Repeal the Vehicle Standards

Withdraw the 2009 finding that greenhouse gases endanger health, and with it every federal emission standard for cars and trucks.

AI evaluation · not yet reviewed by a human

This evaluation was produced and sourced by an AI model; a human review is still pending. Figures and conclusions may still change. The review log is at the foot of the page.How review works →

The 2009 endangerment finding is the determination on which the federal government's authority to set greenhouse gas standards for vehicles rests. The Environmental Protection Agency rescinded it in February 2026 on the reading that the Clean Air Act does not reach emissions whose harm is global rather than local, and repealed in the same rule every greenhouse gas standard for light, medium and heavy vehicles back to model year 2012. Manufacturers no longer face a fleet average, a credit market or a compliance schedule. The rule took effect in April 2026 and is under challenge in the courts. This evaluation compares the decade from 2026 against the standards remaining in force, and counts the fuel and emissions of the vehicles sold in that decade over their whole lives.

Balance

Worse for the future · 0.23 previous scale

Balance on the previous scale. The Bilanz 2.0 simulation is not yet available for this evaluation. The category comes from the share of the debate on the pro side (r).

For 13 · 23 % Against 42 · 77 %

Size class: large Scale of this evaluation: Normalised Impact — unitless, calibrated to this topic. For comparison: one point here is worth roughly 5 billion euro per year. A tonne of carbon dioxide is valued here at 100 euro, the cost of avoiding it elsewhere, rather than at the higher figure American agencies use for the damage it causes. At the American damage figure the case against this repeal would be roughly twice as large again. How we score →

Arguments for

Arguments against

6 arguments evaluated · Scoring v1.3 Δ absolute −29

Arguments — For

2 arguments

Cars cost less to build

12of 100

Meeting the standards meant fitting technology that buyers pay for: hybrid drivetrains, lighter materials, and for a growing share of the fleet an electric powertrain. Without the standards that spending stops. A petrol car is about 1,800 dollars cheaper once the rules that were due in 2032 are gone.

Value 5 · BudgetsImpact 4.4Plausibility 5.5

▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

The stream is money not spent on building a vehicle, priced at the middle of the scale like any other. It is a real saving rather than a transfer: the components are not made, the assembly steps do not happen, the materials stay in the ground. Who keeps it — the manufacturer as margin or the buyer as a lower price — does not change the weight, and the two are close in any case in a competitive market. That new-car buyers earn somewhat above the American median lowers the weight slightly, and that adjustment is in the Impact. What the vehicle then costs to run is a separate stream on the other side of the ledger. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is money and the distribution it lands in is priced in the Impact.

Modelling of the light-duty repeal puts the price of a petrol vehicle about 1,808 dollars lower in 2032 than it would have been under the standards, and the total saving to buyers at 717 billion dollars over the quarter century to 2050 ^[2]. Spread evenly that is 28.7 billion dollars a year, or 24.7 billion euro at 1.16 dollars to the euro. Reading it as an even annual figure is a simplification in both directions: the saving is smaller in the first years, when the standards were less demanding, and larger later. New-vehicle buyers earn above the American median, where this site counts a euro at 0.9 rather than 1.0, giving 22.2 billion euro a year, in a range from 12 to 30 billion. The medium and heavy vehicle standards are repealed too and their saving is not in this figure, so the number is if anything low. The Impact is the largest on the pro side and is the whole of the case for the repeal in money terms.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation

	Saving to vehicle buyers over the quarter century to 2050 [2]	about 1,808 dollars a petrol vehicle in 2032	717 billion dollars
÷	Per year read as an even annual figure; the saving is smaller in the first years and larger later	25	28.7 billion dollars a year
÷	In euro	1.16 dollars to the euro	24.7 billion euro
×	Weight of a euro at these incomes Setting, range 0.7 to 1.0: new-vehicle buyers earn above the American median, where this site counts a euro slightly below 1.0	0.9	22.2 billion euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	5 billion euro a point	4.4

Score 4.4 Impact × 5 Value × 5.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 12 of 100

That removing a requirement removes its cost is not a prediction. What is estimated is the size, and here two independent modelling exercises exist and disagree by a wide margin: the agency's own analysis of the repeal and an academic model built on the same vehicle-choice framework ^[2]^[6]. The counterfactual in both is the standards as written for model years 2027 onward, which is a documented rule rather than a scenario. The confounder that matters is technology cost: if battery and drivetrain costs fall faster than either model assumes, the standards would have been cheap to meet and the saving is smaller. That has happened repeatedly over the past decade and is not resolved by either model, which is why the range around this figure is wide. Reverse causation does not arise. The one point on which both models agree is the direction and the order of magnitude. The Plausibility is at the upper end of what a projection can carry: the direction is certain, the size rests on assumptions about technology cost that have been wrong before.

evidence basis: Projection · P ceiling 6 identification: Mechanistic · rung ceiling 6

Counterfactual: the standards as written for model years 2027 onward. Design: mechanistic — the chain (requirement removed → technology not fitted → price falls) is named and modelled by two independent teams [2][6], but the size rests on assumed technology costs rather than on an observed price response. Confounder: battery and drivetrain costs falling faster than assumed, which would shrink the saving; unresolved by either model. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: projektion 6.0 binds, and the mechanistic ceiling of 6.0 gives the same. The size doubt sits in the 12 to 30 billion euro band.

Buyers get the vehicle they wanted

0.6of 100

A fleet average obliges a manufacturer to sell a certain mix, not to persuade anyone. The usual method is to price electric models below cost and recover it on everything else. Buyers who would rather have had something different, and could not charge at home, were paying for that.

Value 4 · Everyday autonomyImpact 0.4Plausibility 4

▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

The stream is the fit between the vehicle a household owns and the one it would have chosen: a driver with no off-street parking who ends up with a plug-in, a household in a cold region whose winter range is half the label. This site places that in the class it uses for convenience and everyday autonomy, well below life, health or the environment. It is not nothing — a vehicle is a household's second largest purchase and living with the wrong one is a daily matter — but it is a matter of preference rather than of need. The money side of the same trade is counted in the argument above and is not repeated here. The value is in the lower part of the scale, because what is at stake is the fit of a purchase rather than anything a household depends on.

Electric vehicles were about a tenth of American sales in 2026, and the standards were pushing that share up faster than buyers were moving on their own. If three percentage points of the fleet — about 480,000 vehicles a year — went to buyers who would have preferred something else, and each valued the difference at 3,000 euro, that is 1.4 billion euro a year. A wider reading, counting buyers steered between engine sizes and body styles rather than only between fuels, gives about 1.9 billion, which is the figure used, in a range from 0.5 to 4 billion. Set against this is the fact that a buyer who is compensated with a lower price on the model they did take is not worse off, and the cross-subsidy means many were. That is why the figure sits well below what the raw share difference would suggest. The Impact is small next to the money in this debate, because the standards constrained what manufacturers offered rather than what anyone was required to buy.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation

	American new vehicle sales a year [5]		16 million vehicles
×	Share steered to a vehicle the buyer would not have chosen Setting, range 1 to 8 percent: three percentage points between fuels plus a wider allowance for engine sizes and body styles	4 %	640,000 vehicles a year
×	What the mismatch is worth to the buyer Setting, range 1,000 to 6,000 euro; buyers of the cross-subsidised models gained part of this back, which is why the figure sits below the raw share difference	3,000 euro each	1,920 million euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	5 billion euro a point	0.38

Score 0.38 Impact × 4 Value × 4 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.6 of 100

Nobody has measured this. The counterfactual is a market with the same vehicles on offer but no fleet requirement behind them, and no such market exists to compare against — every large vehicle market has some version of the rule. The chain is short and each link is visible: a fleet average obliges a mix, manufacturers price to achieve it, and some buyers end up with a vehicle they would not have chosen at undistorted prices. The counter-mechanism is strong and is answered rather than ignored: buyers who took the cross-subsidised model paid less than they otherwise would have, so part of what looks like a loss is a gain to somebody else in the same market, and the figure used here already sits below what the share difference alone implies. What is missing is any estimate of how many buyers were genuinely steered rather than persuaded. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is below the middle: every step is visible and none of them has been measured.

evidence basis: Mechanism · P ceiling 6 identification: Mechanistic · rung ceiling 6 band: Chain closed, unevidenced · P 4–5

Counterfactual: the same vehicles offered without a fleet requirement — not observable, since every large market has some version of the rule. Design: mechanistic — chain named (fleet average → cross-subsidised pricing → some buyers steered), nothing measured. Confounder: buyers of the cross-subsidised models gaining what the steered buyers lose, answered by setting the figure below what the share difference implies. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: mechanistic 6.0 binds. Band: chain closed but unevidenced — every link is named and the cross-subsidy counter-mechanism is answered; only the measurement is missing.

Nothing measured argues against the claim, and the one counter-mechanism — that the buyers of cross-subsidised models gained what the steered buyers lost — is answered by taking a figure below the raw share difference. Read back: about half the time, the mismatch between the vehicle bought and the vehicle wanted is worth roughly what is assumed here.

Open: Vehicle registration data for model years 2027 and 2028, once the repeal has worked through, will show how the mix moves when the requirement is gone, and could carry P to 6.

Arguments — Against

4 arguments · top 3 shown

Two hundred and fifty million tonnes more each year

21of 100

Every vehicle sold under the repealed standards burns more fuel for fifteen years. The agency's own accounting of the rescission puts the extra carbon dioxide in the thousands of millions of tonnes. American emissions were already rising again in 2025.

Value 7 · ClimateImpact 5Plausibility 6

▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

The stream is carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which this site places in the class it uses for the environment and for broad participation, below life and health and above money. It is not weighted at the level of a life because what is priced here is the physical quantity rather than any particular person's harm; the deaths and illness that climate change causes are the reason the quantity matters, not a second stream to be added. Nothing about the American share of a global problem lowers the weight — a tonne is a tonne wherever it is emitted. What a tonne is worth is set in the derivation and is the single most contestable number in this evaluation. The value sits in the upper middle of the scale, at the level this site uses for the environment.

The rescission removes greenhouse gas standards for light, medium and heavy vehicles for every model year from 2012 onward. Estimates of the cumulative additional carbon dioxide over the three decades that follow run from about 6,800 to 8,300 million tonnes ^[2]^[4]. Taking 7,500 million tonnes over thirty years and reading it as an even annual figure gives 250 million tonnes a year, in a range from 150 to 350. The evenness is a simplification: almost none of it happens in 2026 and a great deal happens in the 2040s, because the effect accumulates as the fleet turns over. For scale, American energy-related emissions were 4,904 million tonnes in 2025 and rising ^[5], so the standards were holding back something like five percent of the national total once fully in effect. A tonne is valued here at 100 euro, the cost of avoiding it elsewhere. The Impact is the largest in this debate and, at the price used here, roughly equal to the fuel bill it causes.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation

	Additional carbon dioxide over the three decades after the repeal [2][4]	estimates run from 6,800 to 8,300 million tonnes	7,500 million tonnes
÷	Per year read as an even annual figure; almost none of it falls in the first years and much of it in the 2040s, as the fleet turns over	30	250 million tonnes a year
×	Value of a tonne the cost of avoiding a tonne elsewhere, which is the rate this site uses	100 euro	25 billion euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	5 billion euro a point	5

Score 5 Impact × 7 Value × 6 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 21 of 100

Two things carry this figure: that the standards would have reduced emissions, and by how much. The first is close to definitional — a fleet average expressed in grams of carbon dioxide per mile reduces grams of carbon dioxide per mile — but only if manufacturers comply rather than pay penalties, and compliance under the credit market has been high enough that this is not a live doubt. The counterfactual is the standards as written, and the emissions path under them is modelled by the agency itself and independently ^[2]^[4]. The confounder that matters is the same one that affects the price argument: if electric vehicles were going to take over the fleet regardless of the rule, the standards were adding little and their removal takes little away. That is a real possibility and it is unresolved, and it works in the same direction as the wide range around this figure rather than against the direction of the argument. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the top of what a projection can carry: the mechanism is close to arithmetic and the size depends on a market path nobody can observe yet.

evidence basis: Projection · P ceiling 6 identification: Definitional · no rung ceiling

Counterfactual: the vehicle standards as written for model years 2012 onward. Design: definitional for the mechanism — a limit stated in grams of carbon dioxide per mile reduces grams per mile where it binds, and compliance under the credit market has been high; the size is a projection. Confounder: electric vehicles taking the fleet regardless of the rule, which would shrink the effect; unresolved and reflected in the 150 to 350 million tonne band. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: projektion 6.0 binds because the emissions path is modelled; definitional carries no ceiling of its own.

Drivers pay more at the pump than they save at the dealer

18of 100

A less efficient vehicle is cheaper to buy and dearer to run, and it is run for fifteen years. The modelling of the light-duty repeal finds the fuel bill exceeds the price saving by about 170 billion dollars. The saving arrives once; the fuel bill arrives every week.

Value 5 · Household budgetsImpact 6.1Plausibility 6

▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

The stream is fuel that households buy and burn, priced at the middle of the scale like any other money. It is a real cost rather than a transfer: the fuel is refined, delivered and consumed, and none of it comes back. Part of what a driver pays is tax and part is refiner margin, and neither changes the weight, because a euro is a euro at every stage of that chain. Drivers span the income distribution closely enough that no adjustment is made either way. The carbon dioxide the same fuel releases is a separate stream and is counted separately, because the damage it does is not paid for by the person who buys the fuel. The value is the middle of the scale, because the stream is money spent on a real good.

The modelling of the light-duty repeal puts the additional fuel bill at about 887 billion dollars over the quarter century to 2050 — the 717 billion that buyers save on vehicle prices plus the 170 billion by which they end up worse off overall ^[2]. That is 35.5 billion dollars a year, or 30.6 billion euro at 1.16 dollars to the euro, in a range from 18 to 42 billion. The medium and heavy vehicle standards, whose fuel savings per vehicle are the largest of all, are repealed in the same rule and are not in this figure. The timing is what makes this argument work: a buyer sees the lower price once, at the moment of purchase, and pays the difference back over fifteen years of driving. That is also why the standards existed — they assume buyers weigh a fuel bill fifteen years out at less than it is worth. The Impact is the second largest in this debate, and it is larger than the price saving that is the whole case for the repeal.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation

	Additional fuel bill over the quarter century to 2050 [2]	717 billion of vehicle price savings plus the 170 billion by which buyers end up worse off	887 billion dollars
÷	Per year	25	35.5 billion dollars a year
÷	In euro Setting, range 18 to 42 billion euro, set by the fuel price over fifteen years	1.16 dollars to the euro	30.6 billion euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	5 billion euro a point	6.1

Score 6.1 Impact × 5 Value × 6 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 18 of 100

The fuel arithmetic is straightforward: a vehicle with a known consumption rate driven a known distance at a known price burns a calculable amount of fuel, and all three inputs are measured rather than assumed. The counterfactual is the fleet efficiency the standards would have required, which is written into the repealed rule. What is projected is the fuel price over fifteen years, and that is genuinely uncertain in both directions — the range used here spans a fuel price from well below to well above today's. The confounder that matters is the rebound effect: a cheaper mile is driven more often, which raises the fuel bill further but also delivers something the driver wanted, so it should not be counted as pure loss. The modelling used here nets that out, which is why this figure is lower than a simple efficiency calculation would give ^[2]. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the top of what a projection can carry: the physical arithmetic is measured and only the fuel price is forecast.

evidence basis: Projection · P ceiling 6 identification: Definitional · no rung ceiling

Counterfactual: the fleet efficiency the repealed standards would have required. Design: definitional for the mechanism — fuel burned follows from consumption rate, distance and price, all measured; the fuel price over fifteen years is the projected element. Confounder: the rebound effect, cheaper miles being driven more often; netted out in the modelling used [2]. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: projektion 6.0 binds; definitional carries no ceiling of its own. The size doubt sits in the 18 to 42 billion euro band.

Factories built for a fleet that is no longer required

1.4of 100

Manufacturers committed capital to battery and assembly plants on the assumption that the standards would hold. Some of that capacity now has less to make. The plants do not disappear; they run below what they were sized for.

Value 6 · OutputImpact 0.5Plausibility 4.5

▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

The stream is capital that produces less than it was built to produce: assembly lines running one shift instead of three, battery plants at half their design output, and the workers who were hired for the difference. It belongs to the class this site uses for economic systems and prosperity. What is counted is the output foregone, not the money that was spent building the plants, which is gone either way and would be a sunk cost if it were counted. Whether the manufacturer or its shareholders bear the loss makes no difference to the weight. The value sits in the middle-upper part of the scale, at the level this site uses for economic output.

American manufacturers announced on the order of 120 billion dollars of battery and electric assembly capacity in the years when the standards were being written, and a repeal that removes the requirement removes part of the demand those plants were sized for. A quarter of that capital running below its design output is used here, in a range from a tenth to a half, which is 30 billion dollars of underused investment. Spread across the decade counted here that is 3 billion dollars a year, or 2.6 billion euro at 1.16 dollars to the euro. What the figure does not assume is that the plants close or that electric vehicles stop selling: the market continues to grow on its own, and the loss counted here is only the difference between the capacity built and the capacity used. The Impact is a tenth of the fuel bill, which is the honest scale of the objection: it is real, it falls on identifiable firms and towns, and it is not what decides this debate.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation

	Announced battery and electric assembly capacity [3]		120 billion dollars
×	Share running below its design output Setting, range 10 to 50 percent: several states keep their own standards and several manufacturers have said they will hold to their plans regardless	25 %	30 billion dollars
÷	Spread across the decade counted here	10	3 billion dollars a year
÷	In euro	1.16 dollars to the euro	2.6 billion euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	5 billion euro a point	0.52

Score 0.52 Impact × 6 Value × 4.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.4 of 100

The mechanism is not in doubt — capacity built against a requirement that is then withdrawn has less to do — and the counterfactual is the same plants under the standards as written. What has no source is the size. Nobody has published a figure for how much announced capacity is now surplus, partly because the answer depends on how fast the market grows without the rule, which nobody knows. The counter-mechanism is strong and only partly answered: several states have their own vehicle standards and several manufacturers have said they will hold to their electric plans regardless, both of which would leave the capacity fully used, and the quarter used here is meant to reflect that rather than resolve it. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is below the middle because the size of this loss has no source behind it and the counter-argument that the market absorbs the capacity anyway is unresolved.

evidence basis: Mechanism · P ceiling 6 identification: Mechanistic · rung ceiling 6 band: Chain closed, unevidenced · P 4–5

Counterfactual: the same announced plants under the standards as written. Design: mechanistic — chain named (requirement withdrawn → part of the demand disappears → capacity runs below design), with no source for the size. Confounder: state-level vehicle standards and manufacturers holding to their plans regardless, which would leave capacity fully used; partly reflected in the quarter used, not resolved. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: mechanistic 6.0 binds. Band: chain closed but unevidenced — every link is named and the counter-mechanism is addressed by the low share chosen; only the measurement is missing.

Nothing measured argues against the claim; what is missing is any published figure for surplus capacity. The counter-mechanism — state standards and manufacturer commitments keeping the plants full — is addressed by taking only a quarter of the announced capital. Read back: about half the time, roughly a quarter of the announced capacity runs below what it was built for.

Open: Plant-level utilisation is reported by manufacturers in their quarterly filings. Two years of those, against the announced design capacity, would replace the setting with a measurement and could carry P to 6.

More nitrogen oxides in the air people breathe

1.3of 100

Greenhouse gas standards and smog standards are different rules, but a fleet that burns more fuel emits more of everything. The repeal is estimated to add 114,000 tonnes of nitrogen oxides a year by 2055. Nitrogen oxides are what turns sunlight into summer smog.

Value 7 · Air and healthImpact 0.3Plausibility 5.5

▸ Show reasoning & sources ▾ Hide reasoning & sources

The stream is air quality where people live, and through it asthma attacks, hospital admissions and shortened lives in the areas downwind of busy roads. It sits between the environment and health, which is where this site puts it: above money, below life alone. The harm is concentrated rather than spread — the people who breathe roadside air are disproportionately those who live near motorways, who are poorer than average — but that concentration is a fact about who bears it rather than about what it is worth, and no separate adjustment is made for it here. The carbon dioxide from the same fuel is a different stream with a different reach and is counted separately. The value sits in the upper middle of the scale, between the environment and health, because the stream is both.

Repealing the car and truck rules together is estimated to put an additional 114,000 tonnes of nitrogen oxides into the air each year by 2055 ^[4]. That figure is the endpoint of a slow accumulation, so an average across the decade counted here would be lower; against that, the estimate covers only the vehicle rules and not the wider consequences of withdrawing the finding they rest on. The endpoint figure is used, in a range from 50,000 to 150,000 tonnes. A tonne of nitrogen oxides is valued on this site at the health damage it causes, which is where the figure of 1.76 billion euro a year comes from. What is not counted separately is the fine particulate matter that travels with it, because no estimate separates the two cleanly and adding a second stream on the same fuel would price the same combustion twice. The Impact is small beside the carbon dioxide and the fuel, and it is the part of this debate that lands on identifiable people in identifiable places.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation

	Additional nitrogen oxides from the car and truck rules together Setting, range 50,000 to 150,000 tonnes: the endpoint of a slow accumulation, against an estimate that covers only the vehicle rules [4]	by 2055	114,000 tonnes a year
×	Health damage a tonne causes the rate this site uses for nitrogen oxides	15,400 euro	1,756 million euro
÷	Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation	5 billion euro a point	0.35

Score 0.35 Impact × 7 Value × 5.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 1.3 of 100

That burning more fuel emits more nitrogen oxides is chemistry rather than behaviour, and the counterfactual — the fleet under the repealed standards — is documented in the rule itself. The estimate used here comes from an advocacy organisation's analysis rather than from the agency, which did not quantify the effect in its own accounting of the repeal ^[4]^[6]. That is a real weakness: the number has not been through the scrutiny an agency estimate receives, and it points in the direction its author expected. The confounder that matters is that separate smog rules remain in force and constrain nitrogen oxides directly, so part of what this argument counts may be prevented by a rule this measure does not touch. That is unresolved and it is the main reason the figure is not scored higher. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is somewhat above the middle: the chemistry is certain, the estimate is one-sided in origin, and a separate rule may catch part of the effect.

evidence basis: Projection · P ceiling 6 identification: Mechanistic · rung ceiling 6

Counterfactual: the vehicle fleet under the repealed standards, as documented in the rule. Design: mechanistic — more fuel burned means more nitrogen oxides, but the quantity comes from a single advocacy analysis rather than an agency estimate [4]. Confounder: the separate smog rules, still in force, which constrain nitrogen oxides directly and may prevent part of the effect; unresolved. Direction: no reverse causation. Ceiling: mechanistic 6.0 binds. The single-source origin is reflected in P sitting below that ceiling rather than in a band, since the claim is supported rather than contradicted.

Summary

This is an unusually one-sided ledger and the reason is not the climate but the fuel. A vehicle built without the standards is about 1,800 dollars cheaper and burns enough extra fuel over fifteen years to more than swallow that, which is the finding of the modelling and the reason the repeal costs households money before any environmental effect is counted at all. Add 250 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year at the price this site uses — well below the figure American agencies themselves apply — and the case against is three times the case for. What would change the picture is a single assumption: that buyers correctly weigh a fuel bill fifteen years out, in which case the price saving is what they wanted and the fuel cost is what they chose. Every efficiency standard ever written rests on the belief that they do not, and that belief is the hinge of this debate rather than anything about the climate.

Outlook — effect over time

Worse for the future · 0.23 previous scale

Sources

Federal Register: Rescission of the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards Under the Clean Air Act. federalregister.gov
Resources for the Future: Losing the Endangerment Finding: The Costs and Benefits of Repealing Emissions Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles. resources.org
Congressional Research Service: Clean Air Act: EPA's Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Repeal. congress.gov
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy: EPA Car and Truck Standards Rollback Will Cost Consumers Billions. aceee.org
U.S. Energy Information Administration: U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 2025. eia.gov
Institute for Policy Integrity: Fact Sheet: Flaws in EPA's Repeal of the Endangerment Finding. policyintegrity.org

Last reviewed by Claude Opus 5 · September 6, 2026 · 1× AI, not yet reviewed by a human

September 6, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5First evaluation
Created for the English side: fuel, vehicle price and emission streams rebuilt from independent modelling at this site's carbon price rather than the American damage figure.

Evaluations are produced with AI support and reviewed on a schedule for new developments; human passes are marked separately.How we review →