Election Administration and Voting Rights

Ballots by Election Day

A federal rule that a mail ballot in a federal election counts only if it reaches election officials before the polls close on Election Day.

7 arguments 18 Sources
  • 745,000 mail ballots postmarked in time arrived after Election Day in 2024 and were counted [4]
  • 1,564 ballots arrived too late in Ohio's first election without a grace period, the primary in May 2026 [8]
  • 83 % of likely voters told pollsters in March 2026 that ballots should be received by Election Day [13]

Fifteen states and the District of Columbia count mail ballots that are postmarked by Election Day and arrive afterwards [5]. On 29 June 2026 the Supreme Court left that choice to the states; Republicans in both chambers then filed bills to end these grace periods for federal races [1][2][3]. Voting rights groups defend the grace periods; the bills sit in committee, and neither chamber has voted.

The proposal

In federal elections, a mail ballot counts only if it reaches election officials before the polls close on Election Day; military and overseas ballots stay exempt.

The key question

Does requiring mail ballots to arrive by Election Day make people trust the count more, without costing votes that were mailed on time?

The debate

Supporters say a firm deadline gives voters certainty and results on election night, and that ballots arriving for days afterwards erode trust [1]. Opponents, among them voting rights groups, say a postal delay the voter cannot control should not erase a ballot mailed in time [3]. The Supreme Court settled the underlying legal question five to four on 29 June 2026. On the bills themselves, no committee and no chamber has voted.

  • “Election Day should mean election results. When the polls close, voters should have confidence that the voting is over and election officials can move forward with determining the results.”

    argues for: Laurel Lee, Republican Press release, 3 September 2026
  • “The Ballots by Election Day Act is a simple fix to rebuild trust in elections.”

    argues for: Ashley Moody, Republican Press release, 3 September 2026
  • “This ruling ensures that a postal delay outside of any voter’s control does not erase a lawfully cast ballot and supports election officials’ ability to capture the will of voters.”

    argues against: Pamela Smith, Verified Voting Statement on Watson v. RNC, 29 June 2026

The analysis

Ballots by Election Day

9% of the weight is for, 91% against.

An argument's weight combines three questions: how big the effect is, how certain it is and how much the good at stake matters. The larger the slice, the more the argument weighs.

For

Against

Answer to the key question

Does requiring mail ballots to arrive by Election Day make people trust the count more, without costing votes that were mailed on time?

No on both counts. No measurement shows that an earlier deadline raises confidence in the result, and no ballot filled in after the polls closed has been documented. Most voters would simply mail earlier, but some would miss the deadline, and their votes would not count.

On the current analysis, requiring mail ballots to arrive by Election Day is a poor proposal: it would cost more votes than it can be shown to protect.

Very likely worse

Very likely worse: Under the assumptions used, the proposal brings more than it costs in 3 of 100 model runs.

Overall effect: small

How strongly the proposal works overall, in five steps from very small to very large, comparable across all debates. The ring is always full, even when the overall effect is small; this step says how large it is.

Here the opponents have the better case, and for the reason they give: votes lost in the mail. That single item outweighs everything else on the page, because at each election a small share of the many voters who mail late fails to adapt. The second weight against, the choice the Supreme Court left to sixteen legislatures, is more than twice the strongest argument for the bill. That argument, trust in a count that ends on election night, is the one supporters stress. No measurement shows that a deadline raises confidence, however, and no ballot filled in after the polls closed has been documented.

In detail

All arguments

Arguments for4 arguments

Confidence in the count

0.036points

In a March 2026 poll, 83 percent of likely voters said ballots should be received by Election Day, and 59 percent said they would not trust results that include ballots arriving later. A single deadline removes one reason for that doubt. How much trust it adds has not been measured, and confidence in mail voting follows party lines more than rules.

Value 6 · Trust in institutionsImpact 0.02Plausibility 3
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Value

The stream is whether people accept the result of an election, including one their side lost, which is what lets power change hands without force. That is a real public good close to the constitutional core, but the consequence here is a diffuse shift in confidence rather than a change in who can vote. It touches many people lightly and no one heavily. The same value is used for confidence in the result in this site's evaluation of the SAVE America Act. The value is in the middle of the scale: legitimacy matters greatly, and a marginal shift in stated confidence is a thin slice of it.

Impact

Without the measure, counts in states with grace periods keep moving for days after Election Day as late ballots arrive, and in 2024 California's long count left control of the House unsettled for more than a month [17]. In a poll for an advocacy group that favours the deadline, 59 percent of likely voters said they would not trust results that include late-arriving ballots, and 76 percent of Republicans said so [13]. Stated distrust is not the change the measure makes: confidence that mail ballots are counted as intended follows party far more than rules, at 67 percent among Republican and 78 percent among Democratic mail voters in October 2026 [14], and a deadline that costs some voters their ballot lowers confidence among others. Net, 15 percent of the 158 million people who voted in 2024 are assumed to gain confidence, in a range from 5 to 30 percent [11]. Each is valued at 1.16 dollars a year, in a range from 58 cents to 2.32 dollars, the low end of what this site uses for approval or disapproval spread thinly across many people. That gives 27.5 million dollars a year. The Impact is small because a large stated number shrinks to a net shift once the opposite reaction to the same rule is counted.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
158 million voters
People who voted in 2024
× × 0.15 Setting, range 0.05 to 0.30: well below the 59 percent who state distrust, because confidence follows party and the rule lowers it for others
23.7 million people
Net share who gain confidence in the result
× × 1 euro Setting, range 0.50 to 2 euro, the low end of this site's figures for thinly spread approval
23.7 million euro a year
Value of the gain per person and year
÷ 1 billion euro a point scale of this evaluation; range 0.0076 to 0.074
0.02
Normalised Impact
Score 0.02 Impact × 6 Value × 3 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.0 of 100

Plausibility

The counterfactual is the same electorate under today's grace periods. Polls measure stated support for a deadline well, but no study shows that ending grace periods raises acceptance of results afterwards, and the four states that ended theirs in 2025 have produced no before-and-after measurement of confidence [4]. The poll that carries the size was commissioned by a group campaigning for the deadline, and its full wording is not published [13]. The confounder is partisanship: confidence in mail voting splits by party and moves with what party leaders say, which a deadline does not change [14]. A cross-state comparison also finds that states with and without grace periods reported nearly all results within a week in 2024 [6], which weakens the link from deadline to a settled count. The chain from rule to trust is named, and its load-bearing link has not been checked. The Plausibility is low, about one in three: the doubt is real, and nothing yet shows that this rule removes it.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Open: A survey of acceptance of results before and after the 2025 changes in Ohio, Kansas, North Dakota or Utah would show whether the effect exists and could lift the Plausibility to about 5.

No ballots filled in after the polls close

0.00041points

Where a late ballot has no readable postmark, some states presume it was mailed in time, so in principle someone could vote after the results are known. No such case has been documented. The ballots without postmarks number in the hundreds per state, and those filled in late, if any, far fewer.

Value 9 · Integrity of the voteImpact 0.00023Plausibility 2
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Value

A ballot filled in after the polls close is not a valid vote, and counting it dilutes the votes of everyone who voted in time; that is the integrity of the vote, at the constitutional core [3]. This site values a prevented invalid vote the same as a lost valid one, so that both sides of the question are weighed on one scale. The value concerns the rule being kept, not who would benefit. Nothing in the argument depends on organised fraud: a single person mailing late with knowledge of early returns is the case it describes. The value is at the constitutional core because the election should end for everyone at the same moment.

Impact

Without the measure, ballots that arrive after Election Day without a readable postmark can still count in some states: Nevada counts them if they arrive within three days, a rule its Supreme Court upheld in October 2024 [15]. Their number is small: 24 such ballots reached Nevada after its 2024 primaries [15], and in Kansas 104 late ballots had no postmark against 2,110 counted late ones, about five percent [4]. Five percent of the 1.85 million late arrivals expected over the four years is used, in a range from 2 to 10 percent, or about 92,000 ballots. Of those, one percent is assumed to have been filled in after the polls closed, in a range from 0.3 to 3 percent, since no such case has been documented. That gives about 920 ballots over four years, or 231 a year, each valued at 1,160 dollars. The Impact is very small because the opening is narrow and nothing shows that it is used.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
1,846,800 ballots
Late-arriving ballots over the four years
× × 0.05 Setting, range 0.02 to 0.10: Kansas 104 against 2,110 in 2024; Nevada 24 after its primaries
92,340 ballots
Without a readable postmark
× × 0.01 Setting, range 0.003 to 0.03: no documented case
923 ballots
Filled in after the polls closed
÷ 4 years
231 ballots a year
Per year
× 1,000 euro each the value of a vote at a national election used across this site
0.23 million euro a year
Value of a vote
÷ 1 billion euro a point scale of this evaluation; range 0.000057 to 0.00094
0
Normalised Impact
Score 0 Impact × 9 Value × 2 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.0 of 100

Plausibility

The counterfactual is the current rules. That ballots without postmarks arrive is documented [4][15]; that any of them was filled in after the polls closed is not, and the Nevada court found that the national party had offered no evidence for its claims [15]. Postmarks are often missing or delayed because of how mail is processed, which the postal service itself acknowledges [4], so the gap has an explanation that needs no late voting. There is no study, no precedent and no closed chain that carries the claim, and no finding against it either. The Plausibility is low, about one in five: the opening exists, and nothing shows it being used.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5 Placement: No carrier, but conceivable · plausibility 1.5–2.5

Results settled sooner

0points

Supporters say counts would finish sooner if every ballot were in hand when the polls close. A comparison of the 2024 election finds that states with and without grace periods reported nearly all results within a week. The argument is recorded but not valued.

Value 6 · Administrative qualityImpact 0Plausibility 2
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Value

The stream is how quickly and cleanly election offices finish the count, which matters most when races are close and control of a chamber is at stake. It is valued as the quality of public administration, in the middle of the scale. Speed has no value of its own beyond what it does for certainty about who won. The trust that follows from a settled count is the subject of the first argument; this one would count only the administrative side. The value is in the middle of the scale, at the level of how well public systems work.

Impact

Without the measure, offices in grace-period states keep accepting ballots for up to three weeks [5]. Los Angeles County needed six days to count 85 percent of its 2.2 million primary ballots in June 2026, while Florida counted 85 percent of 3.3 million within 45 minutes in August [17]. With the measure, every ballot is in hand on election night. The cross-state comparison, however, finds that states with and without grace periods reported nearly all 2024 results within a week, a difference the analysis could not distinguish from chance [6]. No source puts a value on finishing a count a few days earlier, and this site has no rule for pricing it. The Impact is not assessed: the argument belongs to this debate, but its size cannot yet be derived.

Plausibility

The counterfactual is the current rules. The claim has been tested in the sense that both kinds of state ran the 2024 election side by side, and their reporting times did not differ in a way the analysis could detect [6]. That comparison has no design that isolates the deadline, so it shows that the effect is not large rather than that it is absent. Single cases such as Los Angeles and Florida differ in far more than the deadline [17]. The Plausibility is low, about one in five, because where the comparison has been made the effect did not show.

Recorded, not yet scored: Recorded but not assessed: no source values a count that finishes a few days earlier, and this site has no rule for pricing the time to a final result. If a study shows that receipt deadlines shorten the time to certification, the gain is booked here as administrative quality.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5 Placement: Effect did not materialise · plausibility 1.5–2

One deadline for every federal race

0points

Today a ballot in a federal race may count if it arrives a day, a week or three weeks after Election Day, depending on the state, and the question has been fought in court in Nevada and Mississippi. A single federal deadline ends that patchwork for federal races. It creates a new one inside states that keep later deadlines for their own contests.

Value 6 · Administrative qualityImpact 0Plausibility 3.5
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Value

The stream is the friction of a patchwork: rules that differ by state, campaigns and election offices that must tell voters different things, and lawsuits over which deadline applies. It is valued as the quality of public administration, in the middle of the scale. The same good appears in this site's evaluation of the SAVE America Act, where one federal rule replaces twelve state regimes. It concerns how smoothly the system runs, not whether anyone can vote. The value is in the middle of the scale, at the level of how well public systems work.

Impact

Without the measure, deadlines run from the close of the polls in most states to one, three, four, five, six, seven, ten, fourteen or about twenty-one days after Election Day elsewhere [5], and the national party has sued over them in Nevada and in Mississippi, the latter up to the Supreme Court [3][15]. With it, one rule governs every federal race. A state that keeps its grace period for governor, legislature or ballot measures would, however, run two deadlines for the ballots in one envelope, which moves the friction into the count rather than removing it [6]. No source counts the legal or administrative cost of the current patchwork or of the split that would replace it. The Impact is not assessed: the friction removed and the friction created are both real, and neither has been measured.

Plausibility

The counterfactual is the current rules. That the federal rule is uniform is the text of the bills [1][2]. Whether uniformity lowers total friction depends on how many states align the deadlines for their own contests, which is open, and the Bipartisan Policy Center names split federal and state deadlines as a risk [6]. The chain is named, and its load-bearing link, how states respond, has not been checked. The Plausibility is about one in three: the simplification is real for federal races and may reappear one level down.

Recorded, not yet scored: Recorded but not assessed: neither the legal and administrative cost of sixteen different deadlines nor the cost of running split deadlines for state and federal contests has been counted. If either is measured, the net change is booked here as administrative quality.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5 Placement: Chain open · plausibility 3–3.5

Arguments against3 arguments

Votes lost in the mail

0.27points

In 2024 more than 745,000 ballots that were mailed in time reached election offices after Election Day and were counted. Under a receipt deadline most of these voters would mail earlier, but not all: in Ohio's first election without a grace period, 1,564 ballots arrived too late and were not counted. Across the 2028 and 2030 elections that comes to about 53,000 lost votes a year.

Value 9 · Right to voteImpact 0.05Plausibility 6
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Value

The consequence is that a citizen who voted on time by the rules of their state does not have the vote counted. That is the right to vote itself, at the constitutional core of the scale. It falls unevenly: in California the youngest mail voters had late ballots several times as often as voters over 65, and people who had not voted in the previous election more often than regular voters [9]. Rural voters and voters on reservations, whose mail travels further, are named as the most exposed [3][6]. Military and overseas voters, for whom lateness is the main reason ballots are rejected, are exempt from the bill [1][6]. The value is at the constitutional core because what is lost is a ballot that was cast in time.

Impact

Without the measure, sixteen jurisdictions count ballots postmarked by Election Day that arrive afterwards [5]. In 2024 more than 745,000 such ballots arrived in eleven of them, up to about three percent of all votes in Washington and 2.3 percent in California [3][4], and one report puts Washington's count alone at more than 250,000 [18]; 800,000 is used for a presidential general election, in a range from 745,000 to one million. A midterm draws 71 percent of that turnout, 112 million against 158 million ballots [11][12], and a primary is set at 35 percent of a general election, in a range from 20 to 90 percent, because Ohio saw more than 7,000 late ballots in its 2024 primary and about 7,600 in the general [7][8]. With a receipt deadline most of these voters mail earlier or use a drop box. The share that does not adapt comes from two state changes: in Ohio's first election without its grace period, the May 2026 primary, 1,564 ballots arrived too late, about a fifth of the earlier late count [8]; California, moving the other way in 2015, saw late rejections fall from 0.45 to 0.21 percent of mail ballots, which against today's late share of about 3.4 percent is about seven percent of late arrivals [9]. The shares used are 22 percent at the first election (the 2028 primaries), 12 percent at the second and 7 percent in 2030, giving 61,600, 96,000, 13,900 and 39,800 lost votes. That is 211,000 over four years or about 52,800 a year, in a range from 34,000 to 115,000. Each is valued at 1,160 dollars, the figure this site uses for a vote at a national election, which gives 61.2 million dollars a year. The Impact is the largest in this evaluation because a small share of a large group of late mailers fails to adjust at each election.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
Ballots arriving after Election Day in a presidential general election Setting, range 745,000 to 1 million for all sixteen [3][4][18] more than 745,000 in eleven of sixteen jurisdictions in 2024 800,000 ballots
× Lost at the 2028 primaries Setting: primaries at 0.35 of a general election, range 0.2 to 0.9 (Ohio); first election without a grace period 0.22 not adapting, range 0.10 to 0.40 (Ohio 2026: 1,564 against more than 7,000) [7][8] × 0.35 × 0.22 61,600 votes
+ Lost at the 2028 general election Setting, range 0.05 to 0.25: second election under the rule 800,000 × 0.12 96,000 votes
+ Lost at the 2030 primaries midterm turnout 112 against 158 million ballots; 0.07 not adapting once voters have adjusted, range 0.02 to 0.15 (California 2015) [9][11][12] 800,000 × 0.71 × 0.35 × 0.07 13,916 votes
+ Lost at the 2030 general election same shares as the 2030 primaries 800,000 × 0.71 × 0.07 39,760 votes
= Lost votes over the four years 211,276 votes
÷ Per year 4 years 52,819 votes a year
× Value of a vote the value of a vote at a national election used across this site 1,000 euro each 52.82 million euro a year
÷ Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation; range 0.034 to 0.115 1 billion euro a point 0.05
Score 0.05 Impact × 9 Value × 6 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.3 of 100

Plausibility

The counterfactual is the same voters under today's grace periods. That a ballot arriving after the deadline is not counted is the text of the bill [1]; what is uncertain is how many voters fail to adjust, and that rests on a mechanistic chain whose carrying share no study has identified. The supporting cases are two before-and-after comparisons without a control group, Ohio in 2026 and California around 2015, and a cross-state comparison in which states with and without grace periods rejected similar shares of ballots for lateness in 2024, 0.21 against 0.23 percent [6][8][9]. The confounder is the postal service: delivery slowed in 2025 and 2026, and late rejections rose by about one percentage point in areas covered by its network redesign [10][16]; that pushes the loss up and is carried in the range rather than here. The cross-state comparison points the other way, toward nearly complete adaptation in the long run, and sets the low end of the 2030 share. Reverse causation does not arise, because the deadline is set by law. The Plausibility is just above the middle: the direction is certain and was observed in a state that made the same change, while the share that fails to adapt is transferred from two states.

Evidence: Multiple precedents · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6

States lose the choice

0.09points

Sixteen legislatures, from Mississippi, Texas and West Virginia to California and New York, have chosen to count ballots mailed in time. The Supreme Court held in June 2026 that federal law leaves that choice to them. The bill would take it away for federal races, which the Constitution allows Congress to do.

Value 6 · State discretionImpact 0.03Plausibility 5
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Value

The stream is the ability of a state's own legislature to set the rules of its elections, a choice the Supreme Court found that current federal law leaves to the states [3]. That is a structural good of a federal system: states differ in distances and postal service, and a rule tried in one can be judged by the others. It is valued at the level of how well the system works rather than at the constitutional core, because the Constitution itself gives Congress the last word on the time and manner of federal elections. The states keep their rules for their own contests [1]. The value is in the middle of the scale because what is lost is a choice, not a right.

Impact

Without the measure, sixteen jurisdictions keep the grace periods their legislatures enacted, from one day in Texas to about three weeks in Washington [5]. With it, the choice is made once for all federal races. About 43 percent of 2024 voters, some 68 million of 158 million, live in these jurisdictions [4][11]. Fifty-eight cents per voter and year is used, in a range from 12 cents to 2.32 dollars, the figure this site uses where a federal rule applies in states whose legislatures decided otherwise. It is applied here per voter rather than per resident, which roughly halves it, because the Constitution expressly lets Congress alter these rules and the states keep the choice for their own contests [1]. That gives 39 million dollars a year. The Impact is about two thirds of the votes lost, which is what a small per-person figure does to a large population.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
158 million voters
People who voted in 2024
× × 0.43
67.94 million voters
Living in the sixteen grace-period jurisdictions
[4]
× × 0.50 euro Setting, range 0.10 to 2 euro: the figure used where a federal rule overrides a state legislature, applied per voter because Congress holds the last word over federal elections
33.97 million euro a year
Value of the state's choice per voter and year
÷ 1 billion euro a point scale of this evaluation; range 0.0068 to 0.136
0.03
Normalised Impact
Score 0.03 Impact × 6 Value × 5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.1 of 100

Plausibility

The override is certain: it is the text of the bill [1]. The counterfactual is the sixteen jurisdictions as they are. What is a convention rather than a measurement is the price of a state's choice, which this site sets by analogy from its figure for a set-aside popular vote and uses in the same form across its federal-preemption topics. The confounder is that the choice is not stable: four states ended their grace periods in 2025, so part of what is overridden might have changed anyway [4]. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is at the middle: the override is certain and the price put on it is a setting.

Evidence: Plausibility · plausibility at most 5

Earlier mailing and extra trips

0.0021points

Most voters who now mail on or just before Election Day would adjust: they mail several days earlier, or take the ballot to a drop box or an election office. For many that only means a different day, for some an extra trip. About 409,000 voters a year adapt, and the time they spend is small next to the votes lost.

Value 9 · LifetimeImpact 0.00042Plausibility 5.5
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Value

The stream is time that voters spend because the rule requires it rather than because they chose to. Such time is valued as part of a person's lived day, one step below life and health on the scale, and an hour imposed by a rule counts in full, unlike an hour of freely chosen travel. It is not the vote itself, which the argument on lost votes covers for those who do not make the deadline. Mailing earlier also means deciding earlier, with less of the campaign's final information, which is not valued here. The value is high per hour, and the Impact is what keeps this argument small.

Impact

Without the measure, a voter in one of the sixteen jurisdictions can drop a ballot in any mailbox on Election Day. With it, the same voter must mail about a week earlier, as the postal service advises, or deliver the ballot in person [6][10]. Of the 1.85 million late mailers expected across the four elections, about 1.64 million adapt, the complement of those who lose their vote in the argument on lost votes [4][8][9]; that is 409,000 a year. Most of them simply mail earlier at no cost; 30 percent are assumed to make an extra trip to a drop box, a post office counter or an election office, in a range from 10 to 60 percent, of half an hour each, in a range from a quarter of an hour to an hour. That gives 61,300 hours a year, valued at 7.95 dollars an hour, the rate this site uses for time a rule imposes, or 0.49 million dollars a year. The Impact is tiny because most voters can adjust by changing the day they mail rather than the effort.

▸ Show calculation ▾ Hide calculation
1,635,524 voters
Late mailers who adapt over the four years
÷ 4 years
408,881 voters a year
Per year
× × 0.3 Setting, range 0.1 to 0.6: most simply mail earlier
122,664 voters a year
Share making an extra trip
[7]
× × 0.5 hours Setting, range 0.25 to 1 hour
61,332 hours a year
Time per trip
× × 6.85 euro an hour the rate this site uses for an hour a rule imposes
0.42 million euro a year
Value of imposed time
÷ 1 billion euro a point scale of this evaluation; range 0.00013 to 0.00135
0
Normalised Impact
Score 0 Impact × 9 Value × 5.5 Plausibility ÷ 10 = 0.0 of 100

Plausibility

The counterfactual is the same voters under today's grace periods. That voters who mail late must act earlier follows from the deadline; how many make an extra trip rather than just mailing on another day has not been measured, and the half hour is a setting. The chain is short and has no counter-mechanism, since a voter who neither adapts nor makes a trip is counted in the argument on lost votes, not here. Ohio's return rate in its first primary without a grace period, 90 percent against 91.5 percent in 2022, shows that voters adapted rather than gave up [7]. The confounder is the shift to drop boxes for other reasons, which the setting does not separate. Reverse causation does not arise. The Plausibility is just above the middle: the effort is certain to arise, and its size rests on settings.

Evidence: Mechanism · plausibility at most 6 Evidence of effect: Mechanistic · at most 6

How robust the result is

Under the assumptions used, the proposal brings more than it costs in 3 of 100 model runs.

gains more than it costscosts more than it gains

Each dot stands for 200 of the 20,000 model runs.

One vote at a national election is valued at 1,160 dollars, the figure used across democracy topics on this site, and a ballot lost and a ballot invalidly cast are weighed alike. The four-year horizon matters as well: it covers the first elections under the rule, when most of the loss falls, so a longer horizon would lower the yearly loss toward the level at which voters have fully adjusted.

The verdict does not depend on how incomes are weighted: if a euro at a low income counted somewhat less or somewhat more than assumed, it would stay “Very likely worse”. How incomes are weighted

Show the distribution of the model runs

20,000 simulated futures

Very likely worse · 3 %

In 3 of 100 simulated futures the proposal brings more than it costs.

No effect is known exactly; every argument has a range. The calculation draws a possible size for each argument from its range 20,000 times and counts how often the benefits exceed the costs.

Net effect in points per future. Left of zero the drawbacks outweigh the benefits, right of zero the benefits win. Eight in ten futures fall between −0.6 and −0.1 points.
Scale and assessment

Scale of this evaluation: Normalised Impact — unitless, calibrated to this topic. For comparison: one point here is worth roughly 1 billion euro per year.

Size class:very small

Effect small (−0.35) · 10 % of the effect is positive

Areas show individual argument weights. The positive share of the effect nets out money transfers between the two sides; the probability of a positive net effect is determined separately.

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Review and sources

AI evaluation · not yet approved by a human

This evaluation was produced, sourced and reviewed by an AI model; approval by a human is still pending. Figures and conclusions may still change. The review log is at the foot of the page. How review works →

Last reviewed by Claude Opus 5.5 · November 10, 2026 · 4 reviews since 11/2026 · 3 corrections · not yet approved by a human
  1. November 10, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5revised

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  2. November 9, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5revised

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  3. November 1, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5revised

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  4. November 1, 2026AI reviewClaude Opus 5.5First evaluation

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Show all 18 sourcesHide sources
  1. U.S. Government Publishing Office: H.R. 10276, Ballots by Election Day Act (introduced 3 September 2026). govinfo.gov
  2. U.S. Government Publishing Office: S. 5355, Ballots by Election Day Act (introduced 6 August 2026). govinfo.gov
  3. Votebeat: Supreme Court allows states to accept mail ballots that arrive after Election Day (29 June 2026). votebeat.org
  4. Votebeat: How many mail ballots could be rejected under postmark changes and the Supreme Court case? (11 February 2026). votebeat.org
  5. National Conference of State Legislatures: Table 11: Receipt and postmark deadlines for absentee/mail ballots. ncsl.org
  6. Bipartisan Policy Center: What could the Supreme Court's decision in Watson v. RNC mean for mail voting?. bipartisanpolicy.org
  7. Signal Ohio: Ohio absentee ballot returns steady after deadline change (12 May 2026). signalohio.org
  8. WYSO / Ideastream Public Media: More than 1,500 mail-in ballots tossed in first election since elimination of grace period (4 June 2026). wyso.org
  9. Public Policy Institute of California: Understanding increases in late vote-by-mail ballots in California (September 2026). ppic.org
  10. Brookings Institution: Postal network redesign and mail ballot rejections in the 2026 primaries (23 September 2026). brookings.edu
  11. U.S. Election Assistance Commission: Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024. eac.gov
  12. U.S. Election Assistance Commission: Election Administration and Voting Survey 2022. eac.gov
  13. The Federalist: Poll: 83% of voters want ballots received by Election Day (Honest Elections Project survey, March 2026). thefederalist.com
  14. Pew Research Center: How U.S. voters view mail and absentee balloting (20 October 2026). pewresearch.org
  15. FOX5 Las Vegas: Nevada mail ballots can be counted 3 days after election, court rules (28 October 2024). fox5vegas.com
  16. Election Law Blog: More mail ballots are arriving late this cycle, and they're getting tossed (31 August 2026). electionlawblog.org
  17. The Federalist: Bill aims to require mail-in ballots arrive by Election Day (4 September 2026). thefederalist.com
  18. NPR: The Supreme Court will hear a challenge to grace periods for mail ballot returns (11 November 2025). npr.org

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