 · Administrative qualityImpact 1Plausibility 4.5
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Value

The stream is the working order of the administrative system that runs elections — staff time, court time, and the predictability of the rules for people who move between states. This does not touch anyone's existence or health, and it does not decide who wins. It affects how reliably and how expensively a public function is carried out. That places it well below the constitutional core and above mere convenience. The value is middling because a well-functioning election administration is a real public good, but the consequence stream here is friction rather than participation.

Impact

Without the measure, the map keeps fragmenting: twelve states require documentary evidence in at least some cases, eight of them in all cases [10], and courts have struck down parts of these laws in Kansas and, in May 2026, New Hampshire [9]. Voters who move between states meet different rules; registration drives operating across state lines carry twelve compliance regimes; litigation runs continuously. A federal standard removes that layer. What it does not remove is the layer beneath: the statute leaves the handling of name discrepancies and the notice process before removal to the states [1], so the same divergence reappears in the procedures that decide individual cases. The saving is therefore partial — administrative and legal friction in the low tens of millions per year rather than the elimination of a patchwork. The Impact is small because the friction removed is real but narrow, and because the measure recreates part of it one level down.

Plausibility

The mechanism is straightforward and needs no study: one rule instead of twelve is less to comply with. What is contested is whether the net effect is a reduction at all. The federal requirement is new for 38 states, so the transition itself generates a wave of litigation and administrative divergence that the steady state would later reduce. Within the four-year horizon, most of what is observable is the transition rather than the steady state. There is no precedent for federalising registration requirements at this scale, so nothing anchors the size of the eventual saving. The plausibility is low to middling: the direction is defensible, the magnitude is a guess, and over this horizon the sign itself is not secure.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 5

Confidence in the result

1.2points

A large majority supports the requirement, and support of this size is itself a fact about legitimacy. But the same survey shows the majority thins once the cost to eligible voters is named, and the confidence gained on one side is partly lost on the other.

Value 6 · Trust in institutionsImpact 0.5Plausibility 4
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Value

The stream is whether people accept the outcome of an election they did not win, which is what makes a democratic system able to transfer power without force. That is a real public good and it sits close to the constitutional core, but the consequence here is diffuse and psychological rather than a concrete change in who can vote. It touches everyone lightly rather than anyone heavily. The value is middling: legitimacy matters greatly, but a marginal shift in stated confidence is a thin slice of it.

Impact

Without the measure, a substantial part of the electorate doubts that only citizens are voting, whatever the audits show. With it, that specific doubt has a documented answer. A February 2026 survey found 71 percent of registered voters supporting the act [1], which is a level of agreement rare in American election policy. The delta, though, is not that number. The same survey splits 54 to 46 when respondents are asked to weigh the requirement against eligible voters being turned away [1], and confidence lost among those who see the measure as exclusionary offsets part of the confidence gained among those who see it as protective. Booked net, the residual is small and positive rather than the headline figure. The Impact is small because what looks like a large effect is largely two movements in opposite directions.

Plausibility

Survey support is measured well; the link from a legal change to durable confidence in results is not. Polls capture stated approval of a policy, not whether people afterwards accept an election they lose. No study establishes that adopting a documentary requirement raises subsequent acceptance of results, and the states that already have one have not visibly diverged from the others on that measure. Running the other way, the loss side is equally unmeasured. Both directions rest on reasonable expectation rather than evidence, which caps how much confidence this argument can carry. The plausibility is low: the survey number is solid, and it is not the thing the argument needs.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5

Ineligible registrations and votes are prevented

0.054points

The measure closes a gate that is currently held by a sworn attestation rather than a document. What comes through that gate, on every audit that has looked, is tens to low hundreds of cases against rolls in the millions.

Value 9 · Integrity of the voteImpact 0.01Plausibility 6
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Value

The stream is who decides a federal election. An ineligible ballot cancels an eligible one, which is the same injury the measure's critics name on the other side, arriving from the opposite direction. That symmetry is deliberate here: both this argument and the participation arguments below sit on the constitutional core, at the same weight, so the comparison between them is a comparison of size and evidence rather than of values. Nothing about the smallness of the number reduces the weight of the value it touches. A society that treats election integrity as a constitutional matter treats one improperly cast ballot as serious. The value is high because the integrity of the franchise is a foundational good, and it is exactly as high as the weight given to the eligible voters on the other side.

Impact

Without the measure, citizenship at registration rests on a sworn statement backed by after-the-fact audits and, increasingly, voluntary database matching. With it, a document must be produced before registration completes. The question is how many ineligible registrations the document catches that the attestation does not. Every audit that has looked gives a similar answer: Georgia found 20 non-citizens among 8.2 million registrants, nine of whom had ever cast a ballot [1]. Kansas, running a comparable requirement, identified 39 non-citizens across nineteen years [6]. A count of the Heritage Foundation's own case database yields 77 instances of non-citizen voting nationwide between 1999 and 2023 [1]. Scaled to a roll of 211 million [2], and adding the removals mandatory database matching would produce, the central estimate is a few hundred prevented ineligible votes per election cycle. The Impact is small because the number of affected cases is small, not because each case matters little — one ineligible vote and one lost eligible vote weigh the same here.

Plausibility

This is the best-evidenced number in the whole evaluation, and what it establishes is how small it is. Three independent sources — a state audit in Georgia, nineteen years of enforcement data from Kansas, and a national case database assembled by an organisation that campaigns for the requirement — converge on the same order of magnitude [1][6]. They differ on the exact count, which is expected given different definitions and periods, but not on the scale. The one genuine uncertainty runs upward: audits catch what they look for, and a determined effort to register non-citizens at scale would not necessarily show up in them. That is why the upper band is set an order of magnitude above the central estimate. Against that, no such effort has ever been documented in the United States. What the audits count, though, is cases found under the checks already running — sworn attestation, audits after the fact, and the database matching several states use today — and not the cases a documentary gate would stop on top of those checks; no state has measured that increment, and Kansas, which ran the gate, found too few to separate it from what its audits would have caught [6]. Middling plausibility: that the gate stops some ineligible registrations follows from how it works, and how many beyond today's checks is inferred rather than measured.

Evidence: Precedent · plausibility at most 8.5

Arguments against5 arguments

Mail ballots returned without identification

42points

Nearly a third of ballots arrive by mail, and each would count only if returned with a copy of photo identification or a Social Security alternative. Texas added an identification number to its mail ballots in 2021, and its rejection rate rose from 0.8 percent to 2.7 percent in the next general election. A smaller rise across 37 million mail ballots is about 185,000 votes a year.

Value 9 · Right to voteImpact 9.3Plausibility 5
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Value

The consequence is the same as at the registration gate — a citizen entitled to vote does not have their ballot counted — and it lands on the same value. It falls hardest on voters for whom mail voting is not a convenience but the only practical route: people who cannot stand in line, who work shifts, who live far from a polling place. For them a failed mail ballot is not a fallback to in-person voting but the loss of the vote itself. The value sits at the constitutional core for the same reason as the argument above.

Impact

Without the measure, a mail voter requests a ballot, receives it, and returns it signed. With it, the returned ballot counts only if it comes with a copy of a valid photo identification, or with the last four digits of a Social Security number and an affidavit that a copy could not be obtained after reasonable efforts [14]. The request itself is not affected; uniformed voters abroad and some voters with disabilities are exempt [14]. Nearly one third of the 112 million ballots at the last midterm were cast by mail [3], about 37 million. The closest precedent is Texas, which in 2021 required an identification number on the mail ballot envelope. In its first statewide use, the March 2022 primary, 12.4 percent of mail ballots were rejected; in the November 2022 general election 2.7 percent, against 0.8 percent in 2020 [15]. A copy is harder to supply than a number, but nothing has to match a record on file, which was the main cause of the Texas rejections. An additional 1.5 percent of mail ballots is assumed lost in 2026, in a range from 0.5 to 3.5 percent, because the rule arrives five weeks before the election with no primary to learn from; 0.5 percent is assumed in 2028, in a range from 0.2 to 1.2 percent. That is 555,000 votes in 2026 and 185,000 in 2028, with the 2028 count held at the midterm number of mail ballots, which understates a presidential year. Over four years that is about 185,000 lost votes a year. The Impact is the largest in this evaluation because the exposed population is very large and the first election comes with almost no notice.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Ballots cast by mail at the last midterm [3] nearly one third of 112 million 37 million ballots
× Additional share rejected in 2026 Setting, range 0.5 to 3.5 percent: Texas went from 0.8 percent in 2020 to 12.4 percent in its first primary and 2.7 percent in the next general election under a comparable rule; here five weeks of notice and no primary [15] 1.5 % 555,000 votes
+ Additional rejections in 2028 Setting, range 0.2 to 1.2 percent, after one election of adjustment; the midterm count of mail ballots is kept, which understates a presidential year 0.5 % of 37 million 185,000 votes
= Lost votes over the four years 740,000 votes
÷ Per year 4 years 185,000 votes a year
× Value of a vote the vote value used across democracy topics, set out beside the balance 1,000 euro-equivalent each 185 million euro-equivalent
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation 20 million euro-equivalent a point 9.25
Score 9.25 Impact × 9 Value × 5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 42 of 100

Plausibility

One state has run a comparable rule and measured its effect. Texas required an identification number on its mail ballots from 2022, and the rejection rate rose sharply in the first election and settled at more than three times its earlier level in the next one [15]. The counterfactual is the same mail voters under the current rules; the Texas comparison is a before-and-after in one state without a control group, and in 2022 other things changed as well. The transfer runs in both directions. A copy of an identification document is a heavier demand than a number, and in states that mail every voter a ballot, most voters will not have sought out the rules. Against that, nothing has to match a record on file, states must provide free copiers in public buildings, and the Social Security route removes the hardest version of the problem for anyone who knows it exists [14]. Habitual mail voters are on average older and better documented than the population as a whole, which pulls the number down. Whether voters learn of the alternative in five weeks depends on state communication, which is the thing least likely to work under this timetable. The Plausibility is at the middle: there is a measured precedent for the direction and order of magnitude, and the rates used here are settings transferred from a different rule.

Evidence: Single precedent · plausibility at most 5.5 Evidence of effect: Associational · at most 5.5

Eligible citizens blocked at the registration gate

29points

Two states have run this requirement long enough to count the people it stops: Kansas blocked 31,089 eligible applicants during its transition, with a hearing route for people without documents in place, and Arizona still carries 34,933 registrants who never supplied a document after twenty years. The bill adds an attestation process run by local officials. Scaled nationally that is roughly 100,000 eligible votes lost per year.

Value 9 · Right to voteImpact 5Plausibility 6.5
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Value

What disappears is a person's vote in an election that is held once and cannot be repeated for them. A citizen who moved house in September, files the address change in October and is told to appear in person with a birth certificate she does not have does not get a later chance at that election. The people this falls on are disproportionately those who move often, who married and changed their name, and who were born at home or in states with poor records — none of which has any bearing on their entitlement to vote. This is the same value stream as the integrity argument above, at the same weight, which is what makes the two comparable: one ineligible ballot admitted and one eligible ballot prevented are the same injury to the same good. The value is at the constitutional core because the franchise is the mechanism by which every other political right is defended.

Impact

Without the measure, registration runs almost entirely through channels that never see a document: motor vehicle offices handle 55 percent of applications, online registration 14 percent, mail 9.1 percent, and in-person filing 5.9 percent [3]. With it, every one of those transactions requires a document presented in person. How many eligible citizens that stops need not be estimated, because two states have run the experiment. Kansas, which like this proposal left existing registrations untouched, blocked 31,089 eligible applicants against a roll of about 1.8 million in the three years its law operated [6] — a count of new applications, so the ratio scales with a state's registration traffic rather than with its stock of voters. Arizona, twenty years in and with a driver-licence pathway that satisfies the requirement automatically for most residents, still has 34,933 registrants who never supplied the document, out of 4.4 million active voters [12]. Applied to a national roll of 211 million [2], that is roughly a million people in the first year and a few hundred thousand each year after. Arizona also shows how many of them would have voted: its federal-only voters turned out at about 19 percent, against 79 percent for everyone else [12]. That leaves about 120,000 lost votes per year before the alternative route. The bill obliges every state to let an applicant without a document sign an attestation under penalty of perjury and present other evidence to an election official, who decides and countersigns [14]. Kansas had a route of the same kind, a hearing before the State Election Board with evidence of the applicant's choosing [16], and the 31,089 were blocked with it in place, so the Kansas count already contains what a hard-to-reach process achieves. A local process under federal guidance is easier to reach than a hearing in the state capital: a sixth of those otherwise blocked are assumed to register through it, in a range from none to a third. That gives about 100,000 lost votes per year. The Impact is large because many people meet a requirement they cannot satisfy, even though most of them vote rarely.

Plausibility

Two states have run a documentary requirement long enough to measure, and they measure different parts of it. Kansas shows what a transition costs, and the trial court found the law burdened qualified applicants while only nominally preventing non-citizen registration [6]. Arizona shows what remains after two decades of adjustment and a fallback ballot this proposal does not offer: still 34,933 people who never supplied the document [12]. Arizona also settles what used to be the weakest assumption here, how many of the affected would have voted, and the answer of 19 percent against 79 is well below what is usually assumed [12]. Both transfers err in a known direction. Kansas understates, because a national rollout with registration closing between a few days and four weeks after enactment allows less adjustment than Kansas had. Arizona understates too, because its voters at least receive a federal ballot while under this proposal they would receive none. What remains uncertain is how much of the national roll resembles these two states, and how many people the attestation route will actually carry: Kansas shows that the existence of such a route says little about its use [16]. That is why the range still spans a factor of seven. Good middling plausibility: two independent real cases agree on the order of magnitude, and both err toward the conservative side.

Evidence: Precedent · plausibility at most 8.5

Cost and disruption to election offices

11points

Fifty states and thousands of counties would have to reprogramme registration systems, retrain staff and handle in-person document checks, on ten days of federal guidance and while primaries are still running. No one has costed it.

Value 5 · Administrative costImpact 4.5Plausibility 5
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Value

This stream is public money and public administrative capacity — funds that are raised from taxpayers and, once spent here, are unavailable elsewhere. It touches no one's rights and no one's health directly. Its weight in this evaluation is the standard weight for public expenditure, neither more nor less, and it is deliberately not raised because the spending happens in a constitutionally sensitive area. The value is moderate: public money always counts, and it counts the same here as anywhere else.

Impact

Without the measure, election offices run the cycle they have planned for two years. With it, they receive federal guidance within ten days of enactment [1] and must rebuild registration intake around in-person document presentation before the deadlines. That means software changes, new forms, staff training, longer counter queues, and a surge of provisional ballots to adjudicate afterwards. Money spent here is money not spent on poll worker recruitment or ballot processing in the same weeks, which is why the disruption matters beyond its price. No agency has produced a cost estimate; the figures in circulation are expert ranges in the tens to hundreds of millions of dollars [1]. Assuming a couple of hundred million once and fifty million annually thereafter gives roughly a hundred million dollars per year over the horizon. The Impact is small in money terms and its real weight is the timing rather than the sum.

Plausibility

That a national administrative change costs money is not in doubt; every figure attached to it here is. There is no fiscal note, no state-level estimate, and no comparable national rollout to transfer from. The band spans an order of magnitude, from thirty to two hundred and fifty million per year, and the true figure could sit outside it. What is better founded is the direction and the timing: the guidance window is fixed in the statute at ten days [1], and the primary calendar is a matter of public record. Low plausibility on the size, high on the fact that a cost falls in the wrong weeks.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5

Voters turned away at the polling place

3.4points

The requirement reaches every in-person voter, but this is the part of the measure the research has actually studied, and the studies find small effects. Most voters hold identification and those who do not can cast a provisional ballot and cure it.

Value 9 · Right to voteImpact 0.6Plausibility 6
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Value

The same stream again — a citizen entitled to vote does not vote. The particular people involved are those least likely to hold current identification, which correlates with age, income and housing stability rather than with entitlement. That the number is small does not change what each instance is: a person turned away at the door of a public election. The value is at the constitutional core, unchanged by the size of the count.

Impact

Without the measure, 36 states already ask for some form of identification and the rest do not. With it, photo identification is required everywhere for in-person voting. This argument counts only the residual after the registration gate: a person already blocked from registering never reaches the polling place, and counting them twice would inflate the total. Between 85 and 95 percent of the voting-eligible population holds valid photo identification [8], and a voter without one may cast a provisional ballot and present identification within three days [1]. What remains is voters who lack identification, do not know about the provisional route, or cannot return within three days: an estimated 10,000 to 60,000 lost votes in 2026 and fewer in 2028. The Impact is small because the exposed population is enormous but the share who both lack identification and fail to use the cure is very thin.

Plausibility

This is the one component with a real research literature, and it argues against the largest version of this objection. A review of the field found modest turnout effects at most [11]. A panel study using administrative registration and turnout records rather than surveys found no significant negative effect of strict identification laws on either [7]. A replication of the most-cited contrary finding showed that correcting data errors produces positive, negative or null estimates depending on specification, so no firm conclusion survives [8]. The dissent in the literature is real and has not been resolved [11], which is why the estimate is not set at zero. Transferring these findings to a nationwide first-time rollout on five weeks' notice also weakens them, since every study observes states that had time to prepare. What the studies establish is that the effect is small, not that it has this size: none of them can tell a loss of a few tens of thousands of votes among more than a hundred million from zero, so the number here rests on the mechanism — voters without identification who do not return within three days to cure a provisional ballot [1] — rather than on the literature. Middling plausibility: the studies bound the effect from above, the mechanism says it is not nothing, and neither measures it.

Evidence: Study · plausibility at most 9

Citizens removed in error by database matching

1.8points

The federal immigration database that states would be required to match against refers about one record in five thousand, and county review confirms only a fraction of those. Making the process mandatory and national in the weeks before an election removes the time to sort them out.

Value 9 · Right to voteImpact 0.3Plausibility 6.5
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Value

A citizen removed in error learns of it, if at all, when they try to vote. The people this falls on are concentrated among the naturalised, who are being asked to prove something the state has already adjudicated in their favour, sometimes decades earlier. The consequence is the loss of a vote in a specific election, the same stream as the arguments above, with the added weight that the burden falls on a group defined by how they became citizens. That does not raise the value ranking, which is already at the constitutional core, but it is what the argument is about. The value is at the constitutional core because a wrongly removed citizen has lost the same thing as a wrongly blocked one.

Impact

Without the measure, states use the federal database voluntarily and at their own pace, with time to review flagged records before an election. With it, matching is mandatory, national, and compressed into the pre-election period. Of 49.5 million registrations checked to date, roughly 10,000 were referred, about 0.02 percent, and county review confirmed only a fraction of those as genuine [1]. Texas flagged 2,724 records out of more than 18 million and found citizens among them [1]. The system's known weak point is people naturalised after their record was created, whose file still shows their earlier status [1]. Applied across 211 million registrations [2], mandatory matching implies roughly 40,000 referrals per cycle; if 10 to 40 percent are erroneous and go uncured before election day, that is a few thousand to fifteen thousand citizens removed. The Impact is small because the referral rate itself is very low, and it is not zero because the notice process the statute leaves to the states has the least time to work exactly when it is needed most.

Plausibility

The error direction is documented rather than hypothesised: Texas found citizens among its flagged records, and reporting has traced the naturalisation-timing problem to its cause in how the records are built [1]. What is not documented is what share survives county review under time pressure, because the existing use of the system has run with time to spare. The estimate therefore transfers an observed error type to an unobserved operating condition. The range of 10 to 40 percent uncured is wide and unanchored. Middling to good plausibility: that erroneous removals happen is established by real cases, and how many survive a compressed timetable is inference.

Evidence: Precedent · plausibility at most 7

How robust the result is

Under the assumptions used, the proposal brings more than it costs in fewer than 1 of 100 model runs.

gains more than it costscosts more than it gains

Each dot stands for 200 of the 20,000 model runs.

One vote at a national election is valued at a fixed sum, the same across democracy topics. The figure comes from two thin but real prices. One is Berlin's cost per affected ballot for its repeated 2023 election; the other is the lower end of American court awards for a vote denied, 500 to 2,000 dollars (Taylor versus Howe, 2002). Here it scales both sides alike: the few hundred ineligible votes prevented and the hundreds of thousands of eligible votes lost count in the same unit, so the result does not turn on it. The scenario is enactment around 30 September 2026, five weeks before the election: 1.5 percent of mail ballots lost in the first election, 0.5 percent in the second after one election of adjustment [14][15]. With the vote valued this way the act comes out ahead in none of the runs.

Show the distribution of the model runs

20,000 simulated futures

Very likely worse · 0 %

In fewer than 1 of 100 simulated futures the proposal brings more than it costs.

No effect is known exactly; every argument has a range. The calculation draws a possible size for each argument from its range 20,000 times and counts how often the benefits exceed the costs.

Net effect in points per future. Left of zero the drawbacks outweigh the benefits, right of zero the benefits win. Eight in ten futures fall between −137 and −40 points.
Scale and assessment

Scale of this evaluation: Normalised Impact, unitless and calibrated to this topic. For comparison, one point here corresponds to about 20 million euro-equivalent a year.

Size class:small

Effect medium (−1.7) · 4 % of the effect is positive

Areas show individual argument weights. The positive share of the effect nets out money transfers between the two sides; the probability of a positive net effect is determined separately.

How we score →

Review and sources

AI evaluation · not yet reviewed by a human

This evaluation was produced and sourced by an AI model; a human review is still pending. Figures and conclusions may still change. The review log is at the foot of the page.How review works →

Last reviewed by Claude Opus 5.5 · October 29, 2026 · 8× AI, not yet reviewed by a human
  1. October 29, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5record updated

    Page texts for the new page layout (draft G) with quotes from primary sources; numbers unchanged.

  2. October 21, 2026AI reviewClaude Fable 5.1record updated

    Money amounts in argument texts stated in dollars per style-en.md; scores, chains and balance unchanged

  3. October 20, 2026AI reviewClaude Fable 5.1record updated

    Summary and scale note rewritten to the style of 20 Oct 2026; numbers unchanged

  4. October 16, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5record updated

    Ranges added to four arguments from the bands stated in their reasoning; the balance is unchanged.

  5. October 14, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5re-scored

    Prüfbericht 11.10.: Ausweiskopie nur mit dem zurückgesandten Stimmzettel (S.1383 EAH § 303A(a)(2)), con-2b am Texas-Präzedenzfall SB 1 neu hergeleitet (0,033 → 0,185); con-1 mit dem Ersatzverfahren nach NVRA § 8(j)(3) um ein Sechstel gekürzt; Inkrafttreten 30.09.2026 als Szenario; r 0,060 → 0,044.

  6. September 24, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5record updated

    Herleitung des Stimmen-Werts auf conv/franchise/2.0 umgestellt (Reparaturpreis Berlin, US-Schadensersatz); 1.000 € bleiben, keine Zahl geändert.

  7. September 14, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5re-scored

    Gesamtprüfung 08.09.: Fristen korrigiert (5 Wochen bis zur Wahl, Registrierung schließt 4.–27.10.), P pro-1 8,5 → 6 (Audits ≠ Zusatzwirkung) und con-2a 8 → 6 (Studien begrenzen, messen nicht); r 0,06 → 0,06, Zeitkosten der Nachweise offen.

  8. August 25, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5First evaluation

    Taken from the archiv/usa-source-2026-08/ delivery (revision final); derived fields recomputed.

Evaluations are produced with AI support and reviewed on a schedule for new developments; human passes are marked separately.How we review →

Show all 16 sourcesHide sources
  1. FactCheck.org: Q&A on the SAVE America Act. factcheck.org
  2. U.S. Election Assistance Commission: Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024. eac.gov
  3. U.S. Election Assistance Commission: Election Administration and Voting Survey 2022. eac.gov
  4. Brennan Center for Justice: Millions of Americans don't have documents proving their citizenship readily available. brennancenter.org
  5. Bipartisan Policy Center: Do documentary proof of citizenship requirements disadvantage one party more than the other?. bipartisanpolicy.org
  6. Prism News: Kansas proof-of-citizenship voting law blocked 31,000 eligible voters. prismnews.com
  7. Cantoni & Pons, NBER Working Paper 25522: Strict ID Laws Don't Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008-2018. nber.org
  8. Grimmer, Hersh, Meredith, Mummolo & Nall, Journal of Politics 80(3): Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID Laws' Effect on Turnout. jmummolo.scholar.princeton.edu
  9. Brennan Center for Justice: State proof-of-citizenship requirements and litigation. brennancenter.org
  10. Ballotpedia: Voter registration proof of citizenship requirements by state. ballotpedia.org
  11. MIT Election Data and Science Lab: Voter identification. electionlab.mit.edu
  12. Votebeat Arizona: Who are the Arizona voters without proof of citizenship?. votebeat.org
  13. OpenSecrets: Total 2024 election spending projected to exceed previous record. opensecrets.org
  14. U.S. Government Publishing Office: S. 1383, Engrossed Amendment House (SAVE America Act text as passed by the House, 11 February 2026). govinfo.gov
  15. Election Law Blog: Despite mail voting changes, ballot rejections remain relatively low in 2022 midterms. electionlawblog.org
  16. Kansas Office of Revisor of Statutes: K.S.A. 25-2309, voter registration and evidence of citizenship, subsection (m). ksrevisor.gov

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